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1. The disunified sciences of economics and psychology 
 
1. Understanding the relation between economics and psychology   
The two-fold aim of this thesis is to understand Daniel Kahneman and Amos 
Tversky’s research, and to understand how this research has altered economics in 
fundamental ways. Thus, this thesis is an exercise in postwar history of the relation 
between economics and psychology. The difficulty with this exercise, however, is that 
it is both unavoidable and deeply problematic. To regard the history of Kahneman and 
Tversky’s work as an interaction between the scientific fields of economics and 
psychology is unavoidable because that is the language in which economists have 
described and understood it.1 More generally, the division between the different 
disciplines is so deeply ingrained in twentieth-century Western social science – 
institutionally, conceptually, rhetorically, financially and so on – that it is virtually 
impossible to bypass. A historical analysis pertaining to the relation between 
psychology and economics in the twentieth century has in one way or another to use 
or deal with this division.  
 Yet, the distinction is problematic. A first problem is that the labels 
‘psychology,’ ‘economics,’ ‘psychologist,’ and ‘economist,’ are not stable entities in 
postwar science. For instance, judged by received training, non-economists who have 
won the Nobel memorial prize in economics include Kahneman, Herbert Simon, and a 
whole range of physicists and engineers, including in-between cases such as Vernon 
Smith, who received a BA in electrical engineering and a MA and PhD in economics. 
Or consider Colin Camerer, currently one of the leading behavioral economists who 
holds a PhD in behavioral decision research. Moreover, the same is true for 
psychology. Foremost postwar mathematical psychologists such as R. Duncan Luce, 
Patrick Suppes and David Krantz, for instance, received degrees in engineering or 
mathematics before migrating to psychology.  
 In addition, these postwar scientists were labeled economist or psychologist 
flexibly and depending on the occasion. Depending on the situation, Simon called 
himself a political scientist, economist, psychologist and mathematician. 
Mathematician Leonard Savage has been claimed to be an important economist by 
economists and an important psychologist by psychologists. Even on the level of 
                                                
1 I refer to ‘Kahneman and Tversky’ throughout this dissertation. The order of their names bears no 
significance. 
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individual publications the standard divisions are problematic. Von Neumann and 
Morgenstern’s Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (1944) has been described 
as a major contribution to their field by economists, psychologists, biologists, and 
mathematicians. Mathematical psychologists Krantz, Luce, Tversky, and Suppes 
conceived their three-volume Foundations of Measurement (1971, 1989, 1991) to 
extend the work of economist Gérard Debreu. However, at the same time they 
described it as a contribution to the empirical sciences in general, that is physics, 
economics, psychology and others, and thus as a contribution to the “methodology” of 
science. Hence, although it has been fundamentally ingrained in postwar science, the 
distinction between the different disciplines that scientists have employed has been 
anything but stable or clearly defined.        
 There is a second reason for the problematic nature of the division between 
psychology and economics. If there is one constant in postwar Western economics 
and psychology it has been the attempt to cross the alleged boundary between the two 
disciplines and to make this boundary disappear. Letters and minutes in Luce’s 
archive in Harvard University show that ever since the Ogburn Report was initiated 
by President Herbert Hoover in 1929, the attempt to unify the behavioral and social 
sciences has been a constant theme in the National Science Foundation’s (NSF) 
recurring reports from committees on Basic Research in the Behavioral and Social 
Sciences.2 In the late 1950s Ward Edwards created behavioral decision research 
(BDR), a new field in psychology that applied economic theories to psychological 
problems. Three decades later Kahneman and Tversky introduced an adjusted 
Edwards program back into economics. Simon for the better part of his career tried to 
use the insights he gained originally in political science to alter economic theorizing, 
which led him to produce a new theory in psychology. Vernon Smith developed his 
new experimental methods for economists in the 1950s in collaboration with 
psychologist Sidney Siegel, effectively applying a psychological method to economic 
questions. Fifty years later he defended his program as good economics against 
increasing criticism from behavioral economists by claiming heritage to the work of 
                                                
2 In 1929, President Hoover commissioned a committee of social scientists to report on trends in the 
social and behavioral sciences, an effort to augment the knowledge base for his social policy. Recent 
Social Trends in the United States was published in 1933 and regularly updated during the following 
decades [Smelser (1986), p.21]. In the 1984 edition, the members of the committee, senior historians, 
sociologists, economists, and psychologists, discussed how the integration of the different social and 
behavioral sciences could be institutionalized, given that in practice they were already closely related 
and largely overlapped [Based on minutes, letters and reports in Luce’s archive at Harvard University]. 
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political scientist and psychologist Simon. The 1952 Santa Monica conference 
organized by mathematician Robert Thrall and psychologist Clyde Coombs is often 
cited as a major event in the history of game theory in economics, in the history of 
mathematical psychology, and in the history of experimental economics. As much as 
the division into different disciplines has been part of postwar science, so has the 
crossing and dissolving of the boundary been a constant.      
 A third and more subtle problem is that in the postwar period economists and 
psychologists have understood themselves, each other, and the boundary separating 
them in different ways. By and large, economists have understood economics to be a 
positive science refraining from normative claims, leaving those to the policy makers. 
With respect to psychology, postwar economists when pressed have made a 
distinction between psychological assumptions and the scientific field of psychology. 
The received view was that economists made psychological assumptions to build their 
theories and models on. However, that did not mean that economics and psychology 
were part of the same scientific discipline. Psychology, in this view, was a science of 
human behavior independent of economics, although it could always be used as 
source to improve the psychological assumptions made by economists. For 
economists, the economics-psychological border lay somewhere in between the 
scientific field of psychology and the psychological assumptions made by economists.  
 Psychologists for their part understood psychology as a science of human 
behavior in which the label psychology was used as a broad concept covering a range 
of sometimes very different ways of understanding different parts of human behavior. 
Psychology was understood by psychologists as being basically a descriptive and 
explanatory science, but the normative or prescriptive aspect of it was never far away. 
In fields such as psychotherapy, organizational psychology, and behavioral decision 
research the descriptive and the normative parts were kept separate, but there was 
always a clear and direct link between the two. The psychologists who were 
concerned with economics understood economics as a sub-discipline of psychology. 
Psychology in their understanding referred to the total of all different forms of 
investigation into individual human behavior, whereas economics referred to the sub-
field that investigates a single part of human behavior, namely economic behavior. 
Moreover, economics was understood by psychologists as a scientific field which 
focused on the normative aspects of economic behavior. Because psychologists 
considered both the descriptive and the normative to be legitimate parts of science, 
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this exclusive focus of economists on the normative theory was in itself not 
problematic. But what it did imply was that from the psychologists’ perspective 
economists focused only on one aspect of their scientific project. Hence, for 
psychologists the border between economics and psychology lay somewhere between 
the normative theories of economic behavior and the remainder of the psychological 
investigation of human behavior.    
 A further difference between economics and psychology in their perception of 
themselves, each other and the border between them was the status of the question 
how the two were related. For economists living in the twentieth century the relation 
between economics and psychology was something that was always in the back of 
their minds. It was always an issue that had to be dealt with, one that could never be 
dealt with satisfactorily and hence a question that would always reappear. Sometimes 
an economist would take a particularly clear and authoritative stance in this regard 
which made the issue disappear for a time. But it was always there and it always 
returned. For psychologists, on the other hand, the relative understanding of both 
disciplines was self-evident and rarely discussed. One of the surprises for the historian 
of economics who dives into the history of psychology is the absence of the question 
regarding how psychology is related to economics. It is not that the question simply is 
ignored, for psychologists do ask themselves from time to time how their discipline 
relates to economics, sociology, political science and other sciences. But in contrast to 
the relation with sociology, the relation between economics and psychology has 
always been clear to psychologists.3 At the end of the twentieth and beginning of the 
twenty-first century, and after thirty years of active use of psychology by economists, 
psychologists could complain that although “economists are now becoming more 
psychologically receptive, it is unfortunately less apparent that psychology is 
becoming more economically receptive” [Murnighan and Ross (1999), p.7], and that 
“[u]ntil recently, economists were more active in using and referring to social 
psychology than social psychologists were in using economics” [De Cremer, 
Zeelenberg, and Murnighan (2006), p.7]. The relation between the fields of economics 
and psychology, in other words, has been very much a concern of the economists.  
                                                
3 It is true that many psychologists from the late nineteenth century onwards challenged psychology’s 
hedonistic/utilitarian basis [Lewin (1996), pp.1299-1300], which served as a departure point for 
economics also. But this discontent was directed at philosophy, not economics. 
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 For the historian writing about the postwar history of economics and 
psychology, the last point is particularly problematic because it renders the existing 
literature on the relation between economics and psychology in the two disciplines 
problematic as a basis on which to conduct further research. The accounts of both 
practicing scientists and historians in each of the disciplines of the relation between 
the two disciplines are largely incompatible. References to and accounts of Louis 
Leon Thurstone’s work are illustrative in this regard. In postwar economics Thurstone 
(1931), “The Indifference Function” has been a constant reference for economists and 
historians of economics discussing the relation between economics and psychology. 
In these accounts Thurstone was the first to experimentally test economic demand 
theory. His experiments were initially set aside as irrelevant by most economists and 
followed by only a few [Moscati (2007)]. With the emergence of psychological 
experimentation in economics in the final quarter of the twentieth century, however, 
Thurstone was rediscovered and became regarded as an important precursor to 
contemporary research. Thus, Thurstone (1931) plays a significant role in economists’ 
thinking about the relation between psychology and economics: in the early postwar 
years it was dismissed as of possible use in economics, and in the last few decades it 
was an important precursor for ways in which psychology could inform and improve 
economics’ psychological assumptions.  
 Although Thurstone (1931) plays a role in economics and in histories of 
economics, Thurstone is not considered a major figure by economists. In psychology, 
however, Thurstone is seen as a key figure. Thurstone greatly improved measurement 
methods for social psychological research, thus ensuring the scientific status of social 
psychology. Applying his own measurement theory, Thurstone furthermore initiated a 
program of attitude measurement that became a cornerstone of modern psychology. 
Moreover, in the process he played a key role in uniting the fiercely opposed 
experimental and correlational (or Pearsonian) psychology. But in all this recognized 
importance of Thurstone’s work and the accompanying discussion of his major works, 
Thurstone (1931) is completely absent. Thurstone’s one-shot attempt to use the social 
psychological method to test economists’ demand theory does not play any role in 
psychology, either in the past or in the present. Thus, whereas Thurstone seems to 
economists, both practitioners and historians, as an illustration of the relation between 
twentieth century economics and psychology in fact this only illuminates how 
economists and their historians have conceived of the relation between economics and 
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psychology. On the other hand, psychologists and their historians who consider 
economics to be a subfield of psychology view Thurstone as a major figure, but not 
with regard to the question of how economics and psychology are related to one 
another.   
 The unavoidable but problematic division of parts of postwar science into 
psychology and economics and especially the very different understanding of 
themselves, the other, and the border between them presents a dilemma for the 
historian who wants to do justice and to draw on both sides to provide a coherent 
understanding of a particular episode in the relation between the two. To understand 
why a particular branch of psychology could come to influence economics from the 
early 1980s onwards, and especially to understand in what way the experimental 
results and theories of this psychology were adopted and adapted to the economic 
framework, we need to understand the history of economics and psychology 
independently of one another. That is, we need to dive into the history of economics 
independently of how psychology thought and thinks of economics, and in particular, 
we need to draw out some of the threads in the history of psychology independently of 
how economists conceived and conceive of this history. We need to understand what 
was important in economics according to economists, and what was important in 
psychology according to psychologists. But at the same time we need to set out a 
story that will show us how the two scientific disciplines understood each other, and 
how they came to interact. We do not want two independent histories of psychology 
and economics, but two historical accounts that can be related. This boils down to the 
historiographical question of how to understand different, but related disciplines. 
 
2. The disunity of science  
Galison and Stump (1996) and Galison (1999) use the notion of the disunity of 
science to capture the idea that sciences and scientific practices may be separate and 
different, but at the same time be communicating and mutually influence each other. 
Galison applies disunity to the case of twentieth century physics in which he 
distinguishes three subcultures: theorizing, experimenting and instrument making: 
“[d]ifferent finite traditions of theorizing, experimenting, instrument making, and 
engineering, meet – sometimes even transform one another – but for all that they do 
not lose their separate identities and practices” [Galison (1999), p.137]. He makes two 
central points. First, contrary to the logical positivist tradition in science, there is not 
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one unified basis upon which different scientific subcultures are conducted. 
“Experimentalists – and one could make a similar statement about theorists and 
instrumentalists – do not march in lockstep with theory. For example, the practice of 
experimental physics in the quantum mechanical revolution of 1926-27 was not 
violently dislocated despite the startling realignment of theory” [Galison (1999), 
p.143]. Second, contrary to the anti-positivist tradition in the history and philosophy 
of science, neither are different sciences and scientific practices entirely unrelated 
[Galison (1999), p.143].  
 Galison makes a comparison with the interactions of geographically scattered 
cultures that are studied by the anthropologist and introduces the concept of the 
trading zone. Different (sub-)cultures influence each other, for instance in their 
language and cultural habits. They trade with one another and goods travel from one 
culture to the next. But despite all their trading and mutual influencing, they remain 
different cultures nevertheless. Moreover, it is not necessarily true that because of the 
frequent cultural exchanges and trade, the different cultures are brought closer to one 
another over time. A cultural habit that travels from one culture to the next may 
acquire an entirely different meaning. Traded goods may be used for an entirely 
different purpose in the culture that they end up in compared to the culture in which 
they originated. 
 Consider the following example (this example is derived from Taussig (1980), 
and is used by Galison (1999)). In the Cauco Valley in Columbia, two groups of 
people live among each other each with their own culture. One culture consists of 
black peasants, descendants from slaves, running shops or working on the vast 
sugarcane farms. The peasants maintain a culture with magical cycles, sorcery and 
curing. The other culture is that of the rich, white landowners. The cultures exist 
alongside each other and frequently interact, for instance when a member of the 
landowner culture exchanges money for some eggs with a member of the peasant 
culture. The two cultures are, in other words, perfectly able to communicate with one 
another in specific contexts and can even be said to depend upon each other for their 
survival. However, the understanding of the exchange of money for eggs may be 
entirely different for the members of the two cultures. For a member of the landowner 
class, money is a neutral means of exchange that can accumulate into capital. For a 
member of the peasant culture the bank note possesses animistic and moral properties. 
In the most telling instantiation of this aspect of peasant culture, the godparent-to-be 
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hides a peso in his hand when a newborn is baptized by the Catholic priest. By doing 
so, also the peso bill is baptized and obtains the child’s name, and the godparent-to-be 
also becomes the godparent of the peso bill. When this peso bill is put into circulation 
it will always come back to its owner when it is silently called upon three times. As a 
result, the members of the two cultures may be comfortable exchanging eggs for 
money with one another, but in a broader sense they interpret this transaction in a 
completely different way. For the landowner it is a neutral exchange of money for 
eggs, whereas for the peasant it signifies the return of the baptized peso bill to its 
owner. 
 Galison urges us to think of exchanges between different scientific (sub-) 
cultures in a similar fashion. At some level the different cultures may devise a context 
or set of rules within which they can exchange ideas, experimental results and 
instruments. Each is fluent in the exchange process in the sense that a member of the 
other culture will behave exactly as anticipated. But in a broader cultural context, the 
members of the different cultures will interpret the exchange in a completely different 
manner. ”[T]he trading partners can hammer out a local coordination despite vast 
global differences” [Galison (1999), p.138]. The two cultures may entirely disagree 
about the implications of the information exchanged or its epistemic status. But at the 
same time “there is a context within which there is a great deal of consensus” [Galison 
(1999), p.146]. Depending on the topic to which we apply this anthropological 
analogy, we could also think of this context as a pidgin language. The different 
cultures devise a language that allows for a smooth exchange between the two 
cultures, but through back-and-forth trial and error and compromising devise a 
language that will never be able to satisfactorily capture each culture individually.  
 I apply Galison’s approach to the case of economics and psychology. 
Economics and psychology are disunified cultures. They exist alongside each other 
and exchange results, instruments and ideas. They find it relatively easy to talk to one 
another, especially those representatives of the two cultures who operate in each 
other’s vicinity. Indeed, one might say that for those scientists that operate close to the 
boundary on each side, the boundary seems more of a gradual continuum than a sharp 
line drawn in the sand. Both are also affected by the same challenges of the larger 
world and may at times come up with responses and adjustments that are very much 
alike. Yet despite all this exchanging and sharing of results, instruments and ideas, i.e. 
despite all their local coordination, they remain two clearly distinguished and 
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distinguishable sciences. Economists and psychologists have a lot in common, and yet 
are very different. They encounter each other frequently, they draw partly on the same 
authoritative sources, they inspire and influence each other, and psychologists have 
won the Nobel memorial prize in economics twice. At the same time, however, it is 
clear to both psychologists and economists that the two have been different in the 
past, that they are different at present, and that they will be distinguishable academic 
disciplines in the foreseeable future.  
 The disunity approach neatly captures how economists and psychologists talk 
about their relationship. Murnighan and Ross (1999), for instance, argue that although 
closely related, there will always be an “(invisible) dividing line between 
microeconomics and social psychology” [Murnighan and Ross (1999), p.2] because 
“the two fields promote different kinds of thinking and different philosophies, and 
these differences make it difficult for people in the two disciplines to collaborate, 
much less appreciate each other’s work” [Murnighan and Ross (1999), p.6]. The 
difference is that “[t]he objective of much of social psychology is to better understand 
how individuals make decisions in social situations. [..] Economics, on the other hand, 
is ultimately about explaining aggregates like market prices and quantities, incomes, 
employment and market efficiency” [Murnighan and Ross (1999), p.3]. Another good 
example is how one of these psychologists, Keith Murnighan, and an economist, 
Alvin Roth, recall the beginning of their rare thirty-years psychology-economics 
collaboration:   
 
In essence, I did not speak economics and Al [Roth] did not speak psychology. 
(It is still not clear whether either of us has really picked up the other 
language, but at least we now think that we understand each other.) We had to 
work our way through a lengthy process to determine how we could express 
what we wanted to say about our joint work without offending each other or 
insulting each other’s fields in the process. [Murnigham and Roth (2006), pp. 
322-323] 
 
Murnigham and Roth, in other words, had to invent a pidgin language in order to be 
able to communicate. But that does not mean that they now, after thirty years of 
collaboration, understand the other’s native language. 
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 The anthropological analogy also captures the idea that the different cultures 
may not be equally happy with the existing form of their interaction. In the interaction 
between economists and psychologists in the late twentieth and early twenty-first 
century it was the psychologists who sometimes felt abused in the exchange relation. 
A good example can be found in Lunt (1996). Lunt first of all notes that although 
economics and psychology may be investigating the same phenomena and relying on 
the same methods, “the way that social psychology approaches the study of the agent 
is very different from that of economics” [Lunt (1996), p.280]. But Lunt takes it a step 
further. It is not only that the two approach the agent in a different way, the exchange 
between economists and psychologists on this topic is also more favorable to 
economics, and in fact not at all to psychologists’ advantage. “[E]conomists work 
with simplified and anachronistic applications of psychological theory. We 
[psychologists] have to understand that psychology has become a resource for the 
economist, and [that] the motivation for integration is all on the side of psychology.” 
Furthermore, Lunt emphasizes that  
 
 [..] this is made particularly problematic by the kind of psychology utilized 
 within economic theory. In my view, economists are not ready, prepared or 
 even vaguely interested in changing their core assumptions as a response to 
 psychological work. Indeed, we should realize that if an economist sounds 
 interested in our work they are only trying us out to see what kind of resource
 we have to offer. The agenda for their interest will be some debate in 
 economics that we won’t have even heard of. [Lunt (1996), p.283] 
 
The different parties to the cultural exchange understand the exchange and the object 
exchanged in a different way. But on top of this, they may not be equally happy with 
the exchange, so that some members of one of the cultures may start to argue that they 
are being exploited.  
  
3. Scope and limits of this thesis 
The first two chapters of this thesis in particular are focused on the context in which 
scientific developments have taken place, yet this thesis is primarily a history of ideas. 
In addition, although the greater part of the history described in this thesis took place 
on American soil or was otherwise strongly connected to the United States, it is not 
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exclusively an American history. First, because the scientific developments described 
are a continuation of earlier science that has its origins outside the United States, 
principally in Europe. Second, because the two main protagonists of the present 
history, Kahneman and Tversky, although substantially Americanized, conducted the 
research for which they became famous at Israeli universities. Finally, the focus in 
this thesis will be on the developments leading to behavioral economics and on the 
development of behavioral economics itself. But I will use experimental economics as 
well to portray the differences between them. 
 The remainder of this thesis has been organized as follows. The upcoming 
second chapter discusses the work of the mathematical psychologists and behavioral 
decision researchers. I place this work in the unique context of the social and 
psychological research at the University of Michigan in the 1950s and 1960s. 
Although much attention has been paid to the Institute of Social Research (ISR), 
mathematical psychology and behavioral decision research at the University of 
Michigan have not yet been thoroughly investigated. However, these research 
programs and their related institutes would foster a development in psychology that 
was not only influential in the psychological discipline, but that would also transform 
economics from the 1980s onward. These research programs contributed to the 
development of both experimental economics, which developed from the 1960s 
onwards, and to Kahneman and Tversky-inspired behavioral economics that 
developed from the early 1980s onwards.  
 In the 1950s and 1960s the University of Michigan was arguably the center of 
American psychology, hosting the Institute for Social Research (ISR), Coombs’ 
Michigan Mathematical Psychology Program, and Edwards’ Engineering Psychology 
Laboratory and its related field of behavioral decision research. The second chapter 
argues that the key to understanding mathematical psychology and behavioral 
decision research is to see that, although largely separated and focused on different 
questions, both presumed the same two-sided understanding of psychology. In order 
to measure, one needed a sound theory of the measurement instrument, which was the 
human decision maker. Psychology at the same time measured human decision 
behavior and investigated the human being as a scientific measurement instrument.  
 This double understanding of psychology as using a measurement instrument 
to investigate that same measurement instrument became problematic when it turned 
out that the measurement instrument did not behave as it should. That was the 
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problem Tversky struggled with. Tversky had to choose between declaring the 
experimental results invalid and saying that the received theory of the measurement 
instrument was incorrect. Kahneman came to the rescue by suggesting that the human 
decision maker systematically and predictably deviates from how it should behave. 
Thus, the experimental results could be accepted, while at the same time the axioms 
of the measurement theory could be maintained. It did, however, give psychology the 
new task of investigating how and when human decision makers deviate from how 
they should behave. That new task was the basis of Kahneman and Tversky’s 
collaborative research of the 1970s.    
 The third chapter, then, discusses the work Kahneman and Tversky did before 
their collaborative research. Tversky was educated at and received his PhD in the 
early 1960s from the University of Michigan under the supervision of Coombs and 
Edwards. Tversky’s research embodied the synthesis of mathematical psychology and 
behavioral decision research. Towards the late 1960s, however, Tversky increasingly 
struggled with the tension between Leonard Savage’s a priori axioms of decision 
theory and the behavioral deviations he observed in his experiments. Kahneman, for 
his part, came from a very different background. Strongly influenced by his 
experience as psychologist in the Israeli army, Kahneman’s different research 
interests focused on human’s cognitive mistakes. Kahneman showed that despite the 
fact that we think we do cognitively quite well in the course of our daily lives, in fact 
we constantly make systematic cognitive mistakes.   
 In 1969 Kahneman and Tversky started their long and fruitful collaboration. 
The most productive period was during the 1970s, which laid the foundation for their 
subsequent fame. The fourth chapter discusses Kahneman and Tversky’s research of 
the 1970s and shows how Kahneman’s psychology of cognitive mistakes provided a 
solution to Tversky’s struggle with the a priori axioms of Savage’s decision theory 
and experimental deviations from them. Kahneman and Tversky’s solution was to 
rigorously separate the normative from the descriptive. This allowed them to maintain 
Savage’s a priori axioms as the normative rules of decision making, while at the same 
time acknowledging the experimental results as proof that actual human decision 
making deviates systematically from these norms. In 1979 Kahneman and Tversky’s 
research culminated in prospect theory, a theory which describes actual human 
decision behavior as a systematic deviation from the normative rules. Using prospect 
theory, Kahneman and Tversky deliberately broadened their scope to economics. 
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They considered prospect theory applicable to both economists’ and psychologists’ 
use of expected utility theory. The paper was published in Econometrica and argued 
that cognitive psychology and economic were unified in one field of behavioral 
science.  
 Chapter five investigates how economists responded to Kahneman and 
Tversky’s understanding of experimental violations of expected utility theory and 
their descriptive alternative, prospect theory. It argues that there were two main 
responses, each with their own history. Experimental economists such as Vernon 
Smith corroborated and accepted the experimental results, but rejected all expected 
utility theories as a solution, including prospect theory. In addition, experimental 
economists inferred that the experimental deviations further emphasized the 
importance of the market as the mechanism that over time drives the economy to a 
rational equilibrium. Financial economists, such as Richard Thaler, also accepted the 
experimental results, but instead they took it as proof of the observed irrationalities in 
financial markets. In addition, financial economists hailed Kahneman and Tversky 
and prospect theory as being the most important, if not the only claimant to a solution 
to the problem. The use of prospect theory in financial economics led to the new field 
of behavioral finance. The reason for prospect theory’s swift success was that it 
offered financial economists an elegant way out of the problems. The normative – 
descriptive distinction ensured that traditional, neoclassical models could be 
maintained as the normative theory, while at the same time it offered a descriptive 
alternative that was only slightly different from previously-used theories and hence 
easy to learn by economists.  
 In the late 1980s and early 1990s Thaler also started applying the behavioral 
finance approach to problems outside the field of financial economics. The new field 
grew quickly and in 1994 it was officially called behavioral economics. Once the 
traditional economic theories were saved in the normative realm and new theories 
could be developed under the rubric of descriptive theory, a surge of explorations 
ensued. The sixth chapter describes the history of behavioral economics in the 1990s 
and 2000s. Using the examples of intertemporal choice and emerging preferences it 
shows that behavioral economists explored many opportunities for constructing 
descriptive theories of economic behavior, but at the same time they always remained 
faithful to Kahneman and Tversky’s normative – descriptive distinction. Gradually the 
labels of normative and descriptive were replaced by full rationality and bounded 
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rationality, which in turn allowed the behavioral economists to develop their own 
view of economic policy advice under the label of paternalism.  
 These developments contributed to the gradual emergence of behavioral 
economics as a stable and clearly defined mainstream economic program. As a result, 
it also brought to the fore how behavioral economists saw their program as being 
different from other economic programs and disciplines. Behavioral economists began 
to distinguish their program, in particular with regard to psychology and experimental 
economics. This might seem slightly schizophrenic. Behavioral economists defined 
behavioral economics primarily by its incorporation of psychology into economics, 
but at the same time they sought to distinguish behavioral economics specifically as 
economics, and therefore as being different from psychology. Behavioral economists 
relied heavily on the use of experiments and claimed the intellectual heritage of 
Simon, but simultaneously they explicitly distinguished behavioral economics from 
that other economic program that used experiments and claimed Simon: experimental 
economics.  
 How then should we understand this apparent schizophrenia in contemporary 
behavioral economics? In the seventh chapter I argue that the history discussed in this 
thesis shows how economists have actively used psychology to redefine economics. 
The flow of theories, methods and experimental results from psychology to 
economics was not a neutral process that left these theories, methods and 
experimental results unaffected. Instead, they lost some of their psychological 
connotations and gained new economic connotations. What is particularly illustrative 
in this regard are the two cases of experimental and behavioral economics, which both 
added different new economic connotations to the theories, methods and experimental 
results drawn from psychology. Experimental and behavioral economists used the 
theories, methods and results from psychology to redefine economics in their own 
ways. Thus, as I argue in this final chapter, this thesis not only shows that the theories, 
methods and experimental results that travelled from psychology to economic have 
not been stable entities, but it also shows that the definition of economics has not been 
constant. Therefore, the history of economics and psychology can only be understood 
by recognizing economics and psychology as disunified cultures.  
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2. Measuring decisions and measurement as decision in postwar psychology 
 
1. Psychology and measurement in Michigan 
From the 1950s to the 1970s the University of Michigan was the center of American 
psychology. It grew from seven faculty members in the late 1940s to some 225 faculty 
members in the second half of the 1960s [Krantz – Interview (2008), see also e.g. 
Peckham (2005), pp.245-266, Frantilla (1998)], and hosted the Institute of Social 
Research (ISR), Clyde Coombs’ (1912 - 1988) Michigan Mathematical Psychology 
Program and Ward Edwards’ (1927 - 2005) Engineering Psychology Laboratory and 
behavioral decision research. Over the years the ISR has received much attention in 
the literature [e.g. House et al. (2004), Bulmer (2001), Hyman (1991), Hollinger 
(1989)], while the history of Coombs’ mathematical psychology and Edwards’ 
behavioral decision research has not been fully explored. For a history of Daniel 
Kahneman and Amos Tversky’s behavioral economics the important place to look 
might appear to be the ISR. Under the heading of the ISR, George Katona conducted 
his surveys on consumer confidence at the Survey Research Center (SRC), and even 
coined the label ‘behavioral economics’ to refer to this research. However, this 
chapter shows that the ISR is unimportant for the history of Kahneman and Tversky’s 
behavioral economics, and that instead it was mathematical psychology and 
behavioral decision research that constituted the starting point for their subsequent 
collaboration.  
 To understand this, first the historical and organizational characteristics of the 
University of Michigan and its department of psychology need to be defined in more 
detail. Subsequently, because of its remarkable absence in the history of Kahneman 
and Tversky’s behavioral economics, the ISR and its different centers need to be 
briefly discussed. After that, the third section deals with the relevant themes in 
mathematical psychology in the period roughly between 1950 and 1975. The fourth 
section describes the background and rise of behavioral decision research during the 
same period. Finally, the fifth section illustrates the close link between mathematical 
psychology, decision theory and behavioral decision research. 
 
2. Psychology at the University of Michigan and the Institute for Social Research 
David Krantz (1938- ) and Robyn Dawes (1936- ), two key actors in the Michigan 
Mathematical Psychology Program in the 1960s and 1970s, recall how the department 
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of psychology at the University of Michigan grew tremendously during the postwar 
years.4 In the immediate postwar years, before Coombs arrived in 1949, the 
department consisted of seven (voting) faculty members. As said, over the next two 
decades it expanded tremendously. Not all of these faculty members were full time 
employed by the department of psychology, although all could vote. By the late 1960s 
and 1970s the department of psychology employed roughly 60 full-time equivalents. 
Researchers had a part-time, or often even a zero-time contract with the department 
and held part time contracts with other institutions such as the ISR and the medical 
science departments. In fact, a considerable number of psychologists were working at 
the children’s hospital, in the mental health program or in other medical science 
departments of the University of Michigan [Krantz – interview (2008)]. Still other 
psychologists were partly or wholly financed by external funds or grants. Coombs and 
his Mathematical Psychology Program, for instance, were financed through a grant 
from the National Institute of General Medical Science [Dawes – interview (2008)]. 
However, these multiple affiliations should not be seen as the result of vying for 
research funds among the psychologists. In fact, just the opposite was the case: there 
was enough money for nearly everyone to pursue their own ideas and interests in a 
general atmosphere of “live and let live” [Krantz – interview (2008), Dawes – 
interview (2008)]. Moreover, although the employer undoubtedly to some extent 
constrained the research, it was generally a non-binding way. Dawes, for instance, 
was employed for a year by the ISR and had an office in their building, but conducted 
very little work for them and continued working with Coombs and the mathematical 
psychologists [Dawes – interview (2008)].  
 These characteristics are important because it meant that if some 
psychologists, or groups of psychologists did not want to meet each other or discuss 
the merits of each other’s work, they never had to because of the general availability 
of funds. It is in this light that the relationship between Coombs and Edwards should 
be seen. Both were strong, but very contrasting personalities who each had very 
different scientific programs, and the large number of people around and the general 
availability of funds ensured that they could conduct their own research programs 
without ever really having to confront one another. Furthermore, when two 
researchers with different backgrounds and research projects were interested in each 
                                                
4 Interview of the author with Krantz, Columbia University, New York, June 20, 2008. Interview of the 
author with Dawes, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, June 23, 2008.  
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other’s work, or interested in perhaps joining forces, there was little if any pressure to 
do so. Thus, Coombs and the other mathematical psychologists were aware that their 
work concerning the axioms of measurement was in one way or another related to the 
measurement methods used at the ISR, and vice versa the researchers at the ISR were 
equally aware of the work of Coombs and others [Krantz – interview (2008)]. But in 
day-to-day practice both groups simply pursued their own research agendas. 
 In the 1950s-1970s, the department of psychology was divided into ten fields 
of specialization: experimental, mathematical, physiological, personality, social, 
community, industrial organization, and the two largest, clinical and counseling 
psychology. Later, physiological psychology was relabeled biological psychology and 
mathematical psychology became part of experimental psychology, illustrating the 
close connection between both. But this classification was relatively loose and more a 
matter of classifying what people were doing than assigning them what to do. Coombs 
was only associated with mathematical psychology, but Edwards’ Engineering 
Psychology Laboratory was associated with both mathematical and experimental 
psychology. Tversky too was associated with both specializations. Krantz was related 
to experimental, mathematical, and physiological psychology and Dawes to 
mathematical and clinical psychology. Thus, the department of psychology had an 
organization, both in terms of where the money came from and in terms of fields of 
specialization [Krantz – interview (2008)]. But, as a result of the large number of 
faculty members and the availability of funds, the organization in the 1960s was not 
tightly knit, so that everyone could more or less do what he or she wanted to do 
[Krantz – interview (2008), Dawes – interview (2008)].  
 Related to, but organizationally distinguished from the department of 
psychology were the centers organized under the Institute for Social Research (ISR). 
The Survey Research Center (SRC) was established by psychologist George Katona 
in 1946, who pioneered a social survey research on consumer sentiment. To finance 
the war, the American government had issued a large number of war bonds and with 
the end of the war in sight it wanted to know how likely it was that American 
consumers would maintain or liquidate these bonds. Because Katona felt that he could 
not immediately ask people what they would do with their money, he proposed 
starting with some general questions that would comfort the respondents and would 
get him or her to start thinking about their own budgets and future prospects. In these 
consumer confidence surveys Katona was the first to use the term ‘behavioral 
  
 
18 
 
 
 
economics,’ as early as 1947 [Juster (2004), p.120]. Three years later, following the 
death of its founder Kurt Lewin (1890 - 1947) the Research Center for Group 
Dynamics (RCGD) was moved from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) 
to Michigan. The two groups remained separate but were brought together under the 
newly-created Institute for Social Research (ISR). Since 1949 the ISR has been joined 
by other centers, and new centers have been created within the body of the ISR, such 
as the Center for Political Studies (CPS) and the Population Studies Center (PSC). In 
the 1960s, the ISR for a while contained the Center for Research and the Utilization of 
Scientific Knowledge (CRUSK), which later dissolved and disappeared. The scientists 
staffing the different centers of the ISR were social scientists and a few statisticians. 
Many were sociologists or political scientists, but the majority in the 1950s-1970s 
were the psychologists [Krantz – interview (2008)].  
 In order to protect its general university funds, the University of Michigan 
insisted upon creating of the SRC in 1946 that it was to be funded entirely through 
grants and contracts; a policy that was also applied to the ISR when it was created in 
1949. This did not have any immediate financial implications as enough grants and 
contracts were available over the years. It did mean, however, that the ISR could not 
offer tenure to those it employed. There were always certain researchers who were the 
last to leave whenever funds ran out, but even these senior researchers and directors 
could never obtain tenure at the ISR [Krantz – interview (2008), Juster (2004), 
Hollinger (1989)]. 
 The ISR and its research are remarkably absent in the main story of this thesis. 
Because of Katona’s work on consumer confidence at the SCR and the term 
‘behavioral economics’ that he created, Coombs’ research and that of the 
mathematical psychologists is seemingly close to the psychological and social 
measurement of the ISR. One would imagine that there was some connection. 
Furthermore, Kahneman and Tversky’s work during the 1960s and 1970s on human 
beings’ perceptive and cognitive capacities, discussed in Chapters three and four, 
seems to be, at the very least, related to survey research on consumer confidence. In 
addition, one could point to the fact that Dawes was employed for a year by the ISR 
while working for Coombs’ Mathematical Program. However, until Kahneman made 
a connection between his and Tversky’s work and the economic and psychological 
survey work through his program of hedonistic psychology in the late 1990s, no link 
of any significance can be observed. The ISR and the research conducted at its centers 
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are noteworthy because of their complete absence in the history of mathematical 
psychology, behavioral decision research, Kahneman and Tversky’s collaboration and 
their behavioral economics.  
 The reason for this is that, although both the ISR and the mathematical 
psychologists and behavioral decision researchers were working on psychology and 
measurement, in fact the two groups conducted very different projects. The ISR 
worked on measuring actual social, psychological, and economic characteristics of the 
American population. In the social psychological tradition of Louis Leon Thurstone 
(1887 – 1955) and Kurt Lewin it measured the attitudes of the population to spending 
and saving, consumer confidence concerning the performance of the economy in the 
near future, and so on. Mathematical psychologists and behavioral decision 
researchers, on the other hand, investigated the underlying characteristics of the 
human being regarding decision making. In their research a measurement was 
understood to be a human decision between two stimuli, and was thus considered to 
be part of experimental psychology. In a general sense both groups were working in 
psychology and were concerned with measurement. But their actual research was only 
distantly related. Kahneman and Tversky’s research grew out of mathematical 
psychology and behavioral decision research. Therefore, the ISR is not relevant to 
understanding the rest of this story.   
 
3. Mathematical psychology 
The tradition of using mathematics in the study of psychological phenomena goes 
back to Gustav Fechner (1860) and is closely related to experimental psychology. 
Fechner’s psychophysics was a two-sided attempt to create a mathematical basis for a 
scientific field of psychology and to create a mathematical basis for (scientific) 
measurement. As measurement occurs through human observation, a theory of human 
observation is at the same time a theory of measurement, and a psychological theory 
of observation or perception [Heidelberger (1993, 2004), Daston and Galison (2007)]. 
As a basis for his psychophysics, Fechner posited the idea that the just noticeable 
difference (jnd) is constant across individuals. For instance, the smallest increment in 
the brightness of a light bulb glowing at a specific brightness, at a specific distance, in 
a specific environment, etc., Fechner supposed to be the same across individuals. 
However, jnd as a basis for psychophysics eventually fell victim to its own success in 
the 1920s after too many jnd’s had been reported and the idea of one constant jnd for 
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each stimulus across individuals could no longer be maintained [Gigerenzer (1987a), 
p.8].  
 Thurstone sought to save the psychophysical program in the 1930s by 
proposing frequency distributions instead of jnd’s as a basis [Thurstone (1927a,b,c)]. 
Thurstone assumed that if you give two different stimuli to the individual (say two 
lights of different brightness) a large number of times, the relative frequency with 
which the individual judges the one to be larger than the other will reflect which of 
the two was the brighter. Moreover, and very important, when the order of objective 
values of the stimuli was independent of which individual perceived it, it was equally 
valid to ask a large number of individuals, instead of one individual a great number of 
times. If you wanted to know which of the two light bulbs was the brighter you could 
ask any individual, but if you wanted to know whether a Ferrari or a Bugatti is the 
more beautiful car, this method would be invalid as the order would differ across 
individuals. What one could ask, however, was whether drivers of a Saab consider the 
Ferrari or the Bugatti more beautiful, or whether Americans with a yearly income of 
over $20,000 have positive or negative expectations of future economic growth, or 
whether Protestants consider Catholics or Muslims more benevolent. These 
measurements were possible when one assumed that there is one preference of the 
Saab driver for either Ferrari or Bugatti, one preference of the Protestant for Catholics 
or Muslims when it comes to benevolence, and so on.  
 Similar to Fechner, Thurstone’s theory was as much a psychological theory of 
human perception as it was a theory of scientific measurement. Thurstone developed 
his theory of measurement to facilitate his own research on attitude measurement. In 
1928, he published a small book in which he reported the results obtained from having 
conducted an extensive investigation on religious attitudes, investigating for instance 
whether the Protestant has an attitude to the relative importance of work and leisure 
that is different from the Catholic [Chave and Thurstone (1928)]. In a one-time 
attempt to extend this work to economic demand theory, after holding discussions 
with Chicago economic colleague and friend Henry Schultz, Thurstone sought to 
construct the attitudes of the individual to different combinations of hats, shoes, and 
overcoats. The article was published in The Journal of Social Psychology, but 
Thurstone sought to connect experimental psychology and economics by labeling the 
curve that connected the different combinations of goods between which the 
individual was indifferent an “indifference function” [Thurstone (1931)]. Thurstone 
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(1931) was picked up by a few economists in the 1930s-1950s [Moscati (2007)], but 
was, to the best of the author’s knowledge, ignored by experimental, social, and 
mathematical psychologists.     
 Thurstone’s measurement program was not the only existing measurement 
program. In the 1940s and 1950s also the representational theory of measurement rose 
to prominence. The most important contributor to the representational theory of 
measurement at this time was Stanley S. Stevens (1906 – 1973). Stevens’ program 
was strongly inspired by Bridgman’s operationalism [Bridgman (1927)], and defined 
measurement as the operation of assigning numerals according to a rule. Stevens 
distinguished between different types of measurement, ranging from the mere 
assignment of numerals without any further restrictions such as in the number of 
players on a football team, to that of ratio-measurement, in which it had to make sense 
to add, subtract, multiply and divide the numerals. The main question Coombs, a 
student of Thurstone in the 1930s, and later mathematical psychologists were 
interested in was whether it was possible, and if so how, to combine Thurstone’s 
measurement approach with the representational measurement tradition.     
 The term ‘mathematical psychology’ was coined by Thurstone in the 1930s 
but acquired common usage in the early 1950s following the creation of Coombs’ 
Michigan Mathematical Psychology Program in 1949. The key importance of 
Thurstone is always mentioned when the origins of mathematical psychology are set 
out [e.g. Frederiksen and Gulliksen (1964), Laming (1973), Luce, Bush, Galanter 
(1963a), Tversky (1991), Stevens (1951)], but the driving force behind mathematical 
psychology as a separate field in psychology was Coombs. An important catalyst was 
a two-month summer institute in Santa Monica in the summer of 1952, organized by 
Coombs and mathematician Robert Thrall, not incidentally a summer institute that 
also played an important role in shaping the newly created field of behavioral decision 
research and equally important in the history of game theory as revealed by historians 
of economics [e.g. Dimand (2005), Weintraub (1992), Lee (2004)]. The Santa Monica 
conference brought a range of psychologists, economists and other scientists working 
on the mathematical and experimental investigation of decision making together and 
thus facilitated the start and progress of much prominent research. Leading 
mathematical psychologists from the late 1950s onwards include, besides Clyde 
Coombs, David Krantz, and Amos Tversky, R. Duncan Luce (1925- ), Patrick Suppes 
(1922- ), and William Estes  (1919- ). 
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 The contributions made to the field increased so much that in 1964 the Journal 
for Mathematical Psychology was founded.5 This gave self-proclaimed mathematical 
psychologists a more solid basis. However, it had not yet become a society. In 1975 
the board of editors of the Journal for Mathematical Psychology discussed the 
possibility of a merger with the Psychometric Society and its journal Psychometrika. 
This effort was due to the financial mismanagement of Psychometrika and the general 
desire of both groups to secure their financial future by combining conferences, 
journal administration and so forth. But, in addition, it was argued by individual 
members and the board of editors of both the Journal for Mathematical Psychology 
and Psychometrika that also content-wise the merger might be beneficial. In the end, 
two proposals were put forward for voting in the two groups, one in which the two 
would be completely merged into one society with two journals and one in which two 
divisions would exist, each having their own journal under the umbrella of one 
overarching society. But although Coombs, Krantz, and Tversky had all indicated to 
Luce, one of the editors of the Journal for Mathematical Psychology that they would 
vote in favor of a merger, both proposals were rejected. In response, the editors of the 
Journal for Mathematical Psychology proposed in 1976 to create the Society for 
Mathematical Psychology.6  This proposal was accepted and the Society was 
officially founded in 1977. 
 Mathematical psychologists defined their field not on the basis of a particular 
understanding of psychological phenomena, but instead on the basis of a method of 
investigation of psychological phenomena. The field was characterized as “the 
attempt to use mathematical methods to investigate psychological problems,” and it 
was thus, “not defined in terms of content but rather in terms of an approach” 
[Coombs, Dawes, and Tversky (1970), p.1]. It signified “not the study of a particular 
type of behaviour or the delineation of some new class of psychological phenomena 
but, rather, the application of new techniques to traditional psychological problems” 
[Laming (1973), p.1]. Mathematical psychology was defined rather broadly as an 
attempt to use theories and techniques from the field of mathematics to represent and 
investigate psychological phenomena. As a result, all research that applied 
mathematics to what could be considered psychological phenomena in principle fell 
                                                
5 The founding committee consisted of Richard C. Atkinson, Robert R. Bush, William Estes, R. 
Duncan Luce and Patrick Suppes. This paragraph draws on letters and minutes from the archive of 
Luce in Harvard University. 
6 The journal editors were Wlliam Batchelder, William Estes, B.F. Green, and R. Duncan Luce. 
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under the heading of mathematical psychology. This is illustrated by the three-volume 
Handbook of Mathematical Psychology (1963-1965) that started its exposition of 
what mathematical psychology is with a list of thirty-nine “Basic References in 
Mathematical Psychology.”7 Mathematical psychology aimed to synthesize all 
mathematical approaches to individual human behavior. 
 The scope of this list of basic references turned out to be more wishful 
thinking than an actual reflection of research conducted by mathematical 
psychologists. The inclusion of economist Kenneth Arrow and political scientist 
Herbert Simon suggested a synthesis that did not exist. Mathematical psychology was 
supposed to include all mathematical reasoning related to human behavior, but in day-
to-day practice it was almost exclusively focused on psychophysics, measurement 
theory and decision theory [Gigerenzer and Murray (1987), Coombs et al. (1970)]. 
Mathematical psychology of the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s was about the mathematics 
of measurement theory and, directly related, about the mathematics of decision 
theory. Decision theory will be discussed in more detail below. But before that it is 
necessary to devote a few words to the measurement theory of mathematical 
psychology.  
 The theory of measurement developed by the mathematical psychologists was, 
as said, inspired by both Thurstone’s and Stevens’ theories on measurement. 
Moreover, the effort to set up a mathematical psychology program by Coombs was 
principally influenced by Thurstone. Yet, after a while the work on measurement of 
mathematical psychologists drifted away from Thurstone and towards Stevens. The 
self-perceived task of the mathematical psychologists became to develop further the 
mathematical structure of Stevens’ view of measurement. The single most important 
publication on measurement of the mathematical psychologists were the three 
volumes of Foundations of Measurement (1971, 1989, 1990), a co-production of 
Krantz, Luce, Suppes and Tversky. It became the standard work on the 
representational theory of measurement in psychology.  
 In the summer of 1965, at the end of a three-week measurement workshop 
held at the University of Michigan, the already established scholars and long-time 
                                                
7 These basic references include among others Arrow’s Social Choice and Individual Values (1951), 
N.R. Campbell’s Foundations of Science (1957), Chomsky’s Syntactic Structures (1957), Guilford’s 
Psychometric Methods (1954), Luce and Raiffa’s Games and Decisions (1957), Simon’s Models of 
Man (1957), Stevens’ Handbook of Experimental Psychology (1951), and Thurstone’s Multiple Factor 
Analysis (1947), and The Measurement of Values (1959). 
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friends Luce and Suppes invited the “then two brightest young people working in the 
area” [Luce’s letter to Hamada, June 23, 1986] to write a book on measurement that 
would summarize and synthesize all the recent work done on measurement in 
mathematical psychology. Despite the gap between the publication of the first volume 
and volumes two and three, most of the three volumes of Foundations of 
Measurement was written in the late 1960s.8 
 The main author of the first volume was Krantz, who consequently was also 
made its first author. The editor and first author of the second volume was Suppes, 
whereas the third volume was edited by Luce. The main initiator and contact person 
throughout the whole project was Luce. Luce and Tukey (1964), the very first article 
published in the Journal for Mathematical Psychology, formed the basis for much of 
the measurement work in mathematical psychology, and hence also formed an 
important basis for Foundations of Measurement. Interestingly, the authors discovered 
along the way that much of what they were doing had been done before by 
mathematician and economist Gérard Debreu [e.g. Debreu (1954, 1958, 1959a, 
1959b, 1960)]. But Debreu had taken a topological approach that was difficult to 
understand for economists and psychologists [Krantz – interview (2008)]. The 
reference to Debreu is intriguing because it illustrates that economists and 
psychologists were working on the same phenomenon, but understood it differently. 
For mathematical economist Debreu his work was on utility theory, and for the 
mathematical psychologists it was about measurement.9  
 In the first two sentences of the first chapter of the first volume of 
Foundations of Measurement the authors stated their belief in the representational 
theory of measurement and the object of their book explicitly: “When measuring 
some attribute of a class of objects or events,” they argued, “we associate numbers (or 
other familiar mathematical entities, such as vectors) with the objects in such a way 
that the properties of the attributes are faithfully represented as numerical properties. 
In this book we investigate various systems of formal properties of attributes that lead 
to measurement in this sense” [Krantz et al. (1971), p.1]. Foundations of 
Measurement thus referred to the mathematical properties used in the numerical 
                                                
8 This paragraph draws on the interview with Krantz and letters from Luce’s archive in Harvard. 
9 Also historians of economics have focused only on the economic interpretation of Debreu’s work. For 
instance, Weintraub and Mirowski (1994) note that “Debreu is best read as providing a handbook for 
the working economic theorist of the neoclassical components of economic theory. In retrospect, it is 
hard to read Theory of Value [1959b] as anything else” (p.266).  
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structure in the representational theory of measurement. The first chapter puts forth 
what were called the three basic procedures of measurement: 1) ordinal measurement, 
2) counting of units, and 3) solving inequalities. It only differs from the approach set 
out by Stevens (1939, 1951) in that it was more mathematically refined and 
sophisticated. The remainder of the book is based on these three procedures. This 
view of measurement served as an important component in decision theory and 
behavioral decision research, as set out below, but it also illustrates which approach 
mathematical psychologists took towards the world they investigated. I have followed 
the example of the measurement of length as it is used in Foundations of 
Measurement (1971). The same example was employed in Stevens (1939, 1951), and 
Bridgman (1927), but using less mathematical formalization.10   
 In ordinal measurement the only thing that is required for measuring the length 
of different rods is that numbers be assigned to rods of different lengths in a consistent 
manner. If one labels the different rods a, b etc, and considers the assignment of 
numbers to denote the length as a function of the rods, the only thing that is required 
for ordinal measurement is that “a f b if and only if f(a) > f(b)” [Krantz et al. (1971), 
p.2], in which the difference between f and > is the difference between the empirical 
and the numerical structure. That is, the numerical structure f(a) > f(b) can be mapped 
onto the empirical or natural structure a f b. A mathematical relation, here an 
inequality, comes to represent the relation between two natural objects, of their 
relative lengths in this case. Hence, if we have assigned any number to the first rod, 
and the second rod exceeds the length of the first rod, the only thing required in 
ordinal measurement is that we assign it a larger number. This is the most general and 
unconstrained procedure of measurement that can be applied to any attribute of any 
object; provided that the empirical comparison can be made and that the sensitivity of 
the comparison process exceeds the disparities of the objects measured.  
 The procedure of counting of units, which is the second procedure in 
Foundations of Measurement, is an extension of ordinal measurement that allows for 
a comparison to be made of the lengths of the rods. If we wish to not only represent 
                                                
10 What I present here is a relatively brief sketch of one specific approach within the representational 
theory of measurement. For a methodological discussion of measurement in general and the 
representational theory of measurement in particular see Boumans (2004, forthcoming). For a thorough 
exposition of the history of measurement theory in nineteenth century experimental psychology and of 
the link of this psychological literature to interwar logical positivism see Heidelberger (1993, 2004). 
For a discussion of postwar measurement theory of the Foundations of Measurement, and its link to 
logical positivism/empiricism and Stevens, see Michel (1999, 2007).  
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that a f  b, but also that, say, the length of rod a exceeds twice the length of rods of 
length b, hence a f  b ○ b’, this is the procedure of measurement we require, where ○ 
is the notation for + in the empirical structure and b’ is employed to distinguish in the 
empirical structure between two rods of the same size. With respect to ordinal 
measurement, a number of extra assumptions are needed in order to establish this 
procedure for the counting of units. For example, to make the representation for the 
addition of b ○ b’ mathematically possible, we have to assume that two rods of 
lengths b can be represented by 2f(b). For the third procedure, that of solving 
inequalities, it requires in addition that the different distances between numbers in the 
numerical structure are meaningful representations for properties of the empirical 
structure. For instance, the numerical representation 2a + 5b = 3c needs to be 
regarded as a meaningful representation of the empirical structure.  
 The example illustrates that the representational theory of measurement in 
mathematical psychology started from mathematics and logic [Michell (2007)]. The 
fundamental assumption in this view of measurement is that if the scientist wants to 
measure, he or she needs the appropriate mathematical system. Thus, it assumed that 
the phenomena he or she wants to measure are clearly defined. If the scientist wants to 
measure length, temperature, wealth, or utility, what he or she needs to do is specify 
mathematically all the characteristics used in the measurement procedure and in the 
empirical system he or she wants to measure, and then afterwards apply this to the 
observations. When, for instance, transitivity is a mathematical requirement or a 
characteristic of the measurement system the scientist wants to use to measure 
temperature, he or she needs to start from the observation or assumption that the 
natural phenomenon of temperature has transitive properties. In other words, if the 
numerical structure that he or she uses to measure temperature has the property that it 
is transitive, the measurements of temperature are interpreted as transitive. This is 
equally true for situations where the human being is used as a measurement 
instrument. If the psychologist wants to measure the human perception of utilities 
through human beings using a measurement framework that employs transitivity, he 
or she needs to assume that human perception of utilities has transitive properties. 
Ideally one first discussed whether transitivity made sense in the case of temperature, 
religious attitudes or utility, but if this stage was forgotten the mathematical 
framework used would determine how the world was understood.  
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 As said, from its inception measurement theory has been linked to 
psychophysics and experimental psychology. Heidelberger (1993, 2004) shows that 
from the start Fechner’s psychophysics was as much a psychological theory relating 
objective stimulus to subjective sensation as a theory of measurement. Fechner 
devised his psychophysical system as a scientific foundation of measurement. It 
provided a scientific theory for the human body as a measurement device 
[Heidelberger (1993, 2004), see also Michell (2007)]. For the mathematical 
psychologists of the postwar period this link between psychophysics as a 
psychological theory and as a theory of measurement still served as the basis for their 
work.  
 It appeared to mathematical psychologists that mathematical psychology 
transcended the distinction between psychology and economics. As said, the basic 
references in mathematical psychology from the Handbook of Mathematical 
Psychology included the works of economists such as Arrow, Howard Raiffa, and 
Frederick Mosteller, who were considered to be important contributors to economics 
as well. In addition, the Handbook included publications written by non-economists 
which were considered to be important by economists for the field of economics, such 
as Savage and Simon. It also contained a book that was co-authored by a psychologist 
and an economist, Luce and Raiffa’s Games and Decisions (1957). In addition, the 
summer institute in Santa Monica in 1952 provided an important impetus for both 
mathematical psychology and economics.     
 Yet, to conclude from this that in mathematical psychology economics and 
psychology indeed were one and the same thing, and hence unified would be a 
mistake. The list of basic references used in mathematical psychology contained many 
more books that were unfamiliar to economists than it did books that were familiar.11 
The 1952 Santa Monica conference, immediately mentioned when the history of 
mathematical psychology is touched upon, is important for mathematical psychology 
because it was organized by a mathematical psychologist, Coombs, and afterwards 
proved to have been the beginning of a rapid rise in mathematical psychological 
research. The mathematical psychologists did not make a link to the field of 
economics in relation to the Santa Monica summer institute. 
                                                
11 Examples include Osgood’s Method and Theory in Experimental Psychology (1953), and 
Rosenbith’s Sensory Communication (1961). 
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 Mathematical psychology’s view of economics can be further illustrated by 
their discussion of what economists would immediately recognize as an economic 
book, von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944)’s Theory of Games and Economic 
Behavior, in Coombs et al. (1970) Mathematical Psychology, An Elementary 
Introduction. The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, Coombs et al. argued, is 
the most important modern contribution to utility theory, that is, the theory that 
derives from the philosophical-psychological theory of utilitarianism. It is a 
mathematical refinement of what is a philosophical or psychological theory. The book 
does, of course, have “Economic Behavior” in its title but to Coombs et al. economic 
behavior was a subset of behavior, just as social, religious, political or any other kind 
of behavior, and thus part of psychology. Mathematical psychologists drew on sources 
that economics also relied on, but they employed these sources in a different way than 
did economists. A similar case is Krantz, Luce, Suppes, and Tversky’s reference to 
Debreu work as measurement theory, as mentioned above.  
 
4. Decision theory and behavioral decision research 
4.1 Decision theory 
The main question that Coombs had started his mathematical psychology program 
with was how could Thurstone’s measurement theory be brought in line with the new 
representational theory of measurement, a process that culminated in Foundations of 
Measurement, an axiomatic interpretation of the representational theory of 
measurement that has little to do anymore with Thurstone. But mathematical 
psychology maintained the link with Thurstone and psychophysics in general by 
continuing to emphasize the two-sided role of their approach as being both a theory of 
measurement and a psychological theory of human behavior. Furthermore, with 
respect to their theory of human behavior the mathematical psychologists brought 
their theories in line with the recent developments in theories of human behavior. The 
new theory they incorporated was decision theory. The thus modernized two-sided 
theory of psychophysics was described as follows at the beginning of Chapter eight, 
Foundations of Measurement I: 
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Unlike most theories of measurement, which may have both physical and 
behavioral interpretations, the theory of expected utility is devoted explicitly 
to the problem of making decisions when their consequences are uncertain. It 
is probably the most familiar example of a theory of measurement in the social 
sciences. [Krantz et al. (1971), p.369]   
 
In mathematical psychology the originally two-sided psychophysical theory of just 
noticeable differences had been abandoned, but the idea of one theory serving both as 
a theory of measurement and as a theory of human behavior had been maintained. No 
economist, perhaps with the exception of Francis Edgeworth, would have understood 
utility theory as a theory of measurement. But for the mathematical psychologists the 
representational theory of measurement and the theory of expected utility theory, or 
decision theory, were two sides of the same psychological coin.  
 Decision theory studied which decision an individual should make when he or 
she is faced with uncertain or incomplete information. Decision theory’s revival in the 
twentieth century was principally due to Leonard Savage. It goes back to the second 
half of the seventeenth century when mathematicians and other scholars started to 
investigate how to calculate mathematically the optimal decision in uncertain 
situations. The starting point is prosaically represented by the figure of the Chevalier 
de Méré, a notorious gentleman-gambler at the court of Louis XIV, who asked 
mathematicians Blaise Pascal and Pierre de Fermat to solve a number of gambling 
problems. The mathematics that came out of these and similar questions was 
probability theory and rational choice theory [Hacking (1975), Daston (1988)]. 
Eighteenth-century probability theory gave rise to nineteenth-century statistics and 
came to pervade every corner of scientific and daily life [Daston (1983,1988), Porter 
(1986,1994)], and it is therefore no exaggeration to characterize this development as 
“probabilistic revolution” [Krüger, Daston, and Heidelberger (1987), Krüger, 
Gigerenzer, and Morgan (1987)].  
 A major problem confronting probability theory was what became known as 
the ‘St. Petersburg Paradox,’ invented by Nicholas Bernoulli in 1713. Bernoulli 
demonstrated that gambles could be constructed for which probability theory 
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computed a maximum willingness to pay that was clearly at odds with intuition.12 The 
most famous solution to the St. Petersburg Paradox was offered by his cousin Daniel 
Bernoulli in 1738 [Bernoulli (1954)]. Daniel Bernoulli distinguished between wealth 
and “moral wealth,” in which moral wealth depends on wealth logarithmically.13 Up 
until the early twentieth century the literature on mathematical theory of decision 
making under uncertainty consisted mainly of attempts to solve this and similar 
paradoxes [Edwards (1954), p.380]. 
   Between the 1920s and the 1950s a number of ideas were introduced that 
thoroughly reshaped the way decision theorists, as they were now labeled, thought 
about decision making under uncertainty.14 Authors such as Bruno de Finetti [e.g. de 
Finetti (1937,1949, 1951)] and Frank Ramsey [Ramsey (1931)] introduced the idea 
that probability theory could not only be applied to objective uncertainties out there in 
the world, such as the probability that a coin falls heads and the probability that the 
sun rises tomorrow, but also to subjective probabilities, that is uncertainties inside the 
individual of the sort ‘how uncertain am I that it will rain tomorrow?,’ or ‘how certain 
am I that this second-hand car will last at least two years?’ In a related development, 
authors such as John Maynard Keynes [Keynes (1921)] and Rudolf Carnap [Carnap 
(1950)] extended the theory of logic to include uncertain propositions, that is 
propositions with a degree of probability that is less than 1.15 In this logical 
probability approach, uncertainty stems from the subject’s personal belief in the 
occurrence of an event. The difference between objective and subjective probability is 
that objective probability is a probability obtained on the basis of available 
information and mathematical theory, a probability that is the same for everyone. 
Subjective probability, on the other hand, is a number attached to the personal belief 
of an individual. Subjective probabilities of the same event may thus differ across 
individuals.  
 The distinction between the two was not unproblematic and this is still not the 
case, for it is difficult to determine where to draw the line between the two. Statistical 
                                                
12 The St. Petersburg paradox has given rise to a vast array of literature. An overview of the different 
sides to the debate that have developed over the past 250 years can be found in Jorland (1987).  
13 As a synonym for moral wealth the original Latin text used the term “emolumentum,” which in the 
English translation of 1954 is translated as “utility,” upon the advice of Savage. See also Teira (2006). 
14 This paragraph briefly indicates a few points in a large literature. Useful overviews are Hajek (2007), 
von Plato (1994), and Eriksson and Hajek (forthcoming).  
15 This research can be traced back to nineteenth-century authors such as George Boole and Augustus 
De Morgan [e.g. Maas (2005), pp.111-122, MacHale (1985)]. 
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data, the basis for objective probability, is information observed by human beings and 
can thus equally be considered input for a subjective probability. Moreover, all of the 
calculations for objective probability are always conducted by human beings, and can 
therefore also be considered as subjective probabilities instead of objective 
probabilities. Adherents of the so-called subjectivist or Bayesian school argued 
precisely this: that statistics is simply the extension of the process of human belief 
formation to a more formal domain. This ipso facto meant that the whole of statistics 
is a process of human decision making under uncertainty, albeit a process which is 
scrutinized more rigorously and recorded more formally.   
 In other words, the subjectivist probability theory commenced by de Finetti 
and Ramsey, and the logical probability approach of Keynes, Carnap and others made 
statistics a part of decision theory. Thus, Wald’s influential Statistical Decision 
Functions (1950) stated on the first page that “[a] statistical decision problem arises 
when we are faced with a set of alternative decisions, one of which must be made, and 
the degree of preference for the various possible decisions depends on the unknown 
distribution F(x) of X” [Wald (1950), p.2, see also Fishburn (1964)]. Decision theory 
was no longer only about which decision we as human beings should make given our 
preferences and the objective probability of different states of the world, but it was 
also about which conclusion should be inferred by statisticians from statistical data. 
Decision theory had incorporated statistics and was now an all-encompassing theory 
of human decision making under uncertainty.  
 Another new development was initiated by von Neumann and Morgenstern’s 
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (1944). In the course of constructing game 
theory, von Neumann and Morgenstern introduced the concept of stochastic 
preference, which can be found either in a weak or a strong form [see Tversky (1969) 
for the distinction between the two]. Stochastic preference embodies the idea that an 
individual who has only a very small preference for A as opposed to B, may not 
always correctly perceive this small difference and may mistakenly choose B. The 
difference is so small that he or she cannot consciously perceive it and considers him- 
or herself to be indifferent towards A and B. However, if the choice is repeated a large 
number of times, he or she will nevertheless choose A more often than B. Therefore, 
this individual is said to stochastically prefer A to B.  
 Stochastic preference eliminated the concept of indifference. Even if the 
individual has an infinitely small preference for A as opposed to B, this preference 
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would show up if the choice was repeated often enough. The individual is unaware of 
his or her preference for A as opposed to B and considers him- or herself to be 
indifferent, but he or she is not, and the mathematics therefore needs to model him or 
her as such. In a similar way, stochastic preference dealt the final blow to 
experimental psychology’s just noticeable differences. Just noticeable differences, as 
previously mentioned, were introduced by Fechner as the lowest difference in 
stimulus, including that between preferences, which an individual could observe. With 
stochastic preference, the concept of just noticeable difference had become obsolete. 
The experimenter could now give the subject the same choice a large number of times 
and from the outcome it could be inferred which of the two options he or she 
preferred, even if the individual him- or herself claimed to be indifferent. Stochastic 
preference allowed going below just noticeable differences, and thus rendered it 
obsolete as a starting point for psychophysics.16  
 Furthermore, von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) cut short the discussion 
on what exactly utility is and how it should be measured: “We [..] assume that the aim 
of all participants in the economic system, consumers as well as entrepreneurs, is 
money, or equivalently a single monetary commodity. This is supposed to be 
unrealistically divisible and substitutable, freely transferable and identical, even in the 
quantitative sense, with whatever “satisfaction” or “utility” is desired by each 
participant [von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), p.8, emphasis added]. With 
regard to the unit of analysis of decision theory, von Neumann and Morgenstern thus 
effectively turned the clock back to before Daniel Bernoulli, when the rational 
decision depended on the absolute, objective value of money. For von Neumann and 
Morgenstern, the agents in decision problems wanted to maximize their monetary 
income, not their Bernoullian utility. However, von Neumann and Morgenstern 
(1944) labeled this money ‘utility.’  
 The different aspects and new ideas were organized under the heading of one 
theory by Leonard “Jimmy” Savage (1917-1971) in his The Foundations of Statistics 
(1954). Savage divided decision theory into two realms, a normative realm and what 
he labeled, an “empirical” realm, a reference to the “empirical” domain of 
measurement theory, as discussed above. In the normative realm, rational human 
beings investigated how decision making under uncertainty should be done, and 
                                                
16 Note the similarity with Thurstone’s psychophysical theory of measurement as discussed above. See 
also Gigerenzer (1987a,b). 
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established rational principles for this behavior. In the empirical domain, scientists 
investigated whether people in everyday life behave according to the principles of the 
normative theory. For the research in the empirical domain Savage had the 
experimental psychologists in mind, but as a mathematician Savage himself stuck to 
developing the normative theory. The investigation of normative or rational decision 
behavior was considered a deductive science, an investigation that was best done in 
the comfort of the armchair. But it was, according to Savage, not just mathematicians 
who had contributed or could contribute to developing this normative theory. 
Important contributions had been made by economists and philosophers. Savage thus 
considered economics and philosophy to be deductive armchair sciences just like 
mathematics.  
 The purpose of The Foundations of Statistics was to bring together two themes 
in Western thought that go back to ancient Greece: inductive inference and reasoning 
[Savage (1954), p.1]. The formal investigation of reasoning is logic. Until the end of 
the first half of the twentieth century when Savage introduced his position, logic was 
only concerned with certain propositions; the purpose of Savage’s book, and the 
logical probability and subjective probability tradition in which it stood, was to extend 
logic to uncertain propositions.17 As inductive inference typically leads to uncertain 
propositions, in the sense that the probability that one’s inference is correct is never 1, 
such an extension united reasoning and inductive inference. The result was what we 
call statistics. “Decisions made in the face of uncertainty pervade the life of every 
individual and organization,” Savage argued, and,”[i]t may be said to be the purpose 
of this book, and indeed of statistics generally, to discuss the implications of 
reasoning for the making of decisions” [Savage (1954), p.6].  
Savage’s theory investigated what a rational person does in the face of 
uncertainty. Rationality to Savage is a theory of reasoning, either formalized or not. 
For certain propositions, it is generally accepted that this theory is logic. That is, the 
axioms of logic are widely accepted as describing and providing rules for reasoning 
about certain propositions. For the extension of logic to uncertainty Savage presented 
in the book, this was less clear, as the theory still had to be developed. That is, Savage 
contended that it was as yet not clear whether the axioms he presented were indeed 
                                                
17 I here forgo discussion of Savage’s historical introduction. As above, one may object by pointing to 
for instance George Boole and Augustrus De Morgan. Savage, however, does not discuss the period in 
between the Bernoullis and de Finetti, Andrey Kolmogoroff and Ramsey.   
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the best description, and provided the best rules, for reasoning under uncertainty. The 
reader must subsequently thus verify for him- or herself the axioms Savage presented.  
How could this be achieved? As these axioms had to do with reasoning, the 
reader should verify them by reasoning. In fact, Savage was cautious when seeking to 
convince the reader of his approach. “I am about to build up a highly idealized theory 
of the behavior of a “rational” person with respect to decisions,” he wrote. But,”[i]n 
doing so I will, of course, have to ask you to agree with me that such and such 
maxims of behavior are “rational.” [..] So, when certain [i.e. some - FH] maxims are 
presented for your consideration, you must ask yourself whether you try to behave in 
accordance with them, or, to put it differently, how you would react if you noticed 
yourself violating them” [Savage (1954), p.7]. Like the axioms of logic, Savage’s 
“maxims of behavior” were axioms of decision making that all rational individuals 
should agree upon. They were independent of any preferences or beliefs and derived 
from an introspection that comes before experience of any kind.  
 Savage’s theory did not say anything about whether people in the real world 
actually behave according to his theory. It is important to distinguish this from the 
previous point. On the one hand, Savage’s readers, philosophers, mathematicians, 
economists, psychologists and any other rational individuals needed to investigate 
through introspective reasoning, whether they agreed with the new axioms for 
decision making under uncertainty, as they had done for over two thousand years with 
the axioms of logic proper. If these axioms were agreed upon, they could then be used 
as rules for sound reasoning, just like the rules of logic had been used as rules for 
sound reasoning. On the other hand, when established and agreed upon, the question 
could be posed whether people in their everyday decision making under uncertainty 
would behave in accordance with the new axioms. It should be stressed that such an 
exercise could only be undertaken when the rules of reasoning had been established, 
at the very least by the scientists conducting the empirical investigation. In other 
words, in such an empirical investigation into real-life decision making under 
uncertainty, the rules or axioms themselves were agreed to be true, and could not be 
experimentally scrutinized. It would nevertheless be fruitful to conduct empirical 
investigation in sciences, such as psychology, which were concerned with actual 
decision behavior by people in the real world, and not so much with the theory of 
reasoning itself. In order to clarify this point Savage conceptually distinguished 
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between the already-mentioned normative and empirical realms [Savage (1954), 
pp.19-20].  
 What conclusion needed to be drawn when a subject in an experimental setting 
was observed to make a decision that violated the rules governing the theory of 
reasoning? First of all, the theory could only be applied experimentally to subjects 
that can reason. Roughly, this included all normal and healthy adults; it was not useful 
to ask a subject that cannot reason to make a rational decision. Children, the mentally 
disabled and animals were therefore excluded from experimental investigation. But 
when subjects capable of reasoning were observed making decisions that violated the 
axioms, such decisions were deemed irrational decisions, or simply errors. To Savage 
these errors were the result of failed or too little reasoning. The individual had made a 
mistake in his or her reasoning or had not given it enough thought. When the subject 
would think further or when his or her error would be explained, he or she would 
recognize his or her mistake and correct his or her behavior. Savage noted that 
“[t]here is, of course, an important sense in which preferences, being entirely 
subjective, cannot be in error; but in a different, more subtle sense they can be. [..] A 
man buying a car for $2,134.50 is tempted to order it with a radio installed, which will 
bring the total price to $2,228.41, feeling that the difference is trifling. But, when he 
reflects that, if he already had the car, he certainly would not spend $93.85 for a radio 
for it, he realizes that he has made an error” [Savage (1954), p.103]. 
 How should the empirical testing of the theory be done? The central issue here 
was that the information needed to make a rational decision should be the same for the 
experimenter and experimental subject alike. The reason was that if the experimenter 
was not sure that the experimental subject used the exact same information as input 
for his or her decision, the experimenter could never establish whether the subject was 
making the correct decision, or an error. For instance, if the experimental subject 
believes that the deck of cards of the experimenter has been shuffled unfairly, while 
the experimenter knows that it has been shuffled fairly, the subject could make a 
decision that is rational given his or her own belief, but which is irrational given the 
experimenter’s belief. In the case of decision making under uncertainty, it should be 
completely clear what the uncertainty of the inference was, and what the value of the 
decision was. In other words, the probabilities and utilities of the different decisions 
involved should be clear.  
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 To conceptually clarify, Savage invented the term ‘small world,’ as opposed to 
‘grand world’ in which we live most of the time, for situations in which probabilities 
and utilities are clearly defined. A small world is a decision situation in which all the 
probabilities, utilities and consequences of the different options are clear to both 
experimenter and experimental subject. Therefore, “[i]t will be noticed that the small-
world states are in fact events in the grand world, that indeed they constitute a 
partition of the grand world” [Savage (1954), p.84]. For instance, when the subject is 
asked to choose between five dollars for certain or a six in ten chance of winning ten 
dollars, this is a small world situation. The uncertainty and value of each decision are 
defined and clear to everyone. However, when the subject is asked to choose between 
a ten-year old Mercedes and a three-year old Toyota, we are in a large world decision 
situation. Both the value of the different options as well as the probabilities of all 
kinds of uncertainties associated with the two options is unclear and dissimilar for 
both the experimenter and experimental subject. 
 The value of the different options was to be measured in utilities. On the 
interpretation of the theory of utility, Savage fully sided with von Neumann and 
Morgenstern. Echoing the Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, Savage 
suggested that economists and others had been somewhat led astray in constructing 
complicated theories of utility, as a result of the previously-mentioned paper by 
Bernoulli. “For a long period,” Savage argued,” economists accepted Bernoulli’s idea 
of moral wealth as the measurement of a person’s well-being apart from any 
consideration of probability, though “utility” rather than “moral wealth” has been the 
popular name for this concept among English-speaking economists.” As a result, 
“[e]conomists were for a time enthusiastic about the principle of diminishing marginal 
utility, and they saw what they believed to be reflections of it in many aspects of 
everyday life” [Savage (1954), p.95]. However, thanks to von Neumann and 
Morgenstern we were now back on the right track and able to measure choice-options 
by using a money scale of utility. Utility equals money and is nothing more than a 
convenient measurement scale of preferences. “A function U that [..] arithmetizes the 
relation of preferences among acts will be called utility. [..] I have chosen to use the 
name “utility” in preference to any other, in spite of some unfortunate connotations 
this name has in connection with economic theory, because it was adopted by von  
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Neumann and Morgenstern when they revived the concept to which it refers, in a most 
stimulating way” [Savage (1954), p.95]. 
 Savage’s decision theory may sound rather theoretical and anything but 
applicable to everyday life, but normative decision theory could also be applied to 
questions in the world outside science’s ivory tower. Indeed, the whole purpose of 
decision theory was to help us to make better decisions. During World War Two in 
the United States, the application of decision theory to everyday problems developed 
under the rubric of operations research [e.g. Klein (2000)]. Operations research aimed 
to gather all information available relating to a particular problem and then use 
decision theory to calculate the optimal decision. “Operations research makes the 
claim that, by pitting the forces of research against large-scale problems, the decision 
maker (manager, president, general, etc.) will be freed to devote his time to other 
tasks” [Fishburn (1964), p.4]. Although based on deductive introspective reasoning, 
decision theory was explicitly meant to be applied to real world decision problems. In 
turn, behavioral decision research was closely related to operations research. It was a 
newly-created field in psychology that, like operations research, sought to apply 
decision theory to real-world problems.  
 
4.2 Behavioral decision research  
The founding father of the empirical investigation of decision theory in psychology 
was Edwards, who in 1958 joined the University of Michigan [Philips and von 
Winterfeldt (2006)]. In Michigan Edwards founded the Engineering Psychology 
Laboratory to study and improve human decision making [Fryback (2005)]. Edwards 
was strongly influenced by von Neumann and Morgenstern’s and Stevens’ work on 
measurement, and was one of the first promoters of Savage’s normative-empirical 
decision making program. Edwards admired Savage as one admires a genius, 
something Edwards shared with others who had read The Foundations of Statistics, 
such as Luce, Tversky and Krantz [Krantz – interview (2008)]. Edwards’ 1954 article 
on the historical background of decision making research, “The Theory of Decision  
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Making,” and its 1961 follow-up, “Behavioral Decision Theory,” created the field of 
behavioral decision research.18 Behavioral decision research was dominated by 
Edwards until the early 1970s. From that moment on a number of his students started 
to develop their own interpretations. The most successful were Slovic and 
Lichtenstein, who developed a constructed preferences approach that drew 
connections with Simon [e.g. Slovic and Lichtenstein (1971, 1973, 1983)]; and 
Kahneman and Tversky, who created their Heuristics and Biases approach. 
 Edwards and his behavioral decision research adopted the framework set out 
by Savage, and understood Savage’s distinction between a normative and an empirical 
domain to be the same as experimental psychology’s distinction between normative 
and descriptive. Decision theory was understood as providing a theoretical framework 
for the objective stimuli that the subject is presented with in his case of decision 
making under uncertainty. The self-assigned task of behavioral decision researchers 
was to investigate experimentally which decision subjects make with respect to this 
objective stimulus. In the traditional framework, experimental psychology 
investigated individuals’ subjective perception of objective values, such as weight or 
brightness differences. In behavioral decision research the weights and light bulbs 
were replaced with the utilities and probabilities of decision theory. Given the 
objective values of the utilities and probabilities, decision theory determined the 
objective decision. Behavioral decision research then investigated experimentally 
which decision the subject actually made. In this way Savage’s decision theory and 
his distinction between a normative and an empirical domain were integrated into the 
experimental psychological framework, in which decision theory determined the 
objective benchmark with which the subject’s subjective decision was compared. The 
distinction between the normative and the descriptive was often and clearly made by 
behavioral decision researchers. Here is an example: 
 
 Decision theory is the study of how decisions are or ought to be made. Thus it 
 has two faces: descriptive and normative. Descriptive decision theory attempts 
                                                
18 Different names for Edwards’ program and its offspring exist. Behavioral decision research, 
behavioral decision theory, and behavioral decision making are all used to refer to the same 
psychological program. It is not clear when and how these terms exactly originated; although 
behavioral decision theory has been around at least since Edwards published his second overview 
article in 1961. Behavioral decision research, the most commonly used label seems to have originated 
in the 1970s, but has been applied in retrospect to the research of the 1960s also. To avoid confusion I 
use the term behavioral decision research in this thesis.   
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 to describe and explain how actual choices are made. It is concerned with the 
 study of variables that determine choice behavior in various contexts. As such, 
 it is a proper branch of psychology. Normative decision theory is concerned 
 with optimal rather than actual choices. Its main function is to prescribe which 
 decision should be made, given the goals of the decision maker and the 
 information available to him. Its results have a prescriptive nature. They assert 
 that if an individual wishes to maximize his expected gain, for example, then 
 he should follow a specified course of action. As such normative decision 
 theory is a purely deductive discipline.  
 [Coombs, Dawes, and Tversky (1970), p.114] 
 
 It was in this regard that Edwards was interested in economics, as exemplified 
by his extensive and knowledgeable discussion of economics in Edwards (1954). Like 
Savage, Edwards understood economics as a normative, deductive theory of human 
decision making, and he discussed it on an equal footing with statistics, mathematics 
and philosophy. Thus, Edwards noted that economics is an “armchair” science 
[Edwards (1954), p.14], not because he denounced economics, but because he 
understood economics to be an armchair science just as mathematics, statistics, and 
philosophy. In his classification of the field of decision theory as a) the theory of 
riskless choice, b) the application of the theory of riskless choice to welfare 
economics, c) the theory of risky choices, d) transitivity in decision making, and e) the 
theory of games and of statistical decision function, economics is predominantly 
about a) and b). Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s Theory of Games and Economic 
Behavior (1944) was understood to be a deductive, armchair science as well: Game 
theory as a mathematical theory “can be viewed as a branch of normative decision 
theory” [Coombs, Dawes, and Tversky (1970), p.202]. 
 Edwards’ discussion of “economic man” should also be read in this light. 
Economic man for Edwards is someone who makes his choices according to the 
normative theory, making it therefore a normative concept. If you ask what economic 
man would do in a certain decision problem, you ask what the normative solution is. 
At the same time, economic man as the embodiment of the normative theory, forms a 
hypothesis about actual decision making that can be tested: “if economic man is a 
model for real men, then real men should always exhibit transitivity of real choices. 
Transitivity is an assumption, but it is directly testable. So are the other properties of 
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economic man as a model for real men” [Edwards (1954), p.16]. But transitivity and 
the other properties of economic man were also the assumptions of measurement 
theory, as set out before. As a result, mathematical psychologists moved smoothly 
from measurement theory, to decision theory, signal detection theory and back.19 So 
did Edwards and his behavioral decision research.    
 Savage and other decision theorists investigated the normative decision 
theories, and it was the task of psychologists, according to Edwards, to investigate the 
descriptive part and in turn to see how well human beings in their actual everyday 
decision making behave according to the normative principles set out by decision 
theory. What was at least just as important for Edwards, however, was the question 
how human decision making could be improved. The research conducted and favored 
by Edwards was explicitly called “engineering psychology.” The perceived relevance 
of this research is illustrated by Edwards’ comments on his visit to the North 
American Aerospace Defense Command in the mid 1960s [Phillips and von 
Winterfeldt (2006), p.5]. In this command center an enormous amount of information 
was gathered and decisions made by the personnel had potentially enormous 
consequences. Therefore, it was of utmost importance not only to know how people 
made decisions on the basis of uncertain information, but also to find out how the 
decision system could be organized such that the best decision could be made. In light 
of future developments in the field to be made by Kahneman and Tversky, it should 
be noted here that Edwards and other behavioral decision theorists did not consider 
the human being to be an inapt or limited decision maker in the sense of not 
understanding the divine rules of decision theory. For Edwards, the starting point was 
that the human being is very capable of making complicated decisions in situations 
based on uncertain information. It is just that there is only so much a single human 
being can do. For that reason, human beings may sometimes deviate from what is 
normatively the right decision, and therefore it may be useful to think about how to 
help human beings decide when, for whatever reason, the decision making process is 
especially difficult or especially important.   
 Edwards and behavioral decision research evaluated decisions in terms of 
utility and extensively referred to economists and their use of the concept of utility. 
                                                
19 Signal detection theory (SDT) is a branch of psychophysics that investigates the individual’s ability 
to distinguish between signal and noise. In other words, it investigates decision making under noisy 
conditions. See e.g. Green and Swets (1964). 
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Nevertheless, Edwards and behavioral decision research did not understand utility in 
the same way as economists. For behavioral decision research utility was merely a 
new concept for an already existing idea in experimental psychology, that of valence. 
“The notion of utility is very similar to the Lewinian notion of valence. Lewin 
conceives of valence as the attractiveness of an object or activity to a person. Thus, 
psychologists might consider the experimental study of utilities to be the experimental 
study of valence, and therefore an attempt at quantifying parts of the Lewinian 
theoretical schema” [Edwards (1954), p.25, see also Frijda (1986)]. Valence measures 
the intrinsic attractiveness or averseness of an individual to a certain event, object or 
situation. Thus, if an individual is more attracted to Islam than to Christianity, Islam 
has a higher valence. In addition, emotions can be classified in terms of valence. 
Anger and fear are emotions with a negative valence, joy has a positive valence. By 
equating utility with valence, Edwards and behavioral decision research understood 
utility to be a general measurement of an individual’s attitude towards events, objects 
and situations. As a result, an individual preferring ten to eight dollars, was 
psychologically in the same situation as an individual preferring Islam to Christianity.  
 In behavioral decision research, the behavior of the experimental subjects was 
evaluated in terms of the normative benchmarks. The human being was considered to 
be a mechanism that reasons logically and applies Bayesian statistics. In other words, 
the individual was considered to be a logician and Bayesian statistician of some sort. 
The purpose of behavioral decision research, then, was to figure out whether this 
human being is a good logician and Bayesian statistician. This particular type of 
understanding of human behavior was neatly summarized in a paper by Rapoport and 
Tversky. “[The behavioral decision research] approach to the study of choice 
behavior,” they argued,” is based on the comparison between the normative solution 
of a decision problem and the observed solution employed by subjects.” As a 
consequence, “man is viewed as an intuitive statistician who acts in order to maximize 
some specified criteria while operating on the basis of probabilistic information” 
[Rapoport and Tversky (1970), p.118]. 
 Edwards and the developing behavioral decision research approach created a 
program that took decision theory as provided by mathematicians, economists and 
philosophers, and especially Savage, as point of departure. It compared actual human 
decision making with respect to this norm, measuring the decisions made in terms of 
“utility,” and looked for ways to improve human decision making. But behavioral 
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decision researchers recognized that matters were a little more complicated than they 
usually portrayed them. In their introduction to Decision Making (1967), for instance, 
Edwards and Tversky noted that “the distinction between what an organism should do 
and what it does do is slippery” (p.8). The problematic distinction between the 
normative and the descriptive was a recurring theme, although it was far outnumbered 
by the instances in which the distinction was standardly used. The problem was that in 
Savage’s decision theory the normative and the descriptive were closely related. The 
normative rules were rules that every healthy adult should agree with when thinking 
them carefully through. The normative decision theory was as much a prescription for 
optimal behavior as it was a description of an adult’s behavior who has carefully 
thought through which decision to make. In experimental psychology, however, the 
distinction was much stronger. In experimental psychology, the descriptive value of 
the stimulus, the sensation, was supposed to deviate from the objective norm. Thus, 
when decision theory was integrated into the experimental framework, the normative-
descriptive distinction of decision theory risked becoming a much stronger and much 
more absolute distinction than it was meant to be. This was unproblematic as long as 
the experiments showed that most of the time subjects indeed did make their decisions 
according to the norms of decision theory, and it was what Edwards and his 
behavioral decision researchers expected to find and actually did find. However, when 
the experiments indicated that there might be systematic differences between the 
norms of decision theory and actually observed behavior, an idea that gradually 
developed during the 1960s (treated in the third chapter), it did become problematic.  
 Throughout his career Edwards wanted to maintain the initial decision 
theoretical understanding of the close connection between the normative and the 
descriptive. Until the early 1970s, his disciples in behavioral decision research kept 
this perspective as well.  Normative theory described human behavior in situations 
where we really want to behave as best as we can, for instance in cases where the 
stakes are high. Normative theory was thus to some extent descriptive. Moreover, 
“[d]ecision theory may be viewed as primarily an analysis of the environment; that is, 
an orderly summary of those features of the environment that control behaviour.” 
Therefore, “[s]uch a description of the environment, combined with the simple 
assumptions about behaviour tendencies that the organism brings to that environment, 
may yield an effective description of behaviour” [Edwards and Tversky (1967), p.8]. 
Although the distinction between normative and descriptive was used all the time, it 
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was at the same time clear that the two sides were closely connected and that perhaps 
it was not possible even to distinguish between the two.  
 Decision theory and behavioral decision research in the 1950s and 1960s both 
considered themselves to be directly related to economics and used extensive amounts 
of economics. It is especially Edwards’ evidently extensive knowledge of economics 
[e.g. Edwards (1954, 1961)] which tempts the reader to conclude that here we have a 
case in which psychology and economics were truly integrated into one research 
project. But the way in which Savage, Edwards and others talked about economics 
does not resonate with the way in which economists spoke about economics. Such 
different prominent economists as Lionel Robbins, Paul Samuelson, and Milton 
Friedman would not have agreed to be engaged in constructing a normative theory of 
decision making.  
 Some of this incommensurability showed up in psychologists’ assessment of 
economics. In his discussion of Samuelson’s economics, Edwards was somewhat 
puzzled that “[i]f preference is operationally defined as choice, then it seems 
unthinkable that this requirement can ever be empirically violated” [Edwards (1954), 
p.15]. Moreover, the interpretation of utility in terms of Lewinian valence appears, if 
perhaps not entirely incompatible, not exactly what economists had in mind when 
they use the concept of utility. Thus, although the frequent references to economics in 
decision theory and behavioral decision research suggest otherwise, economists and 
psychologists understood their disciplines and the relationship between them in 
fundamentally different ways. Quite a few theories and concepts traveled from 
economics to psychology. But the way in which these theories and concepts were 
used in psychology was not something economists would have recognized as 
belonging to their field.   
 
5. “Measurement theory in psychology is behavior theory” 
Mathematical psychology was directly related to decision theory and behavioral 
decision research. Mathematical psychology applied mathematics to the investigation 
of psychological phenomena, and as both decision theory and behavioral decision 
research used a great deal of mathematics, a natural and direct link existed between 
the two. How to formulate mathematically how people should behave and how people 
actually do behave in situations under uncertainty, were research questions that 
belonged to mathematical psychology as well as to decision theory and behavioral 
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decision research. Hence, the same scientist could naturally be perceived as being a 
contributor to these different fields at the same time. Tversky, Luce, and Suppes serve 
as examples. 
 But the link between mathematical psychology, decision theory, and 
behavioral decision research also went much further than the mere use of 
mathematics. Mathematical psychology’s representational theory of measurement and 
behavioral decision research’s experimental investigation of human decision making 
started from different perspectives, but were partly about the same subject: normative 
decision behavior. Mathematical psychology’s representational theory of 
measurement used the human body as a measurement device. In the case of utilities 
and probabilities, for instance, the human being was used to measure human 
perception of utilities and probabilities, human perception of risk averseness, and 
human perception of loss averseness. But in order to make this a valid procedure it 
must be assumed that the human being as a measurement device functions 
consistently. Furthermore, the representational theory of measurement’s definition of 
consistency was: according to the normative rules of decision theory. The assumption 
needed to be made was that the human measurement instrument behaved according to 
the normative decision theory.  
 Behavioral decision research, on the other hand, compared behavior of 
individuals in its experiments with the norms of decision theory, for which it used the 
representational theory of measurement. The two fitted neatly together. Assuming that 
subjects behave according to the normative rules, the mathematical psychologists set 
up measurement frameworks that measured the perception of utilities, risk averseness 
and so on. Assuming that, in general, subjects behave according to the normative 
rules, behavioral decision researchers investigated under which circumstances 
subjects made mistakes. Mathematical psychologists provided behavioral decision 
research with a solid theory of measurement, and behavioral decision research 
informed mathematical psychologists under which circumstances its human 
measurement instrument was less accurate.   
 To illustrate further why for mathematical psychologists “measurement theory 
in psychology is behavior theory,” [Coombs (1983), p.36] it is useful to ask how 
experimental psychologists measured the phenomena they were interested in. How did 
they measure the attitude of religious people who go to church twice a day? How did 
they measure the perception of “rape” in terms of good versus bad? How did they 
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measure the perception of a probability of 0.01%? How did they measure the relative 
utility of receiving a certain ten dollars as opposed to a 0.8 chance of receiving fifteen 
dollars? The answer, as already indicated, is that they measured all these 
psychological phenomena through the human being. “In psychological measurement, 
the individual is the measuring device; he plays the role of the pan balance, the meter 
stick, or the thermometer” [Coombs (1983), p.36]. The psychologist used individuals 
to measure the value of psychological phenomena of the individual. This could be the 
human being in general, it could be the member of a culture, and it could even be the 
individual itself. One could, for instance, use individuals as a measurement instrument 
to measure the individual’s risk averseness. “Psychological measurement theory is 
concerned with the empirical regularities in [the individual’s] behavior that justify 
numerical assignments to the stimuli he is responding to and/or justify numerical 
assignments to him” [Coombs (1983), p.36].  
 However, to “justify numerical assignments” to stimuli and to “justify 
numerical assignments” to the individual on the basis of “empirical regularities in this 
behavior” the psychologists needed to understand that behavior. They, in other words, 
needed a theory describing human behavior. The psychologists needed to understand 
how humans function to be able to use them as measurement instruments, just as the 
physicist needs to understand how the thermometer works in order to use it as an 
instrument. But in the case of the human being as a measurement instrument, this 
could not be just any understanding; it needed to be a rational understanding. Work 
done by Heidelberger (1993, 2004) points us to the fact that in nineteenth-century 
German experimental psychology, the human being functioned as a measurement 
device. We now see that post World War Two work regarding the representational 
theory of measurement and in behavioral decision research showed that in order for 
the human being to function as a measurement instrument the human being needed to 
be understood as behaving rationally. The psychologist needed to have a 
psychophysical or decision theoretical explanation of the individual’s response 
towards different stimuli in terms of rationality. In the case of decision making on the 
basis of utilities and probabilities, that theory of rationality was decision theory. 
Decision theory explained how an individual would rationally respond to different 
stimuli, and thus informed the psychologist which numeral to assign to the different 
stimuli. To make the link between measurement theory and decision theory one had to 
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assume that the individual that is used as the measurement instrument behaves 
rationally.   
 What happens if we find out that this individual in fact does not always behave 
rationally? This question did not come up seriously until the late 1960s and will be 
dealt with extensively in later chapters. However, from the above we can see what 
happens. If individuals are found to behave irrationally, this is problematic for 
decision theory because it means that decision theory does not provide a good 
description of human behavior. As long as the deviations from decision theory are 
random this is not too problematic. It would be the same problem as knowing that 
some or even all of the thermometers do not measure exactly right but that they 
measure correctly on average. However, when individuals are found to deviate 
systematically from the norms of decision theory, it becomes a serious problem. It not 
only means that decision theory is not a good description of actual, rational human 
behavior, it also implies that measurement theory is based on flawed assumptions. For 
instance, if the psychologist wants to measure what the relative value of two uncertain 
outcomes is and assumes that people have decided rationally, he or she simply asks a 
few people which of the two they prefer and thus measures which of the two has the 
highest expected value. But if it now turns out that human beings systematically 
deviate from rational behavior, the psychologist cannot infer from their choices, i.e. 
from the measurement, which of the two options has the higher expected value.  
 
6. Conclusion 
Mathematical psychology continued experimental psychology’s focus on 
mathematization and measurement. In the postwar period it aligned itself with the re-
appearance of decision theory in the work of Savage, and with the empirical 
investigation of decision theory in Edwards’ behavioral decision research. This 
alliance proved that in order to use the human being as a measurement instrument in 
psychology, it needed to be assumed that the individual makes its decisions rationally. 
Behavioral decision research was related to mathematical psychology’s measurement 
theory in its use of measurement theory. Behavioral decision research compared 
experimentally actual human decision behavior with the norms of decision theory, 
with the explicit purpose of engineering solutions for situations in which decision 
making is particularly difficult, or the individual is prone to make mistakes. The three 
intertwined developments of mathematical psychology, decision theory, and 
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behavioral decision research together constituted a scientific program of human 
decision behavior revolving around a set of axioms that determine rational or 
normative decision behavior. Furthermore, a comparison of human behavior to this 
normative benchmark could be made within a descriptive domain by means of 
experimental investigation.   
 It is tempting to conclude from the many references made to economics in 
mathematical psychology, decision theory and behavioral decision research that the 
three were connected to economics. And to some extent this is true. Mathematical 
psychology did incorporate economic texts, and Edwards, and to a minor extent 
Savage, based their research on extensive discussions of economics. But mathematical 
psychology, decision theory, and behavioral decision research used the economic 
literature for their own purposes, and they did this in ways that were at odds with 
economic practice.  
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3. Tversky’s behavioral deviations and Kahneman’s cognitive mistakes 
 
1. Kahneman and Tversky before Kahneman and Tversky 
The previous chapter showed how in postwar American psychology measurement 
theory was central to the development of mathematical psychology. This was further 
reflected in the newly-created field of behavioral decision research in psychology that 
assigned itself the task of testing decision theory’s axioms of normative behavior 
experimentally. This was done with the purpose of engineering solutions for cases in 
which the human decision making machinery failed. Because mathematical 
psychology’s measurement theory used the human being as a measurement 
instrument, and because behavioral decision research required a measurement 
instrument to conduct its experiments, mathematical psychology and behavioral 
decision research were natural extensions of one another. What was important for 
their interrelationship was furthermore that both used the University of Michigan as 
their principal base, although contributors to both programs also came from other 
universities. 
 In 1965, Amos Tversky (1937-1996) obtained his PhD from the University of 
Michigan under the supervision of Clyde Coombs and Ward Edwards. Tversky 
embodied the close connection between mathematical psychology and behavioral 
decision research. His dissertation combined Edwards’ focus on normative rules for 
rational behavior with Coombs’ interest in descriptive theories of measurement. 
Within a few years after finishing his PhD, Tversky became one of the foremost 
contributors to mathematical psychology’s representational theory of measurement 
and was one of the four authors of Foundations of Measurement, the standard work in 
the representational theory of measurement. Besides his work in mathematical 
psychology Tversky collaborated with Edwards and quickly became a frontrunner in 
behavioral decision research. Tversky’s prominence in behavioral decision research is 
exemplified by the fact that the collection of core behavioral decision research 
publications, Decision Making (1967), was co-edited by Edwards and Tversky.   
 Tversky’s greatest claim to fame came in the 1970s from his work with Daniel 
Kahneman (1934- ). Together Kahneman and Tversky constructed a new approach to 
human decision behavior in behavioral decision research that soon became more 
prominent than the approach favored by Edwards. They termed the new approach 
‘Heuristics and Biases.’ Heuristics and Biases and its derivative prospect theory laid 
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the basis for behavioral economics which will be dealt with in Chapter four. Before 
we look at Kahneman and Tversky’s collaborative research in the 1970s, however, we 
need to understand why Tversky became dissatisfied with the framework of 
behavioral decision research in the 1960s. To understand Kahneman and Tversky’s 
approach to behavioral decision research of the 1970s, it is necessary to understand 
the problems that Tversky tried to solve. The first section of this chapter thus deals 
with Tversky’s work in mathematical psychology and behavioral decision research in 
the 1960s. 
 But Kahneman and Tversky’s work of the 1970s was not solely the product of 
Tversky’s mind. Indeed, it is my belief that the crucial twist that solved Tversky’s 
problems in behavioral decision research came from Kahneman. An experimental 
psychologist just as Tversky, Kahneman came from a different theoretical 
background. The research that Kahneman conducted during the 1960s included the 
psychophysics of vision, semantic differentials, trade-offs between different cognitive 
tasks and related issues. The recurring theme in Kahneman’s work in the 1960s, and 
in his whole career, is that of cognitive mistakes. In all his research Kahneman 
investigates when human beings make cognitive mistakes, how severe these mistakes 
are, what explanation might account for this mistaken decision making, and in what 
way can mistakes be prevented in the future. In Kahneman’s work experimental 
psychology’s emphasis on deviations from the norm behavior became strongly 
pronounced. To understand why and in what way Kahneman altered Tversky’s 
behavioral decision research, we therefore need to go back to Kahneman’s work in the 
1960s. The second section of this chapter deals with Kahneman’s work in the 1960s.  
 
2. Caught between a priori axioms and behavioral deviations: Tversky’s research 
in the 1960s 
Between finishing his PhD in 1965 and completing his first publication with 
Kahneman in 1971 Tversky worked simultaneously in three related areas. He worked 
within Leonard Savage’s decision theory on the further refinement of normative 
decision theory, he extensively contributed to the mathematical development of the 
representational theory of measurement in mathematical psychology, and he measured 
the actual decision behavior of human beings in experiments and compared these 
measurements to the norms of decision theory. In the section which follows, I will  
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discuss Tversky’s work in these three areas separately, before making an overall 
assessment of Tversky’s work during the first six years following his PhD 
dissertation.   
 
2.1 Decision theory 
In his work on decision theory in the 1960s, Tversky adhered to the model and 
approach set out by Savage: “Utility theory, or the subjective expected utility (SEU) 
model, is a theory about decision making under risk. It is based on a set of seemingly 
reasonable axioms (Savage, 1954) which imply that an individual’s choices between 
risky alternatives can be described as the maximization of his subjective expected 
utility” [Tversky (1967c), p.27]. Tversky also accepted Edwards’ interpretation and 
application of Savage’s decision theory in terms of psychologists’ normative-
descriptive distinction. Thus, we read that utility theory “has been widely applied as a 
normative principle in economics and operations research, it underlies game theory 
and detection theory, and it has stimulated extensive experimental investigation” 
[Tversky (1967c), p.27].   
For instance, in Tversky’s first article “On the Optimal Number of 
Alternatives at a Choice Point” (1964), he described a mathematical model that 
determines the optimal number of alternatives at a choice point in a test. It considered 
as examples choices in “[m]ultiple choice tests, mazes or personality checks” 
[Tversky (1964), p.386], but the argument made implied that the theory could be 
applied to any choice problem in tests. The paper’s model showed mathematically that 
the optimal number of alternatives at a choice point in terms of discriminability, 
power and information is three. Tversky applied the approach of decision theory to a 
specific problem that as yet had not been solved satisfactorily, and he subsequently 
constructed a norm for this specific problem. Applying decision theory to the number 
of options at a choice point in a test yielded an optimum of three. A rational professor 
should thus give his students multiple choice tests with always three alternatives.  
For many decision situations it had already been established how a rational 
individual should behave. But often the mathematics of the solution to these decision 
situations could be improved. The theory was there, but it needed to be worked out a 
bit more. In the brief theoretical part of Tversky and Russo (1969), for example, the 
authors investigated the fundamental principle underlying “probabilistic theories of 
choice behavior” [Tversky and Russo (1969), p.1]. This fundamental principle, the 
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authors argued, appeared in different parts of the literature in different forms. It was 
known as the assumption of simple scalability, strong stochastic transitivity, 
substitutability, or independence. The authors showed that when these four principles 
were formulated in mathematical terms they amounted to the same. Tversky and 
Russo showed how what appeared on the surface to be different types of 
psychological investigations, in fact share a similar mathematical structure.  
Tversky’s work on decision theory in the 1960s accepted the decision 
theoretical work of Savage in particular as a starting point and refined it by applying it 
to specific situations and linking it to other theories. In his work on decision theory, 
Tversky was an exponent of the mathematical psychology in which he obtained his 
PhD. Tversky’s purpose was not to come up with a new theory or to criticize a theory. 
Instead, the focus was on refining mathematically what was already there. 
 
2.2 Measurement theory 
A major part of Tversky’s research during the period 1964-1971 was on measurement 
theory. Five lengthy articles in this period discuss topics such as the development of a 
generalized model of conjoint measurement, which allows one to measure 
probabilities and utilities in one and the same experiment; the foundations of 
multidimensional scaling; and multidimensional representation, which looks for ways 
to decompose different dimensions of measured dissimilarity judgments.20 The main 
question of this research, as set out in Chapter two, was to investigate which 
mathematical structure the measurement procedure requires so as to measure what it 
should measure. An important issue was how the experiment should be conducted so 
that both the subjective probability and the subjective value could be derived from one 
and the same choice of the subjects in the experiments.  
 In this measurement literature Tversky equated measurement theory with 
decision theory. Tversky was a prominent contributor to measurement theory in 
mathematical psychology and his views, in this regard, were the same as the 
mathematical psychology community at large, as depicted in Chapter two. To 
Tversky, the individual in psychological experiments served as the measurement 
                                                
20 In the preface of Foundations of Measurement (1971), Krantz, Luce, Suppes, and Tversky 
acknowledge that all the articles on measurement that appeared in the period 1967-1970 by one, or a 
combination of the authors, were by-products of work on the book. That is, what is in these articles can 
also be found in the book. The five articles on measurement written by Tversky before 1971, four of 
which are co-publications with Krantz, were all written during these four years. 
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instrument, just like the thermometer or pan balance in the experiments of the 
physicist and chemist. As a consequence, the axioms of the representational theory of 
measurement that described the working of the measurement instrument were exactly 
the same as the axioms that described rational, normative behavior in decision theory. 
As this is a crucial part of Tversky’s psychology, I will quote again from Foundations 
of Measurement. 
 
Unlike most theories of measurement, which may have both physical and 
behavioral interpretations, the theory of expected utility is devoted explicitly 
to the problem of making decisions when their consequences are uncertain. It 
is probably the most familiar example of a theory of measurement in the social 
sciences. [Krantz et al. (1971), p.369]   
 
To Tversky, the axioms of normative decision theory were at the same time axioms 
that described the functioning of the psychologist’s measurement instrument and 
axioms that described optimal decision behavior. Conceptually, this is only possible 
when one assumes that actual human decision behavior deviates very little from the 
norms of decision behavior. It assumes that if actual decision behavior deviates from 
the norm, it is somehow distributed evenly around the norm and does not deviate from 
the norm systematically. It also assumes that if human beings are found to deviate 
from the norms in certain situations, their mistakes can be relatively easily explained 
to them after which the individual will correct his or her behavior. Thus, when 
Tversky developed a conjoint measurement model for the representational theory of 
measurement using one measurement instrument to measure both utilities and 
probabilities, he needed to know how the subjects/instrument would behave in the 
experiment. For Tversky, the axioms of the measurement theory and of decision 
theory would predict how the subject/instrument would behave. On the basis of this 
knowledge, Tversky could then devise a measurement model and experiment that 
would produce both the perceived utilities and the perceived probabilities.  
 
2.3 Behavioral decision research 
Tversky’s work on the representational theory of measurement and on decision theory 
came together in his experimental work on behavioral decision research. The 
measurement models were applied in experimental testing and actual behavior was 
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tested against normative decision theory. It is important to emphasize that in this early 
experimental work of Tversky, the question was not whether, let alone how, human 
beings deviate from the norms of decision theory. Tversky’s basic research question 
in the 1960s, just as that posed by Edwards, was how to apply the normative model to 
human decision making behavior. The axioms of decision theory indicated how we 
should, and usually do make decisions given the utilities and probabilities implied by 
the different options. But what the axioms neglected to specify was how a human 
being perceives utilities and probabilities. In Savage’s subjective expected utility 
(SEU) model, for instance, it was assumed that subjects have a subjective perception 
of both value and probabilities, termed utility and subjective probability respectively, 
which differs from the objective values and that subjects base their decisions on these 
subjective values. In a closely related model, the subjective expected value (SEV) 
model, it was assumed that subjects have only a subjective perception of the 
probabilities. Furthermore, it was investigated whether the subjective value curve of 
different goods has the same shape. It could, for instance, be the case that the 
subjective perception of the utility of candy decreases much faster than that of 
cigarettes. Thus, Tversky’s experiments were first and foremost an investigation of 
how to apply the axioms of measurement theory and decision theory. The human 
being was used as a measurement instrument to measure the different attributes of 
actual human decision behavior, which in turn informed Tversky how decision theory 
best fitted into the experimental psychological framework. 
 At the same time, Tversky used his experiments to test whether the human 
instrument indeed functions properly. Tversky’s experiments were set up to measure 
the subjective value curve of candy and cigarettes, but the experiments at the same 
time checked whether the subjects behaved according to the axioms of decision theory 
and measurement theory. As, for instance, the axiom of transitivity was the 
“cornerstone of normative and descriptive theories,” and underlied “measurement 
models of sensation and value” [Tversky (1969), p.31], the experiments were used as 
an opportunity to also test the axioms of measurement theory. Thus, in one and the 
same experiment Tversky would apply the representational theory of measurement, 
check whether its measurement instrument functioned properly, measure subjective 
perception of probabilities and utilities, and monitor whether human beings indeed 
behave according to the axioms of decision theory.  
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 For example, Tversky (1967a) tested the additivity and the independence 
axiom, two key axioms of normative decision theory and measurement theory, in a 
gambling experiment with eleven male inmates at the State Prison of Southern 
Michigan. The subjects had to gamble for, and were paid in, candy and cigarettes. Six 
normative decision models were compared for both the set of candy gambles and the 
set of cigarettes gambles. In both cases, it turned out, Savage’s normative SEU model 
provided the best description of the behavior displayed by the subjects. Given the 
SEU model, both additivity and the independence of subjective probability and utility 
were confirmed. That is, assuming that people make their decisions according to the 
normative theory, the SEU model provided the best description. Nevertheless, 
Tversky was cautious and concluded that “After more than 15 years of experimental 
investigation of decisions under risk, the evidence on the descriptive validity of the 
SEU model is still inconclusive” [Tversky (1967a), p.199].   
 In a follow-up paper, Tversky (1967b) set out a measurement model that tested 
the descriptive validity of different normative models of decision making, among 
them Savage’s SEU model, the power utility theory, and the strict additive model. To 
do so, the eleven inmates from the State Prison of Southern Michigan had to choose 
between different gambles, but did not know the relevant probabilities beforehand. 
Savage’s SEU model provided the best description, but failed in the sense that the 
subjects consistently overestimated low and underestimated high probabilities. The 
model was therefore extended with a power utility function that allowed utility to be a 
non-monotonic function of money (versus monotonic in the standard case), and to 
vary across individuals. Tversky stressed the proven independence of subjective 
probability and utility in the experiment and concluded that the best descriptive model 
(SEU plus power utility) was incompatible with utility theory. In other words, to 
maintain the assumption that subjects make their decisions in the normatively correct 
way, Tversky had to assume a normative model that is inconsistent with utility theory. 
To maintain the idea that individuals make decisions rationally, it had to be concluded 
that utility theory is descriptively wrong.   
 Thus Tversky went a step further than Edwards in testing the axioms of 
measurement theory and decision theory. For Edwards the axioms were a priori truths 
that could not be violated. If the experimental results indicated that the axioms had  
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been systematically violated, then there must have been a problem with the 
experimental design somewhere. During the period between 1965 and 1971, however, 
Tversky came to believe that the axioms were systematically violated by the 
experimental subjects. In his experimental work, Tversky consistently distinguished 
between the normative and the descriptive. The emphasis was on well-known decision 
problems such as making gambles, but other decision situations that were investigated 
were, for instance, whether people can determine which of two lights is the brighter, 
or from which of two distributions a four-digit number can be drawn. Without 
exception, the experiments tested one or more normative models descriptively. That 
is, the hypothesis was that the normative model was a good description of actual 
decision behavior, which was then tested experimentally.  
  In a collaborative paper Tversky and Edwards (1966) investigated whether 
subjects seek the optimal amount of information that normative decision theory 
predicts that they will seek. To test this, an experiment was conducted in which 
subjects had to determine which of two lights is brighter. Subjects could obtain 
information about their results by paying with the money they had earned by giving 
correct responses. In some of the experimental treatments the subjects were told 
beforehand the distribution of each of the two lights. The normative model that was 
proposed as a descriptive model did not work well; subjects sought much more 
information than the model had predicted they would. The normative model which 
served as description of actual choice behavior was subsequently rejected. But the 
authors did not really know what to conclude from these results. They did not draw 
the conclusion that the normative model had been falsified, but they provided a 
number of explanations that might account for the deviations. At the same time, 
however, it was stressed that these explanations only partially explained the 
deviations. They concluded that for reasons yet to be discovered the normative model 
did not work well in this particular situation. 
 The problem of systematic deviations continued to bother Tversky and in 1969 
he published a paper, entitled “Intransitivity of Preferences,” in which experiments 
were described and discussed that had the sole purpose of testing the axiom of 
transitivity. Transitivity, Tversky stated, “is of central importance to both psychology 
and economics. It is the cornerstone of normative and descriptive decision theories.”  
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Furthermore, it is the essential assumption in measurement theories since “it is a 
necessary condition for the existence of an ordinal (utility) scale” [Tversky (1969), 
p.31]. The article described a number of experiments that falsify weak stochastic 
transitivity (WST). In WST, transitivity of preferences is defined in terms of 
probabilities, hence, x is weakly preferred over y if and only if P(x,y) ≥  ½, meaning 
that the probability of choosing x over y is larger than or equal to a half. It was shown 
that WST does not hold descriptively. That is to say, the subjects’ actual decisions 
were not in the least stochastically transitive. And as transitivity is a key assumption 
in decision theory and measurement theory, this was potentially a serious problem as 
it implied that no normative model whatsoever could describe subjects’ actual 
decision making.  
 But Tversky was still reluctant to give up on this foundation of both 
measurement theory and decision theory, as transitivity “is one of the basic and the 
most compelling principles of rational behavior” [Tversky (1969), p.45]. Tversky 
suggested that normative decision theory could be maintained because apparent 
intransitivities could always be attributed to an unobserved change of preference that 
takes place between the decisions made. He concluded somewhat paradoxically that 
“The main interest in the present results lies not so much in the fact that transitivity 
can be violated but rather in what these violations reveal about the choice mechanism 
and the approximation method that govern preference between multidimensional 
alternatives” [Tversky (1969), p.46].  
 The reason that Tversky was reluctant to accept that the experiments falsified 
the axioms was that the axioms were such a fundamental aspect of both measurement 
theory and decision theory. If he had accepted that the axioms were wrong, the 
representational theory of measurement and normative decision theory as description 
of human behavior would be falsified. Another reason why Tversky was reluctant to 
give up the axioms was that the experimental results did not always indicate 
falsification. In the above-mentioned experiments conducted in the prison of Southern 
Michigan, the decision behavior of the subjects largely corresponded to the norm. 
There were more situations in which the results were mixed. In Rapoport and Tversky 
(1970), subjects were presented with a sequence of offers and they had to decide at 
each stage whether to stop and take the present offer, or to continue sampling more  
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offers. The optimal stopping point was given by the normative analysis. It can be 
shown mathematically that with, for example, 200 offers and zero costs it is optimal 
to let 74 offers pass and then pick the first offer that is higher than any of the offers 
encountered before. The authors found that in about one-third of the cases the subjects  
made decision ‘errors’, i.e. deviations from the norm. But in roughly two-third of the 
cases the subjects’ behavior was in agreement with the normative model.  
 Over time it became clearer to Tversky that normative decision theory was 
often too difficult to apply to actual human decision behavior. Although the normative 
theory was not always violated and could often be saved as descriptive theory by 
means of ad hoc assumptions, the pressing conclusion was that in too many cases 
people’s actual decisions systematically deviate from the optimal decision as 
determined by measurement and decision theory. Decision theory could only be 
proven incorrect by a priori introspective reasoning (as set out in Chapter two) but 
persistent deviating decision behavior by people in experiments could nevertheless be 
an indication that something was wrong with the theory. If one observes the reasoning 
behavior of subjects which deviates from what is considered to be logically correct, 
either these subjects do not reason logically, or the assumed theory of logical 
reasoning is incorrect. 
 
2.4 Situating Tversky’s experimental method  
Tversky’s increasing conviction that often the normative theory could not be applied 
to actual human decision behavior was the result of the experiments he conducted in 
the 1960s. These experiments were done with a small number of subjects; seven or 
eight was a normal group size. Although this was not always explicitly indicated, it is 
furthermore clear that in the majority of cases the experimenter and subject were 
previously acquainted since, for example, the subjects had participated in a university 
course the experimenter taught as their professor.  
 The experiments were done in a traditional experimental psychological setting. 
The subjects were often assigned numbers, for instance 1-7, and referred to 
individually. When discussing the empirical results, the subjects were sometimes 
analyzed individually, which was typically exemplary for a perceived more general  
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behavioral pattern. Thus, for instance, in an experiment published in 1969, the utility 
curve of subject 3 was discussed because of its peculiar shape, and in similar 
experiments conducted in 1966, statements of a post-experiment interview with 
subjects were compared with their performance during the experiment [Tversky and  
Edwards (1966), Tversky (1969)]. In this regard, Tversky’s experimental work is an 
example of research from before the “inference revolution” of the mid-twentieth  
century [Gigerenzer and Murray (1987), p.182, see also Danziger (1990)]. That is to 
say, the analyses did not calculate an average response over experimental subjects, but 
instead tried to find an explanation that would cover the observed behavior of the 
individual experimental subjects. 
 The individual trials of the experiments were relatively long. For example, in 
one experiment [Rapoport and Tversky (1970)] subjects were asked to judge which of 
two light bulbs was brighter one thousand times in a row. The experiment consisted of 
a sequence of two or three trials of about one hour each. As a result, the experiment 
took quite some time. In this most time-intensive experiment done by Tversky, “[t]he 
subjects met five times a week for seven weeks. Each experimental session lasted 
about two hours” [Rapoport and Tversky (1970), p.108]. 
 
2.5 The road not taken: Elimination by Aspects 
One conclusion Tversky was aiming to develop from 1966-1967 onwards was that 
people do not behave according to the normative theory of decision making, but 
nevertheless act rationally [Krantz – interview (2008)]. In other words, Tversky tried 
to develop a new normative theory. “Elimination by Aspects: A Theory of Choice” 
appeared as a monograph in 1971 and as an article in Psychological Review in 1972. 
“Elimination by Aspects: A Theory of Choice” began by introducing decision 
theory’s two-fold problem with the independence axiom. The independence axiom 
was first of all problematic on empirical grounds because it was “incompatible with 
some observed patterns of preferences which exhibit systematic dependencies among 
alternatives” [Tversky (1972), p.281]. Even though he had observed this problem 
before, Tversky now concluded that this behavioral deviation could not be solved 
within existing decision theory:  
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 data show that the principle of independence from irrelevant alternatives is 
 violated in a manner that cannot be readily accounted for by grouping choice 
 alternatives. More specifically, it appears that the addition of an alternative to 
 an offered set “hurts” alternatives that are similar to the added alternatives 
 more than those that are dissimilar to it” [Tversky (1972), p.283].  
 
Because of the impossibility of solving the behavioral deviations within the existing 
theory, decision theorists and behavioral decision researchers required “a more drastic 
revision of the principles underlying [the] models of choice” [Tversky (1972), p.283]. 
 In the theory as constructed by Savage (1954) only deductive, introspective 
reasoning could show the normative theory to be wrong. Empirical results could not 
show these rules of logical, rational reasoning to be false. Tversky accepted this 
position but moved on to show that on the basis of deductive armchair thinking doubts 
could also be raised. “Suppose,” Tversky argued, “you are offered a choice among the 
following three records: a suite by Debussy, denoted D, and two different recordings 
of the same Beethoven symphony, denoted B1 and B2.”  Assume furthermore “that the 
two Beethoven recordings are of equal quality, and that you are undecided between 
adding a Debussy or a Beethoven to your collection. Hence, P(B1;B2) = P(D;B1) = 
P(D;B2) = ½.” It then “follows readily that P(D;B1;B2) = 1/3.” However, this 
conclusion “is unacceptable on intuitive grounds because the basic conflict between 
Debussy and Beethoven is not likely to be affected by the addition of another 
Beethoven recording” [Tversky (1972), p.283, emphasis added]. The empirical 
evidence had made the normative theory less useful for practical purposes, but it was 
this last introspective argument that dealt the final blow.  
 Thus, a new normative decision theory was required, Tversky argued, and this 
should preferably be a theory that could serve both the normative and the descriptive 
domain. Tversky then proposed such a theory, labeled elimination-by-aspects (EBA). 
Elimination-by-aspects was as simple and elegant as it was convincing. Rational 
human decision making, Tversky argued, occurs not through a process of expected 
utility maximization, but through a sequential process of eliminating the alternative 
with the lowest expected value. Here I quote Tversky at length.   
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The present development describes choice as a covert sequential elimination 
process. Suppose that each alternative consists of a set of aspects of 
characteristics, and that at every stage of the process, an aspect is selected 
(from those included in the available alternatives) with probability that is 
proportional to its weight. The selection of an aspect eliminates all the 
alternatives that do not include the selected aspects, and the process continues 
until a single alternative remains. If a selected aspect is included in all the 
available alternatives, no alternative is eliminated and a new aspect is selected. 
Consequently, aspects that are common to all the alternatives under 
consideration do not affect choice probabilities. Since the present theory 
describes choice as an elimination process governed by successive selection of 
aspects, it is called the elimination-by-aspects (EBA) model.  
[Tversky (1972), p.285]   
 
 Tversky’s EBA model is an example of attempts made by (behavioral) 
decision theorists in the late 1960s and early 1970s to move away from the traditional 
normative decision theory in order to propose alternatives. It shows that Tversky, over 
the course of the first eight years of his professional career, became increasingly 
dissatisfied with the normative theory as set out by Savage. Moreover, it shows that 
by the late 1960s he was actively searching for a solution in view of the difficulties, 
and that he sought to construct a new normative theory.  
 
2.6 Caught between a priori axioms and behavioral deviations 
Tversky was professionally trained at the University of Michigan during the 1960s in 
two related traditions: the mathematical psychology of Louis Leon Thurstone, Stanley 
Stevens, and Clyde Coombs, and the decision theory/behavioral decision research of 
Leonard Savage and Ward Edwards. In the work of Tversky these two branches of 
psychology came together, extending and influencing each other. The problem that 
arose was that the experiments produced systematic behavioral deviations that 
potentially disproved the very foundations of measurement theory and decision 
theory. Because of the far-reaching consequences of accepting that the axioms were 
falsified, Tversky was reluctant to accept this conclusion. At the same time, however, 
he took the behavioral deviations seriously and was unwilling to accept as an 
explanation for the behavioral deviations ad hoc explanations that problematized the 
  
 
61 
 
 
 
experimental procedure, such as the solution of changing tastes between experimental 
sessions. By the late 1960s and early 1970s, Tversky was actively looking for a way 
to solve the behavioral deviations problem. His eliminations-by-aspects theory was an 
attempt to take the behavioral deviations seriously, and to reconstruct decision theory 
and measurement theory based on a new foundation.  
 The methodological tension Tversky was struggling with involved how a 
theory that is a priori true can be combined with experimental results that point in 
many directions, but only occasionally in the direction of the a priori theory. Tversky 
could not proceed as an experimentalist who seeks to test whether a theory is right or 
wrong. As the axioms were a priori truths, they could only be proven wrong on the 
basis of a priori reasoning. Measurement theory and normative decision theory were 
simply not devised and employed as theories that could be proven wrong 
experimentally. At the same time, however, Tversky wanted to do justice to the 
experimental results he had obtained. Sticking to the axioms of measurement theory 
and decision theory would have implied that whenever a systematic behavioral 
deviation was observed in the experiments, there was something wrong with the 
experiment. This would mean that the majority of Tversky’s experiments were 
invalid. Tversky was thus effectively caught between the a priori truth of the axioms 
of measurement theory and decision theory, and the behavioral deviations that 
surfaced in his experiments. He had to decide between either taking his experiments 
seriously, or accepting the axioms of measurement theory and decision theory. His 
elimination-by-aspects theory proves that by the early 1970s, Tversky had chosen the 
first option. He accepted his experimental results as valid and thus had to construct a 
whole new basis for measurement theory and decision theory. But he did so by 
disproving Savage’s decision theory on intuitive grounds. That is, by accepting that 
ultimately only an a priori ‘test’ of the axioms could prove them wrong. 
 For reasons that will become clear in Chapter four, the elimination-by-aspects 
theory turned out to be a road not taken. In the beginning of the 1970s, Kahneman 
offered Tversky a solution that both solved the problem of experimental behavioral 
deviations, and at the same time left intact the fundamentals of measurement theory 
and decision theory. The Savage-Edwards approach to decision theory and behavioral 
decision research continued to be problematic for Tversky, but the solution he would 
come to favor lay in another direction. Tversky would find this solution in his joint 
work with Kahneman. 
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3. Kahneman’s cognitive mistakes 
3.1 From correlational to experimental psychology 
Kahneman obtained a B.A. from Hebrew University in 1956 while working as a 
psychologist in the Israeli army. In 1958 he moved to San Francisco and obtained a 
PhD from the University of California at Berkeley in 1961 under the supervision of 
Susan Ervin (1927- ). To understand how Kahneman solved Tversky’s problems in 
mathematical psychology, decision theory and behavioral decision theory in the 
1970s, we need to examine the research Kahneman conducted before his collaboration 
with Tversky. Between 1961 and 1971, Kahneman’s research was about semantic 
differentials, optometry, vision research, and related themes. Kahneman’s research in 
this period was unrelated to mathematical psychology, unrelated to decision theory, 
unrelated to behavioral decision research, and despite some retrospective hints of 
Kahneman to the contrary, entirely unrelated to economics.  
 Based on Kahneman’s recollections in his autobiography and the one 
publication that emerged from this, his early work for the Israeli army in the early 
1950s and at the Hebrew University is best characterized as correlational psychology 
[Danziger (1990,1997), Gigerenzer (1987a,b)].21 Correlational psychology builds 
theories on the basis of correlations in statistical data, for example between IQ and the 
degree of education. Using methods developed by the British army in World War 
Two, the aim of Kahneman’s early research was to develop reliable predictions about 
the future performance of people on the basis of character traits, be it in the army or in 
different kinds of jobs. For instance, to find out at an early stage which new recruits in 
the army would eventually be successful leaders on the future battlefield, different 
tests were designed to evaluate the differences between recruits with respect to a few 
behavioral and personal characteristics that were thought to relate to leadership 
capacities.  
 It is not difficult to see that in this kind of research the ability of the researcher 
to predict the future performance of the subjects investigated is an important, and 
perhaps the only way to measure success. A classification of new recruits in the army 
along different dimensions might be an interesting exercise, but if it does not predict 
                                                
21 Kahneman and Ghiselli (1962), Kahneman (2002). After he completed his PhD at Berkeley in 1961 
Kahneman returned to the psychology department at Hebrew University where he would remain until 
1978. In the meantime, however, he was a visiting scholar at the University of Michigan in 1965-1966, 
a visiting scientist and lecturer in psychology at Harvard University in 1966-1967, a visiting scientist 
during the summer terms of 1968 and 1969 at the Applied Psychology Research Unit of Cambridge, 
UK, and a lecturer in the graduate program of the University of Michigan in 1968-1969. 
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better than chance then it is of no use. In his autobiography [Kahneman (2002)] 
Kahneman recalls how frustrating it was when time and again he was confronted with 
the fact that his predictions were anything but reliable. Extensive questionnaires and 
tests were set up, but in the end it turned out that the intuitive guesses of the staff 
members who conducted the tests and collected the questionnaires proved better than 
the scientific predictions.   
 Dissatisfied with the results of this research and eager to develop his research 
skills, Kahneman switched to experimental psychology of vision, resulting in some 
twenty-five articles over a period of ten years, including two publications in Science, 
and a whole range more in prominent experimental psychology journals such as the 
Journal of Experimental Psychology. There is not one particular theme or article that 
stands out during the decade from 1961 to 1971. The psychological view held by 
Kahneman emerges when the different themes and articles are considered next to each 
other. In the following two sections I will first provide an overview of Kahneman’s 
work during this period and then come to a general assessment of Kahneman’s work 
in this period.  
 
3.2 Kahneman’s research 1961-1971 
Kahneman’s career began with the theoretical work he did concerning the models 
used in experimental studies of semantic differentials. Semantic Differential (SD) 
research investigates people’s attitude towards words [Heise (1970), p.235], or, put 
differently, measures the meaning of abstract objects to the individual [Kiddler 
(1981)]. A distinction is made between the denotative and the connotative meaning of 
a word, or concept, or object. Thus, it is assumed that apart from the dictionary, or the 
denotative meaning, words are also assigned connotative meanings by the individual. 
The words massacre and rape, for instance, are attributed different connotations than 
flower or sunny day in terms of good versus bad. SDs are measured on a bipolar scale, 
for which in principle all opposites can be used, such as good-bad, soft-hard, fast-
slow, clean-dirty, valuable-worthless, and so forth.  
 Articles on SD make up a small, but important part of the publications of 
Kahneman’s early work. Apart from his dissertation, it was the subject of one 
published article.22 It also provides a good illustration of Kahneman’s take on 
                                                
22 Kahneman’s dissertation consisted of a paper he wrote in eight days [Kahneman (2002), p.6]. 
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experimental psychology. Within the field of SD research, Kahneman’s focus was on 
the theory behind the models that are used to infer conclusions about the connotative 
meanings. In Kahneman (1963) he showed that models that are used to measure SDs 
are mathematically not sufficiently sophisticated and may give rise to wrong 
interpretations of what is observed. Kahneman considered the following model for the 
rating sijk of the concept j by individual i on scale k 
  
   sijk = Tjk + Cik + dijk      [1] 
 
in which Tjk  is the “true score” of concept j on scale k, computed as the average score 
of a number of judges. Cik is the “constant deviation” of subject i on scale k, computed 
as the average deviation of subject i from the true score over a large number of 
concepts. dijk is the “specific deviation” (or “error of judgment”) on a particular rating. 
Kahneman argued that the practice of contemporary SD research wrongly assumed 
that the specific deviations of ratings were uncorrelated. For example, deviating from 
the true score could very well be correlated during the course of one experiment. 
Improvement should be sought in the direction of more “precise algebraic” models. 
Kahneman’s research focused not so much on the theory of SDs as such, but on the 
improvement of the analysis of variance in the statistical models it employed. 
Specifically, he focused on the notion of the “error of judgment” in SD research. The 
object of investigation was to understand how people deviate from what is true or 
correct. In effect, that meant that the analysis of the actual process of how people 
make judgments was black-boxed.   
 In 1962-1963, Kahneman set up a vision lab at the department of psychology 
of the Hebrew University [Kahneman (2002), p.6]. Many of the articles he published 
in the following years were derived from the experimental results of this lab. In this 
research, Kahneman investigated the relationship between the “energy” of different 
stimuli and visual perception capacities. “Energy” was employed as a general concept 
to define the strength of a stimulus; the brighter, the more illuminated, the more 
contrasted, the longer and so forth the stimulus was, the more energy it had. Visual 
perception was measured in terms of the reaction times of the subjects. In the typical 
experiment, the subject had to decide as quickly as possible whether the opening of a 
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so-called Landolt C was directed up-, down-, left-, or rightwards.23 The conditions in 
terms of brightness, contrast, and so on in this setting could be varied in numerous 
ways. The visual task could also be combined with other cognitive tasks. Kahneman’s 
text book on the psychology of vision and attention, Attention and Effort (1973), is 
still used in the early twenty-first century as standard reference on the subject [Dawes 
– Interview (2008)]. 
 Examples of this research include Kahneman’s (1964), “Control of Spurious 
Association and the Reliability of the Controlled Variable” and Kahneman’s (1966b), 
“Time-Intensity Reciprocity in Acuity as a Function of Luminance and Figure-
Ground Contrast.”24 In Kahneman and Norman (1964), the relation between the 
minimal amount of time subjects need to identify a visual stimulus (labeled the 
“critical duration” tc) and the energy in terms of brightness and duration of the 
stimulus is investigated. It was shown that the stimuli of equal energy do not 
necessarily produce the same critical duration and that a given visual stimulus does 
not trigger one but multiple sensory processes.  The second conclusion particularly 
opposed the general view held in the psychophysical community that one stimulus 
triggers only one sensory process. In Kahneman (1966b) the Bunsen-Roscoe law of 
the time-intensity of reciprocity is (partly) falsified. This law forms a central concept 
in the psychophysics of vision, stating that up to the critical duration tc, duration and 
intensity of the stimulus are interchangeable, in which duration is measured in 
seconds and intensity in lux. Kahneman showed that time-intensity reciprocity fails to 
hold when a Landolt C stimulus at 40mL*msec is preceded by a 2 second flash of 
1mL.    
 In the psychophysical paradigm, visual perception is seen as one of many 
cognitive tasks. Other cognitive tasks include conversation, or more generally, speech, 
learning, and calculation. How different cognitive tasks influence one another was 
investigated in Kahneman and Beatty (1966, 1967), Kahneman et al. (1967,1968), and 
Kahneman and Peavler (1969). The explicit emphasis in these articles was on how the 
combination of different cognitive tasks could lead to “errors of judgment.” In 
Kahneman et al. (1967) for instance it was shown that the capacity to visually 
                                                
23 The Landolt C is one of the standard symbols used in American psychophysics of vision and 
optometry. It consists of a C in which the opening can be varied, and which is either surrounded by 
bars the width of which equals the C’s opening or not surrounded. 
24 Other examples include Flom et al. (1963), Kahneman (1965a,b, 1966a, 1967), Kahneman and 
Norman (1964), and Kahneman et al. (1967). 
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perceive substantially decreases when subjects were engaged in other mental tasks 
such as speech or calculation. The “error of judgment” in these cases is very real, as it 
explains for instance why car drivers may miss a stop sign when engaged in 
conversation. It again illustrates Kahneman’s focus on the psychology of mistakes.  
Another way in which the psychophysics of vision and cognitive tasks are 
connected is through measuring a mental task. For example, a clear correlation can be 
found between the difficulty of the mental task and the diameter of the pupil. The 
pupil dilates when the task begins and constricts when the answer or report is given. 
This relation is investigated in Kahneman and Beatty (1966), Kahneman et al. (1968), 
Kahneman et al. (1969), and Kahneman and Wright (1971). In Kahneman and Wright 
(1971), the authors investigated the correlation between pupil size and short-term 
memory. It was shown that pupillary size provides a good measurement for mental 
activity. When involved in a mental task, the subjects’ pupil clearly dilates. A number 
of characteristics of short term memory were reported. Mental activity in case of short 
term memory seemed for example negatively correlated with the time subjects have to 
store a stimulus in memory. If a stimulus has to be stored in memory for seven 
seconds, instead of three, mental activity on average was lower. However, there are 
more factors influencing the level of activity. It was also shown that mental activity 
and the difficulty of a memory task are positively correlated. Kahneman et al. (1969) 
compared the pupil diameter as a measurement for mental activity with measurements 
of the heart rate and of skin resistance. The results indicated that these three 
measurements are not very well correlated. Pupil diameter remained therefore the 
preferred method. Nevertheless, some reservation was expressed, as the relation 
between mental activity and each of the three methods is not precisely known. 
 
3.3 Kahneman’s cognitive errors 
In Kahneman’s vision research an emphasis was placed on the question under which 
circumstances the human mind makes cognitive errors. Kahneman showed that there 
is a trade-off between different cognitive tasks in perception capacities, and that as a 
result people may sometimes “fail” to perceive the stimulus and make an error in 
judgment. Furthermore, the research done by Kahneman in the period between 1961 
and 1971 was in line with the interwar drive to eliminate all introspection from 
psychology [Danziger (1997)]. In Kahneman’s experiments self-reports were not 
necessary to establish how the cognitive system operates. The behavior of the 
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cognitive system could be inferred from observed behavior and physical responses 
which cannot be controlled, such as pupil dilations and restriction. The human mind 
was considered to be a black box whose functioning could be inferred from the 
uncontrollable and unconscious responses made by the individual subjects.   
 Both elements are important in gaining an understanding of Kahneman’s 
psychology and his subsequent influence on Tversky. The recurring theme of the 
cognitive errors shows, that in Kahneman’s view, psychology was about discovering 
how people deviate from a norm behavior. This aspect of experimental psychology 
dates back to the beginning of experimental psychology in nineteenth-century 
Germany. But in nineteenth-century German and interwar American experimental 
psychology, this framework was adopted for the purpose of discovering what the true 
value was. The experimental psychologists wanted to know the true value of, for 
instance, the smallest amount of difference in weight people could perceive, and for 
this purpose devised a framework, which in spite of all the individual errors, could 
establish the true value. Thurstone, for instance, wanted to measure the attitude 
towards religion of a group of people, and for this purpose he constructed a method 
that would elicit the attitude from a series of observations in which each individually 
deviated from the true value. Experimental psychology was explicitly modeled after 
experimental practice in physics, where the physicist tries to establish the true value 
of boiling water by conducting a series of measurements in which each measurement 
individually deviates from the true value and from each other.  
 Kahneman employed the experimental psychological framework, but applied 
it differently than the nineteenth-century German psychologists. In Kahneman’s work 
the true value was known. The true value was an accurate prediction of a recruit’s 
future leadership capacities, or the true value was not running through a traffic light 
when driving a car. The question Kahneman then raised was how, when, and why the 
cognitive machinery fails to act according to the true value. Kahneman used an 
experimental psychological framework, but applied it with the opposite purpose. He 
did not want to find out what the true value was, but how people deviate from the true 
value. In Kahneman’s research, the true value was always clear and determined by the 
experimenter. Kahneman knew how the cognitive machinery ideally responds, and 
investigated whether it actually does do so. In Kahneman’s understanding, the 
scientist thus completely determined in each experimental situation what the good, 
optimal, or rational behavior should be. This was in line with the scientific desire to 
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eliminate all introspection because it assumed that the experimental subject cannot 
judge whether he or she is giving the correct response or not. In Kahneman’s 
experiments the experimenter determined how the subject should behave and 
determined how it did behave. All authority for judging behavior was placed in the 
hands of the scientist. 
 Because Kahneman has never provided an extensive theoretical exposition of 
the assumption that human beings often make cognitive errors, one could easily 
dismiss it as merely a nice way of illustrating theories which are perhaps not too 
exciting, but that would be a mistake. The key to understanding Kahneman’s 
psychology lies in his conviction that human beings often make cognitive errors. 
Since Kahneman is a psychologist who sets out his theories through case-based 
reasoning, it is also by means of these cases that we can best illustrate and understand 
Kahneman’s firm belief in cognitive errors. In the example of the army psychologist 
at the beginning of this chapter, Kahneman and his colleagues really believed that 
through their extensive studies they could accurately predict, or at least predict better 
than by mere chance, the future performance of different candidates for a job. The fact 
that they could not was for the young Kahneman a true cognitive illusion that he 
needed to correct for himself [Kahneman (2002)].  
 Another illustrative example recalled by Kahneman in his autobiography was 
the moment a flight instructor disagreed with the psychologists’ theory that praise is 
more effective in developing skills than punishment. The flight instructor reasoned 
that although he praised the good performance of his recruits, the next time the 
performance would almost always be worse. Similarly, he would always punish 
recruits who had done a poor job, and this would almost always improve performance 
the next time. To Kahneman this was a clear cognitive illusion. A good performance 
is statistically more likely to be followed by a worse performance than by an equally 
good or even better performance, and vice versa. Thus, the flight instructor was 
suffering from a cognitive illusion. The truck or car driver described above who is 
engaged in a conversation and thus does not see a traffic light that he or she would 
otherwise not miss, really does makes an error. His or her cognitive apparatus is tuned 
to noticing traffic lights, but it fails to do so.  
 To Kahneman it was and is a given fact of life that human beings often make 
cognitive errors. However, science can help in two ways. First, scientists can set out 
what the correct way of behaving should be for each situation. For the truck driver, it 
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is obvious what the correct behavior is, but for the flight instructor it may not be 
intuitively clear what the correct way of reasoning is. Scientists can therefore help to 
establish the correct way of reasoning. Second, scientists, and in particular 
psychologists, can help by investigating when, how and in what way human beings 
make cognitive errors and thus provide a basis for designing tools or education to help 
human beings correct these cognitive errors.  
 
4. Conclusion 
Before Kahneman and Tversky started collaborating in 1969 and published their first 
paper in 1971, the research that each conducted was not directly related. Although 
both can, partly in the case of Tversky, be placed in the realm of experimental 
psychology, the approach each took and the psychological phenomena they 
investigated differed. Tversky was raised in the fields of mathematical psychology, 
decision theory, and behavioral decision research at the University of Michigan. He 
was principally interested in human decision making under risk. Kahneman, on the 
other hand, conducted research on semantic differentials, vision and the interaction of 
cognitive tasks.  
 The point of contact between their two research programs was that of 
experimentally observed behavior that deviates from what the scientist expects. 
Tversky was struggling to incorporate behavioral deviations in the representational 
theory of measurement and decision theory, whereas Kahneman was investigating 
how, when, and why human beings deviate from the response or behavior they should 
display. This concern with deviating behavior would become the basis for their 
collaborative research of the 1970s. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
70 
 
 
 
4. Heuristics and Biases for psychology and economics,  
Kahneman and Tversky in the 1970s 
 
1. The Kahneman and Tversky collaboration 
In 1969 Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky started a collaboration that would result 
in twenty-one collaborative papers and two co-edited books, including one published 
together with Paul Slovic. They continued to co-operate on different projects until 
Tversky’s death in 1996, but the most productive and creative period was from 1969 
to 1979, including the widely cited 1974 Science and 1979 Econometrica articles. The 
cooperation was initiated by Kahneman, who was looking for ways to experimentally 
test his intuition that an individual’s cognitive apparatus often fails, and who tried to 
find a theory that might account for these cognitive errors [Krantz – interview (2008), 
Dawes – interview (2008), Kahneman (2002)]. But the ensuing program stemmed as 
much from the result of Tversky’s growing doubts concerning Leonard Savage and 
Ward Edwards’ assumption that, generally speaking, individuals decide according to 
the normative rules of logic, Bayesian statistics, and expected utility theory.   
 Although their collaborative work constituted an important part of their 
research, especially in the 1970s, it was never the only project they were engaged in. 
Kahneman continued to work on vision research and Tversky kept working on 
measurement theory and, sometimes, on elimination-by-aspects. The role that the 
collaborative work with Kahneman in Tversky’s life played is nicely illustrated in 
fifteen letters which Tversky wrote to his close friend David Krantz between 1967 and 
1977. His work with Kahneman is briefly mentioned for the first time in 1969, when 
Tversky, in an off-hand remark, notes that “I am working a little bit with Danny, on 
the problem of statistical intuition, which helped to reinforce my prejudices 
concerning the importance of statistics” [Tversky’s letter to Krantz, October 5, 1969]. 
A month later, the work with Kahneman seems to have taken off seriously, as one 
project among a number of different projects Tversky was working on:  
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 Danny and I got deeply involved in the problem of processing uncertainty: we 
 are running a research seminar and a couple of studies on the topic [..] I am 
 working now on the Chapters of our book [Foundations of Measurement I – 
 FH]. The editing apparently takes much more time than I realized, but is 
 certainly worth doing. What has happened to our MDS paper submitted to 
 JMP? 25 [Tversky’s letter to Krantz, November 2, 1969].  
 
When two years later he wrote about the re-organization of the psychology 
department he and Kahneman were seeking to advance, Tversky briefly mentioned 
what would become the famous 1974 Science publication. “Danny and I are writing a 
sort of review paper on our work for someplace like Science, and I returned to 
Chapter 16 [of Foundations of Measurement II – FH]” [Tversky’s letter to Krantz, 
November 14 1971].  
 The foundation for their collaborative fame in psychology, as well as the basis 
for their influence on economics from the early 1980s onwards, was laid in the 1970s. 
Between 1971 and 1979 Kahneman and Tversky co-authored eight articles. The first 
seven articles form part of the Heuristics and Biases approach, a new approach in 
behavioral decision research developed in the early 1970s. The prospect theory paper, 
published in 1979 in Econometrica, further developed the Heuristics and Biases 
program and was aimed explicitly at entering and influencing the economists’ debate 
on individual human behavior. In what follows, I will first set out the Heuristics and 
Biases approach, and show in what way this approach was a mix of the earlier work 
done by Kahneman and Tversky. After this, I will set out prospect theory and explain 
how this was intended to plead an argument in economics. The conclusion infers what 
consequences Kahneman and Tversky’s theories had for the conception of rationality 
in psychology and economics.  
 
2. Heuristics and Biases 
When in 1969 Kahneman and Tversky started to cooperate, their joint work became a 
mix of their earlier individual research. Tversky’s work on decision theory, with its 
distinction between the normative and descriptive realm, became coupled with 
                                                
25 “MDS paper” and JMP referred to Tversky and Krantz (1970) “The dimensional representation and 
the metric structure of similarity data,” published in the Journal of Mathematical Psychology (JMP) 
[email Krantz to author August 11, 2008]. 
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Kahneman’s psychology of mistakes. The first Heuristics and Biases articles showed 
that human beings in the real world display behavior that in all kinds of ways 
systematically deviates from what is normatively correct.  
 For their first article Tversky posed a set of questions to eighty-four 
participants who attended the 1969 meetings of the American Psychological 
Association and the Mathematical Psychology Group that meant to capture 
Kahneman’s personal experience of incorrect research planning and unsuccessful 
replications, as discussed in Chapter three. “Suppose,” Kahneman and Tversky asked, 
”you have run an experiment on 20 Ss, and have obtained a significant result which 
confirms your theory (z = 2.23, p < .05, two-tailed). You now have cause to run an 
additional group of 10 Ss. What do you think the probability is that the results will be 
significant, by a one-tailed test, separately for this group?” [Kahneman and Tversky 
(1972), p.433]. The answer depends on the interpretation of the information provided. 
However, it should be below but close to 0.50, Kahneman and Tversky argued. Nine 
out of the eighty-four participants gave answers between 0.4 and 0.6, which 
Kahneman and Tversky interpreted as “reasonable.” The other seventy-five, however, 
gave answers that exceeded 0.60. The median response of all participants was as high 
as 0.85.Thus, even those professionals who were trained and who were explicitly 
asked to give the normatively correct answer failed to calculate it correctly. 
Kahneman and Tversky felt justified in inferring the strong and bold thesis “that 
people have strong intuitions about random sampling; that these intuitions are wrong 
in fundamental respects; that these intuitions are shared by naïve subjects and by 
trained scientists; and that they are applied with unfortunate consequences in the 
course of scientific inquiry” [Tversky and Kahneman (1971), p.105]. 
 Kahneman and Tversky found it appalling and fundamentally disturbing to see 
that even trained professionals failed to behave according to the dictates of normative 
theory. Why did the majority of them fail? As set out in Chapter three, Tversky’s 
answer earlier would have been that either there had been something wrong with the 
experiment, or that the normative theory was wrong. This time, however, Kahneman 
and Tversky took a different route. Building on the work of William Estes (1919- ), a 
mathematical psychologist renowned for work on learning theory he conducted while 
at the University of Minnesota during the 1940s-1960s [e.g. Estes (1964), Bower 
(1994)], Kahneman and Tversky hypothesized that individuals have the tendency to 
suppose that a sample from a population must represent the population in its general 
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characteristics. In other words, they accounted for their results by supposing that 
human nature makes individuals ignore the possibility that a sample of a population 
may not be an accurate representation of that population. Kahneman and Tversky 
hypothesized that human nature sometimes provides individuals with the wrong 
intuition and that as a result they fail to give the right answer. However, Kahneman 
and Tversky took the research of Estes a step further by concluding that if one 
considers a sample to be representative of its population, then it could be thought of as 
a “heuristic.” They advanced the idea the human mind uses this heuristic to base 
decisions on.  
 It is not clear where Kahneman and Tversky derived the term ‘heuristic’ from. 
It appeared for the first time in 1971 without any precursors in either Kahneman’s or 
Tversky’s earlier work, and from the beginning it was used as a natural term for an 
intuitive response. The same term was used by Herbert Simon [e.g Heukelom (2007)], 
leading one to suppose that Kahneman and Tversky had obtained the term from him. 
But Simon used the term differently (on which more below in section 4.3) and is not 
mentioned in Kahneman and Tversky’s research of the early 1970s. Thus, it seems 
that the term ‘heuristic’ was a general term that psychologists could use to refer to 
intuitive, automatic behavior of individuals [Krantz – interview (2008), Dawes – 
interview (2008)].26  
 The reason, according to Kahneman and Tversky, why the majority of 
scientists and lay persons systematically deviated from the norm-answer that was 
given in Tversky and Kahneman, “Belief in the Law of Small Numbers” (1971), and 
further developed in Kahneman and Tversky, “Subjective Probability: A judgment of 
representativeness” (1972) was that human beings, in general, do not base their 
decisions on the normative laws of, in this case, probability theory and statistics, but 
instead use a “representative heuristic.” Kahneman and Tversky described the 
representative heuristic as the phenomenon that “[t]he subjective probability of an 
event, or a sample, is determined by the degree to which it: (i) is similar in essential 
characteristics to its parent population; and (ii) reflects the salient features of the 
process by which it is generated” [Kahneman and Tversky (1972), p.430]. As a result 
of this representative heuristic, most of the professional psychologists mentioned in 
                                                
26 The use of the term ‘heuristic’ needs more investigation. Note in this regard that also the term 
‘behavioral economics’ was used by Kahneman and Tversky and their followers from the 1990s 
onwards without (hardly) any reference to the already existing behavioral economic program in the 
Herbert Simon and George Katona traditions.  
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the example estimated the probability requested to be much higher than it actually was 
(the median estimate was 0.85). Because human beings have much more faith in small 
samples than they should, Kahneman and Tversky half jokingly labeled this 
phenomenon the “belief in the law of small numbers,” in reference to the law of large 
numbers. The analogy with faith and belief expresses Kahneman and Tversky’s view 
that an individual’s erroneous behavior is the result of false beliefs for which the 
unenlightened individual cannot really be blamed. The “deviations of subjective from 
objective probability seem reliable, systematic, and difficult to eliminate” [Kahneman 
and Tversky (1972), p.431 ],  and “[t]he true believer in the law of small numbers 
commits his multitude of sins against the logic of statistical inference in good faith.27  
The representation hypothesis describes a cognitive or perceptual bias, which operates 
regardless of motivational factors” [Tversky and Kahneman (1971), p.109]. 
  
3. Kahneman’s case-based reasoning 
Kahneman and Tversky employed a case-based reasoning that finds its origin in 
Kahneman’s research of the 1960s. Kahneman’s research on the semantic differential, 
in particular, was never far away. For instance, the reason that people’s judgments 
systematically deviated from the correct solution was because of the individual’s 
connotation of the event of which the probability was to be judged: “Although the 
“true” probability of a unique event is unknowable, the reliance on heuristics such as 
availability or representativeness, biases subjective probabilities in knowable ways” 
[Tversky and Kahneman (1973), p.231]. The way in which an individual’s 
connotation of words in semantic differentials research systematically deviated from 
the average, and thus “true” connotation, was the same way in which the individual’s 
connotation of the probability of events systematically deviated from the objective, 
and thus “true” probability of those events. Given that framework, different 
explanations in terms of fixed cognitive rules could and were then put forth.  
 Typically, the argument in Kahneman and Tversky’s research was made not so 
much by giving theoretical explanations for why such and such was a good theory or 
account of observed behavior, but by supplying examples of the experimental  
                                                
27 The notion of subjective probability does not always have the same meaning. In Savage (1954), for 
instance, it is the rationally calculated probability of and by the individual. In Tversky and Kahneman, 
it is the subjective perception of objective probability.  
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questions subjects had been asked which were meant to give the reader an intuitive 
understanding of the point they were trying to make. Similarly, Kahneman and 
Tversky’s adversaries have often proceeded by deconstructing their examples and 
illustrations, or by giving counter-examples. In the typical counter argument it was 
shown that a different conclusion could be inferred from the observed behavior, or 
that responses to another set of hypothetical questions falsified Kahneman and 
Tversky’s conclusions [e.g. Gigerenzer (1991,1993,1996), Hertwig and Gigerenzer 
(1999), Lopes (1991)]. For a good understanding of Kahneman and Tversky’s work 
one needs first to have a feeling for the kind of questions they asked, the examples 
they gave, and how they inferred general conclusions from them. Therefore, I will 
briefly introduce and discuss Kahneman and Tversky’s most frequently used 
examples and illustrations.    
 Assuming that the probability of a new-born to be a boy or a girl is 0.5, 
consider the following question.  
 
 All families of six children in a city were surveyed. In 72 families the exact 
 order of births of boys and girls was G B G B B G. 
 What is your estimate of the number of families surveyed in which the exact 
 order of births was B G B B B B? [Kahneman and Tversky (1972), p.432, 
 emphasis in the original]  
 
The normatively correct answer is 72, as any sequence of boys and girls is equally 
probable. However, average estimates of the second sequence were systematically 
lower than the first. People, in other words, incorrectly believed the first sequence to 
be more probable than the second, from which Kahneman and Tversky concluded that 
“[p]eople view chance as unpredictable but essentially fair” [Kahneman and Tversky 
(1972), p.435]. An alternative, but related explanation was that people judged the first 
sequence to be more probable than the second because it better represented their 
image of a family with six children (representativeness), or that an image of a family 
with three boys and three girls was more readily available than an image of a family 
with five boys and one girl (availability).  
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 In another experiment to test human’s capacity to reason probabilistically, 
subjects were posed the following question. 
 
A cab was involved in a hit-and-run accident at night. Two cab companies, the 
Green and the Blue, operate in the city. You are given the following data: 
(i) 85% of the cabs in the city are Green and 15% are Blue. 
(ii) A witness identified the cab as a Blue cab. The court tested his ability 
to identify cabs under the appropriate visibility conditions. When 
presented with a sample of cabs (half of which were Blue and half of 
which were Green) the witness made correct identifications in 80% of 
the cases and erred in 20% of the cases 
Question: What is the probability that the cab involved in the accident was 
Blue rather than Green? [Tversky and Kahneman (1980), p.62] 
 
The majority responded 80 percent, which was probably based on how often the 
witness had identified the color correctly. However, again they failed to take into 
account the base-rate distribution. Using Bayes’ theorem the normatively correct 
answer is just over 41%.  
The most well-known question amongst the many experimental questions of 
Kahneman and Tversky has become the so-called ‘Linda problem,’ no less because it 
has often been used by Kahneman and Tversky’s adversaries. The Linda problem is as 
follows: 
 
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken and very bright. She majored in 
philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of 
discrimination and social justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear 
demonstrations.  
 Which of the following two alternatives is more probable: 
1) Linda is a bank teller 
2) Linda is a bank teller and active in the feminist movement. [Tversky and 
Kahneman (1983), summarized from pp.297 and 299] 
 
On average, there was a strong bias towards judging 2) to be more probable than 1), 
this despite the fact that 2) is logically contained in 1). Because this bias is an 
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illustration of the failure to see that the probability of the conjunction of two or more 
events can never exceed the probability of one of the events, this bias was labeled the 
conjunction fallacy. 
 From 1972 to 1974, on the basis of these and similar examples, Kahneman and 
Tversky developed the conclusion that their experimental evidence contradicted 
Edwards’ behavioral decision research view that despite some unresolved issues, the 
normative models generally worked well descriptively. Extending further Tversky’s 
earlier work, Kahneman and Tversky argued that the normative models worked 
descriptively far worse than had previously been thought. But instead of arguing that 
either the experiments were flawed or that the normative theory was wrong, the two 
options available in Tversky’s research on human decision making in the 1960s, they 
now argued that the experimental results were perfectly valid and that there was 
nothing wrong with the normative theory. Instead, the new conclusion that was drawn 
was that when individuals make their decisions intuitively, they systematically deviate 
from the rational norm. The argument was thus directed explicitly against Tversky’s 
former mentor and collaborator. With respect to Bayes’ rule, Edwards had mistakenly 
assumed “that man, by and large, follows the correct Bayesian rule, but fails to 
appreciate the full impact of evidence, and is therefore conservative” [Kahneman and 
Tversky (1972), p.43]. However, the mainstream representatives of signal detection 
theory were also criticized.28 “Peterson and Beach (1967), for example, concluded 
that the normative model provides a good first approximation to the behavior of the Ss 
who are ‘influenced by appropriate variables and in appropriate directions’” 
[Kahneman and Tversky (1972), p.43]. Kahneman and Tversky had come to 
fundamentally disagree with them. “[In] his evaluation of evidence, man is apparently 
not a conservative Bayesian: he is not Bayesian at all” [Kahneman and Tversky 
(1972), p.449]. 
 The alternative theory Kahneman and Tversky proposed was their Heuristics 
and Biases theory, first labeled as such in Tversky and Kahneman (1974), “Judgment 
under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.” In this theory, people do not use the 
normative theories of probability and logic to make decisions under uncertainty, but 
instead rely on a number of heuristics, heuristics that sometimes lead to systematic 
                                                
28 As said above in Chapter two, Signal detection theory (SDT) is a branch of psychophysics that 
investigates the individual’s ability to distinguish between signal and noise. In other words, it 
investigates decision making under noisy conditions. See e.g. Green and Swets (1964). 
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deviations. In the often quoted definition of the theory, Heuristics and Biases “shows 
that people rely on a limited number of heuristic principles which reduce the complex 
tasks of assessing probabilities and predicting values to simpler judgmental 
operations. In general, these heuristics are quite useful, but sometimes they lead to 
severe and systematic errors” [Tversky and Kahneman (1974), p.1124]. Kahneman 
and Tversky emphasized the importance and functioning of a few heuristics, such as 
representativeness, availability, and anchoring. But by no means was the Heuristics 
and Biases theory meant to remain confined to these few heuristics. There was no 
limit to the number of heuristics that possibly could be discovered in humans’ minds. 
The Heuristics and Biases program summed up the many violations of the normative 
models Kahneman and Tversky had found, and provided a small, non-exhaustive list 
of explanations that might account for these violations.  
 
4. How to understand Heuristics and Biases 
4.1 The collaboration 
Kahneman and Tversky’s collaborative work in Heuristics and Biases was a 
combination of the research conducted by them in the 1960s. Heuristics and Biases 
was closely related to Tversky’s earlier work. It was about human decision making 
and referred to much of the same literature as Tversky’s work in the 1960s. Moreover, 
the psychological community considered Heuristics and Biases to be a part of 
behavioral decision research [Phillips and Von Winterfeldt (2006), p.8]. The link with 
Kahneman’s earlier work is less obvious; Heuristics and Biases had little to do 
directly with vision and attention research, optometry, semantic differentials or 
personnel psychology. But Kahneman had a profound influence on a conceptual level; 
the adjustments of Edwards’ behavioral decision research made by Kahneman and 
Tversky were the result of the psychological framework developed by Kahneman in 
the 1960s. 
 In Chapter three I showed how towards the late 1960s and early 1970s 
Tversky became increasingly dissatisfied with the approach and theory of behavioral 
decision research and decision theory. The normative models were consistently 
violated by subjects, and there did not seem to be an explanation for this. Elimination-
by-aspects was an attempt to solve this problem by providing a new normative theory 
of rational decision making. However, its merits had not yet been tested and its 
implications for measurement theory were not clear. Kahneman suggested an 
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alternative route by introducing the idea that in every decision situation there is but 
one optimal, or normative, solution. To Kahneman it did not make sense to test a 
number of different normative models to see which, if any, fit best. When a decision 
problem under uncertainty occurred, there was always only one normative solution 
and that was the solution determined by logic, Bayesian statistics, and expected utility 
theory.  
 Kahneman emphasized that there was absolutely no reason to doubt these 
normative rules, as Tversky had become inclined to do. Irrespective of whatever 
people think of the norms or in whatever way they behave in daily practice, the 
normative rules of logic, Bayesian statistics and expected utility theory were the fixed 
rules of rational behavior. Kahneman proposed the view that when people were 
observed to violate the normative rules, this meant that they had made an error, a 
mistake. Kahneman, in other words, introduced his psychology-of-mistakes view to 
Tversky’s behavioral decision research. If people were observed to violate the 
normative rules, this meant that people made consistent and systematic errors.  
 Contrary to Tversky’s earlier work and contrary to the framework as set out by 
Edwards and Savage, experimental violations no longer implied there might be a 
problem concerning the normative rules. Thus, Kahneman saved the normative basis 
of decision theory and measurement theory. Instead of placing the burden on the 
theory, as was done by Savage and Edwards, Kahneman proposed that the burden of 
the violations be placed on the human beings in the experiments. Heuristics and 
Biases was a research program in behavioral decision research that built directly upon 
the earlier work done by Tversky in the 1960s, and still drew on the same 
authoritative sources. However, after it became inspired by Kahneman’s work of the 
1960s, the approach had changed conceptually in fundamental ways.  
 Heuristics and Biases took Tversky in a very different direction than his 
elimination-by-aspects theory. In elimination-by-aspects Tversky had started from the 
position that the experimental results were valid and that, by and large, the normative 
theory should account for observed behavior. Given Savage’s assumption that all 
rational people should behave in accordance with the normative theory, Tversky 
concluded that Savage’s normative set of axioms must be wrong and set himself to 
developing a new normative theory. In Heuristics and Biases, however, Kahneman 
and Tversky departed from Savage and Edwards’ starting point in a different way. 
They reasoned that Savage’s normative axioms for rational decision making were 
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valid irrespective of what decisions human beings actually made. They now 
concluded that the experimental results were valid, but that at the same time Savage’s 
normative rules were the one and only set of rules for rational decision making. As a 
consequence, behavior that deviated had to be considered an erroneous deviation from 
the rational norm. Kahneman pulled Tversky in a different direction than Tversky had 
initially chosen. That said, Heuristics and Biases was a psychological program that 
Kahneman and Tversky developed together. At no point during his career did 
Tversky’s deep commitment to his joint research with Kahneman waver. Neither did 
he seriously continue to develop elimination-by-aspects or other accounts of human 
decision making. Heuristics and Biases was a joint product and enjoyed the continued 
support of both its authors.     
 
4.2 Kahneman and Tversky’s experiments 
In their collaborative research during the 1970s, Kahneman and Tversky conducted 
different kinds of experiments than the two had done individually in the 1960s. In 
their 1960s research the experiments were done in laboratories, or laboratory-like 
settings. That was in line with received experimental practice in psychology. From the 
early 1970s onwards, however, the experiments consisted of questionnaires with 
hypothetical questions which mainly students were asked to fill out. These 
questionnaires could be distributed anywhere, to participants at conferences, to 
students during a course at the university, and in a shopping mall on a Saturday 
afternoon.29 These questionnaires consisted of hypothetical questions and were cheap 
and easy to conduct.  
 Laboratory experiments required a setting in which all of the variables could 
be carefully monitored. However, Kahneman and Tversky’s questionnaire 
experiments required only copies of the questionnaires and pens to fill them out. No 
separate laboratory space was needed and no payment of the experimental subjects 
was required, filling out the questionnaires took a few minutes at the most. The 
advantages of conducting questionnaire experiments compared to using previous 
experimental psychological methods were clear, but Kahneman and Tversky’s 
departure from received practice in experimental psychology required a rationale. In 
1979, Kahneman and Tversky defended their new method of experimentation and 
                                                
29 It is outside the realm of this dissertation to examine to what extent this new type of experiment was 
part of a more general development in psychology. 
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contrasted it with two other methods of investigation. First they distinguished the 
possibility of “field studies,” which used “naturalistic or statistical observation.” 
Evidently, this category referred to the practice of correlational psychology, such as 
Kahneman’s experiments for the Israeli army, although Kahneman and Tversky did 
not use this term. Field studies, according to Kahneman and Tversky, could yield 
important insights when a new field of research was opened, but in the end they could 
only provide “crude tests of qualitative predictions, because probabilities and utilities 
cannot be adequately measured” [Kahneman and Tversky (1979), p.265].  
Secondly, they recognized the method of laboratory experiments, a reference 
to experimental psychological practice although, again, Kahneman and Tversky did 
not call it as such. Despite all of its advantages in the particular case of decision 
theory, laboratory experiments had the disadvantage that stakes could only be 
relatively small. In a laboratory experiment with real pay-offs it was for financial 
reasons difficult to conduct an experiment in which the subjects were asked to choose 
between, say, $300 for certain or a 0.8 chance at obtaining $400. A set of hypothetical 
questions did not have to reckon with this constraint. Laboratory experiments in 
psychology had furthermore been set up to measure probabilities and utilities as 
precisely as possible and therefore often large sequences of very similar decision 
problems were required. This characteristic feature of laboratory experiments, 
Kahneman and Tversky argued, made it questionable whether the results obtained in 
the laboratory could be related to behavior in the real world. It complicated “the 
interpretation of the results and restricts their generality” [Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979), p.265]. The third method, that proved to be the best for solving the problem 
they were investigating was “the method of hypothetical choices.” It solved both the 
immeasurability problem of field studies, and the external validity problem of 
laboratory experiments. It did however rely on the assumption that people “know how 
they would behave in actual situations of choice” and that they “have no special 
reason to disguise their true preferences” [Kahneman and Tversky (1979), p.265].  
 Tversky’s experiments conducted during the 1960s were in the ‘small world’-
‘grand world’ setting, an experimental requirement Edwards had obtained from 
Savage. In this setting, the crucial, but only requirement for experiments was that both 
the utilities and probabilities should be unambiguously clear to both the experimenter 
and the subject. As earlier set out in Chapter two, this entails that a designated space 
qualifies as a viable laboratory environment when the utilities and probabilities have 
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been defined and when it is clear to both experimenter and subject that each have the 
same figures in their minds, and thus that the subjects have been convinced they are 
not being deceived. This could, for instance, be done by tossing the dice in front of the 
subject and by showing that the possible pay-off (in the form of money, cigarettes or 
anything else) was at hand and could be offered immediately. When these 
requirements were fulfilled, experiments could be conducted everywhere: in prisons, 
in classrooms or in specifically designed laboratories.  
 The Savage-Edwards experiments were often long and repetitive in order to 
allow for initial adjustment behavior, or alternatively, to investigate learning 
capacities. Kahneman’s psychophysical experiments during the 1960s on the visual 
system, on the other hand, were brief experiments in highly-controlled laboratories. 
The subjects had to distinguish between letters, digits or other visual stimuli, but a 
few observations per subject was generally considered sufficient. In Kahneman’s 
experiments it was important that the value or “energy” was precisely the same for the 
experimenter and the subjects. But compared to Tversky’s choice experiments, this 
meant that the experimental setting needed to be controlled as much as possible. 
Hence, Kahneman’s visual experiments could only take place in laboratories which 
were specially built for this purpose. 
 In Kahneman and Tversky’s collaborative experiments the small world 
requirement was abandoned. They no longer required that there be absolute certainty 
that the stimuli be understood in the same way by the experimenter and the subject. 
There did not need to be an actual draw from an urn or a toss of a dice in the presence 
of the individual, a hypothetical question about uncertainties sufficed. Repeated trials 
could be avoided on the grounds that most decisions were only taken once or twice, 
and not five hundred times in a row – although, admittedly, this point remained 
largely implicit. Furthermore, as the experiments could be done everywhere and all 
the time, no special laboratory controls were required. Answers to hypothetical 
questions obtained in the street from passers by were just as valid as the responses 
obtained from first-year students who had to participate in experiments to obtain their 
credits, or from subjects in controlled laboratories who were paid according to their 
performance. Finally, responding to hypothetical questions concerning decision 
problems produced enough evidence on which to base conclusions, and subsequently 
theory. Although Kahneman and Tversky considered experimental data based on real 
stakes better, answering hypothetical questions, in principle, sufficed. 
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 There is not a direct link between the Heuristics and Biases program and the 
new, more relaxed standards of the experimental method. That is to say, Heuristics 
and Biases could, in theory, have been developed without the new means of 
conducting experiments. But the new standards of the experimental method facilitated 
Kahneman and Tversky’s research in fundamental ways. It is safe to say that, without 
the method of hypothetical questions they could not have developed Heuristics and 
Biases. For instance, it would have been almost impossible to assemble eighty-four 
professional psychologists in a single laboratory in order to ask them what their 
opinions were on a statistical draw which was performed in front of them. Questions 
in which subjects were asked to choose hypothetically between a weekend in Paris or 
a week on a beach in Florida would have been impossible, if Savage’s small-world 
requirement had still remained the standard. Thus, although there is not a direct link 
between Kahneman and Tversky’s Heuristics and Biases theory and their 
experimental method, it is difficult to see how the theory could have been tested and 
developed without this new method.30  
 
4.3 Kahneman and Tversky versus Simon 
It is tempting to view Kahneman and Tversky’s heuristics as being similar to Simon’s 
rules of thumb [cf. Heukelom (2007)] although this would be a mistake. In Simon’s 
view, individuals use rules of thumb or heuristics to make decisions. An example of a 
heuristic could be when hearing the alarm clock in the morning, one gets up, takes a 
shower, and makes a cup of coffee. To Simon, the heuristic exists because the 
individual over time has learned that this is the best response to the stimulus of the 
alarm clock. In Kahneman and Tversky’s approach, the function of heuristics was to 
simplify and reorganize the decision problem in such a way that it was manageable 
for a not very sophisticated decision maker. The heuristics determine how the new 
information of the stimulus is understood. The heuristics do not yield the decision, but 
reorganize the informational input in such a way that a decision making process is 
possible.  
 In the Linda problem, for instance, the individual intuitively believes it to be 
more likely that Linda is a bank teller and a feminist, as opposed to being just a bank 
                                                
30 I do not discuss here the question of whether different experimental methods yield different data and 
phenomena on which to construct theories. Obviously, someone such as Savage considered the 
experimental method crucial, whereas Kahneman and Tversky, as indicated above, considered it to be 
of much less relevance. 
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teller because he or she associates the information about Linda more with being a 
feminist than with a bank teller. In terms of the availability heuristic, ‘feminist’ is 
more available than ‘bank teller’ for the individual. Hence, the individual makes his or 
her intuitive decision on the basis of his or her understanding of the information 
presented. If it is given more thought, he or she may opt for the bank-teller-only 
option, particularly if he or she has just taken a course in logic. But the individual’s 
intuitive initial response will always be the bank teller plus feminist option.    
 In addition, in Kahneman and Tversky’s account the individual could not 
adjust his or her heuristics, as he or she could in Simon’s approach. The Simon 
individual might replace coffee with orange juice when he or she learns that it is 
healthier. After a brief period in which extra effort is required to change the heuristic, 
the new heuristic will be to get up, take a shower, and drink a glass of orange juice. 
For Kahneman and Tversky, it appears to be the contrary, since the heuristics seem to 
be considered to be part of a given, unchanging human nature. Availability, 
representativeness, and so on, are seen as components belonging to the human 
information processing machinery that cannot be changed. They can be overridden by 
means of conscious, rational effort, but they always are determined by how the 
individual will behave when he or she is making decisions intuitively. To 
mathematical psychologists and behavioral decision researchers such as Coombs, 
Edwards, Luce and Tversky, a human, when acting intuitively, was acting as a 
statistician. In Kahneman and Tversky’s research man was an intuitive statistician, an 
intuitive optimizer of utility, and an intuitive logician, although an imperfect one. The 
individual used the normative models, but only after the heuristics had reorganized the 
input. In many ways, this was a very different theory compared to Simon’s theory of 
bounded rationality. 
 
5. Prospect theory: Heuristics and Biases for economics 
In 1979 Kahneman and Tversky published their famous article on “Prospect Theory: 
An Analysis of Decision under Risk” in Econometrica. The article marked a shift in 
emphasis away from probabilistic decision problems to an investigation of people’s 
capacity to behave according to the normative theory of expected utility theory. It was 
the first attempt to produce a more complete descriptive theory of human decision 
making under uncertainty. Prospect theory has often been presented as being different  
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from Heuristics and Biases [e.g. Kahneman (2002)]. It is certainly true that prospect 
theory brought the different heuristics into one overarching framework, but the 
foundation still was the idea that human beings relied on a set of heuristics for their 
decision making and that the use of these heuristics sometimes leads to systematic 
deviations from the normatively correct decision. In this regard it is to be noted that it 
took Kahneman and Tversky some five years to get the article published in 
Econometrica, and that the last four of these five years were used to tweak a, for the 
most part, finished argument to fit an economic audience [Kahneman (2002)].  
 This continuity between Heuristics and Biases and prospect theory is 
illustrated by the remarks made in Tversky’s letter to Krantz, April 10, 1975. In this 
letter Tversky, for the first time, devotes more than just one line to his scientific work 
with Kahneman, and he is clearly enthusiastic about the project. The letter illustrates 
that the basic argument of prospect theory had crystallized in the spring of 1975: 
 
 Danny and I are working primarily on decision making and we believe for the 
 first time that we understand the basic principles governing choices between 
 gambles. [..] The key elements in the theory we propose are: 1) an S-shaped 
 utility function defined on differences from status quo rather than on total 
 asset position and 2) uncertainty weights (not to be confused with subjective 
 probability) by which the utilities are weighted. We are collecting empirical 
 data which seem to provide very strong support for this model. [..] I will send 
 you a draft of the paper in the very near future.  
 [Tversky’s letter to Krantz, April 10, 1975] 
 
In 1975, four years before prospect theory would be published, Kahneman and 
Tversky were in the middle of developing their Heuristics and Biases theory. Prospect 
theory, then, is best understood as an extended version of their Heuristics and Biases 
theory that focused on applications in economics. Its rhetoric was specifically 
designed to convince economists. Kahneman and Tversky’s attempt to enter 
economics during this period is also illustrated by a workshop Tversky co-organized 
with Daniel McFadden, econometrician and 2000 co-winner of the Nobel memorial 
prize in economics. The workshop, held in October 1977 and entitled “Cognition,  
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Choice, and Economic Behavior,” was supported by the Mathematical Social Science 
Board and the National Science Foundation and was intended to bring together 
psychologists and economists interested in cognition and choice theory [McFadden 
and Tversky’s letter to Luce, June 20, 1977]. 
Kahneman and Tversky made the connection with their earlier work in the 
first few lines of the 1979 article, which set out the conception of expected utility 
theory as a normative theory which also makes descriptive claims:  
 
Expected utility theory has dominated the analysis of decision making under 
 risk. It has been generally accepted as a normative model of rational choice, 
 and widely applied as a descriptive model of economic behavior. Thus it is 
 assumed that all reasonable people would wish to obey the axioms of the 
 theory and that most people actually do, most of the time.  
[Kahneman and Tversky (1979), p.263].  
 
In a clever way these opening sentences alluded to both the psychological and the 
economic framework. To psychologists these sentences restated the well-known 
normative-descriptive framework and signaled a contribution to an already established 
field of research. Positivist economists on the other hand might have raised their 
eyebrows at the injunction of the ‘normative,’ but they would certainly have agreed 
that reasonable people prefer to obey the axioms of expected utility theory and do so, 
or at least most of the time. Note, furthermore, that Kahneman and Tversky carefully 
avoided the term ‘rational,’ and used ‘reasonable’ instead. Evoking the term ‘rational’ 
might have suggested that this was an article in the line of critique of economics. The 
use of ‘rational’ would certainly have induced some economists to think that these 
two psychologists had the same research program as Simon, who had won the Nobel 
memorial prize the year before. From the start, prospect theory had been carefully 
constructed so as to be able to convince economists especially.   
 As in Heuristics and Biases, Kahneman and Tversky based their argument on a 
series of hypothetical questions they had presented to experimental subjects, in this 
case psychology students at Hebrew University. The problems the subjects were 
presented with were decision problems, involving different utilities and different  
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probabilities. Most of the questions were reformulations or variants of Maurice Allais’ 
decision problems. After Allais had shown that even Savage himself had violated his 
own axioms, resulting in Savage making a distinction between a normative and an 
empirical domain, as set out in Chapter two, the “Allais paradox” in the 1960s and 
1970s had become the iconic demonstration of a violation of expected utility [Jallais 
and Pradier (2005)].  
 One example of Kahneman and Tversky’s use of an Allais-type approach is in 
the question where subjects were asked to state which of the following options they 
preferred. 
 
 A: (4,000, .80)   or  B: (3,000) 
 
That is, they were asked whether they preferred 4,000 shekel with a probability of 0.8, 
or 3,000 shekel for certain.31 Most of the subjects in this case chose B. Assuming that 
the utility of the outcome equaled its monetary outcome this implied that they did not 
maximize expected utility. However, opting for the choice B could be the expected 
utility maximizing choice, if the decision maker was risk averse. Then subjects were 
asked which of the following two options they preferred. 
 
 C: (4,000, .20)  or  D: (3,000, .25) 
 
In this case, most of the subjects chose C and hence maximized expected utility. This 
was problematic in combination with the first choice as it implied that subjects were 
sometimes risk averse, but on other occasions they maximized expected utility. Note 
that the second choice is equal to the first with probabilities divided by four. With 
such examples, Kahneman and Tversky illustrated that despite its normative status, 
expected utility theory as a descriptive theory was invalidated. In specific 
circumstances people systematically deviated form the norms of expected utility 
theory. A new descriptive, “alternative account of individual decision making under 
risk,” was therefore required. The alternative account was christened “prospect 
theory” [Kahneman and Tversky, (1979), p.274].32 
                                                
31 At the time of the experiment, 4000 shekel was about one third of the modal monthly Israeli income.  
32 Kahneman (2002) recalls that they deliberately looked for and chose a name that did not refer to any 
other theory or phenomenon in economics and psychology. 
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According to prospect theory, a human decision maker first employs a number 
of heuristics to make a decision problem manageable. This process is called the 
editing phase. Complicated decisions are broken down into different simpler 
decisions, different decisions are lumped together into one big decision, a benchmark 
is set with which the decision was compared, and so on. The purpose of this editing 
phase was to make the decision manageable. After this, the decision was evaluated in 
what was referred to as the evaluation phase. The evaluation phase had the same 
structure as the maximization of expected utility, but instead of the objective values of 
utility and probability, it used the individual’s subjective perception of utility and 
probability. The subjective perception of utility was referred to as value (denoted v) 
and the subjective perception of probability was referred to as decision weight 
(denoted π). In expected utility theory, a subject who is faced with a choice between 
outcome x that occurs with probability p and outcome y that occurs with probability q 
derives utility according to the following function.  
 
 )()(),;,( yuqxupqypxU ⋅+⋅=       (1) 
 
In prospect theory, a subject that following the editing phase faces the exact same 
choice values this choice according to this function. 
 
)()()()(),;,( yvqxvpqypxV ππ +=       (2) 
 
Following the editing phase, value in prospect theory was a function of the outcomes; 
decision weight was a function of probability. The estimated relation, the relation 
based on the experimental results, between value and outcomes can be seen in the 
following graph. 
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 Kahneman and Tversky (1979), p.279 
 
This relationship, in which the decrease in value from losses is larger than the increase 
in value from gains, held for each individual. It was, in other words, assumed that 
there was one functional form of the outcome-value relation that held for each human 
being.  
At first sight it seems unnecessarily confusing to label the subjectively 
perceived outcome of a choice ‘value,’ instead of utility. But if we recall that in the 
second chapter it was set out that the Lewinian notion of ‘valence’ in psychology was 
used to denote the attractiveness or averseness of an object or choice option to the 
individual, we can see that by making ‘value’ instead of ‘utility’ the term that refers to 
the subjective attractiveness of a choice option, Kahneman and Tversky were able to 
design a framework that could be accepted by both psychologists and economists. To 
psychologists, the value framework matched the Lewinian valence framework; to 
economists it preserved the expected utility framework, while at the same time it 
allowed for the possibility that individual economic behavior deviates from the 
expected utility framework. In addition, the term ‘value’ was historically a central 
concept in economics that could be used very well to denote the pleasure an economic 
agent derives from choosing a specific option.  
In prospect theory, individuals were believed to be similar in their subjective 
valuation of outcomes. Moreover, also regarding the relationship between 
probabilities and decision weights individuals were considered to be similar. Both the 
functional form and the numbers were equal for each individual. The estimated 
relation between decision weights and probability is depicted below.  
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The weighting function, Kahneman and Tversky (1979), p.283 
 
In the figure, the dotted line represents the normative relation between the objective 
“stated probability” and the subjective “decision weight.” The dotted line connects the 
points in which the two are equal. This is the line one would find in the experimental 
measurement of the decision weights of the rational individual: for the rational 
individual perceived probabilities are the objective probabilities. The second, 
unbroken line shows the average of experimental measurements of reported decision 
weights of different objective probabilities by experimental subjects. The figure 
shows, that for small probabilities subjects over-perceive the objective probability, but 
for all probabilities above approximately 0.1, they under-perceive objective 
probabilities.  
 In Chapters two and three I discussed the connection between the theory of 
individual perception in psychology and the theory of scientific measurement. I 
recalled that they were two sides of the same coin in the days of Gustav Fechner, and 
showed that they continued to be two sides of the same coin in postwar mathematical 
psychology and behavioral decision research. However, now they were subject to the 
extra dimension of rationality. The value-utility and the decision weights-stated 
probability relations as presented by Kahneman and Tversky in their 1979 
Econometrica article provides a clear example of this continued connection between 
the psychology of perception and the theory of measurement. First, the figures 
demonstrate how individuals perceive the objective stimuli of the choice, and thus 
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facilitate the theorizing of human decision making by demonstrating which 
information the human being uses to make his or her decision. But, second, the figures 
also show how the human measurement instrument deviates from its ideal 
functioning. It demonstrates how the human measurement instrument systematically 
deviates from the norm and provides a detailed relationship between the ideal 
measurement instrument and the actual measurement instrument. In other words, for 
prospect theory the psychological theories of human perception and decision making 
and theories of measurement are two sides of the same coin.  
 Kahneman and Tversky did not make this link explicit in their 1979 article in 
Econometrica, but a clear indication is that prospect theory is related to what is 
essentially psychophysics, although they did not use the term psychophysics as such. 
Kahneman and Tversky argued that “[a]n essential feature of the present theory is that 
carriers of value are changes in wealth or welfare, rather than final states,” and that 
“[t]his assumption is compatible with basic principles of perception and judgment.” 
This basic principle was that  
 
 [o]ur perceptual apparatus is attuned to the evaluation of changes or 
 differences rather than to the evaluation of absolute magnitude. When we 
 respond to attributes such as brightness, loudness, or temperature, the past and 
 present context of experience defines an adaptation level, or reference point, 
 and stimuli are perceived in relation to this reference point. Thus, an object at 
 a given temperature may be experienced as hot or cold to touch depending on 
 the temperature to which one has adapted.  
 [Kahneman and Tversky (1979), p.277]   
 
Kahneman and Tversky extended this basic argument to other attributes: “The same 
principle applies to non-sensory attributes such as health, prestige, and wealth. The 
same level of wealth, for example, may imply abject poverty for one person and great 
riches for another – depending on their current assets” [Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979), p.277]. This principle of psychophysics, Kahneman and Tversky argued, was 
a fundamental aspect of economics. 
 The use of heuristics and the framework of psychophysics allowed Kahneman 
and Tversky to construct a theory in which individuals behaved rationally, and yet 
could often be observed as making irrational decisions. Man is rational, but because 
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human beings apply heuristics to reconstruct decision problems to manageable 
proportions, and because they have a specific perceptual system, their reasoned 
decisions may deviate from the normatively correct solution. Kahneman and Tversky 
had to cut the link between the normative and the descriptive theory in order to 
maintain the normative theory, while at the same time allowing for the conclusion that 
people systematically and persistently deviate from the norm. Human beings, who in 
Savage and Edwards’ accounts were capable of rational reasoning, i.e. normal healthy 
adults, could no longer be expected to behave according to the normative rules. 
Therefore, also the arguments against the normative theory by normal rational people 
were potentially no longer valid arguments.   
 Prospect theory based its reasoning on mathematics. It took the mathematical 
principles of decision theory as the norm for behavior, and developed the 
mathematical measurement framework so that the experimental observations would 
fit. Deviations from the mathematical norms were understood as errors or mistakes, 
and they bore no implications for the norms. Because of the clear separation between 
the normative and the descriptive, it was now possible to construct a separate 
mathematical account of decision making in the descriptive domain, without making 
implications for the normative theory. In prospect theory, human beings were 
understood as having a biased perception of the relevant input of uncertainties and 
utilities, just as they had a biased perception of sensory inputs such as temperature and 
weight. Because of these imperfections, Kahneman and Tversky argued, their 
behavior would often deviate from the optimal norms of normative decision theory.  
 
6. Economics and psychology  
In economics, prospect theory has been understood as an attempt to apply a 
psychological theory to an economic question. It has been viewed as a theory taken 
from another discipline that has traveled across the scientific border in order to plead 
its arguments in a neighboring discipline. In other words, prospect theory has been 
understood by economists in terms of their own understanding of the relationship 
between economics and psychology. This has been set out Chapter one and will be 
further discussed in Chapters five, six, and seven. However, working as psychologists, 
Kahneman and Tversky understood economics, insofar as it concerned individual 
decision making, as a subfield of psychology. Moreover, following Edwards they 
regarded behavioral decision research as a psychological research program that 
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derived much of its inspiration from economics. Hence, Kahneman and Tversky 
regarded prospect theory, not as the application of a psychological theory to a 
question in the neighboring field of economics, but as an attempt to unify psychology 
and economics, and in particular as an attempt to unify behavioral decision research 
and economics. To acquire an understanding of prospect theory’s reception in 
economics, it is therefore important to understand first how Kahneman and Tversky 
themselves understood prospect theory’s relevance for economics.  
 
6.1 Normative versus descriptive 
In prospect theory Kahneman and Tversky employed their normative-descriptive 
distinction, and assumed that economists would employ the very same distinction. 
This partly reflected the standard understanding of economics in behavioral decision 
research and psychology. It should not be forgotten that Edwards understood 
economics’ theories of individual human behavior as being normative theories. A 
valid conclusion would therefore be that Kahneman and Tversky were not familiar 
with the economists’ use of positive and normative, and thus assumed them to mean 
the same as descriptive and normative in behavioral decision research, therefore 
employing the terms as they had been accustomed to.  
 But Kahneman and Tversky’s use of normative and descriptive can also be 
seen as a very clever way of trying to convince economists of the relevance of 
prospect theory for economics. Note, that in their earlier Heuristics and Biases, their 
changing use of normative and descriptive played an important role. In prospect 
theory, Kahneman and Tversky did not tell the economists that their theory was 
complete nonsense or useless. Instead, they claimed to understand economics as using 
one theory to cover both the normative and the descriptive realm. For the normative 
part they fully agreed with economists, which fitted in neatly with practice in 
behavioral decision research. But, Kahneman and Tversky argued, economists had 
been mistaken in using that same theory in the descriptive domain.  
 Kahneman and Tversky’s approach differed in a subtle but fundamental way 
from Simon’s, the other main psychological critic of economics. Just as Kahneman 
and Tversky, Simon understood economics to have both normative and descriptive 
ambitions, but unlike Kahneman and Tversky, he considered economics to have 
embarked on the wrong track entirely. According to Simon, economics failed to 
distinguish correctly between descriptive and normative, had an inappropriate theory 
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in both domains, had an absurdly restrictive notion of rationality, and was much too 
narrowly focused on the mathematical advancement of its theories.33 
 Kahneman and Tversky were much less hostile. In fact, they were in favor of 
the current practice in economics – after all, behavioral decision research and 
measurement theory were considered to be at least partly based on economics – and 
they only meant to suggest that a few adjustments be made to improve it. Contrary to 
Simon, Kahneman and Tversky argued that there was nothing wrong with the 
economists’ theory of expected utility maximization. It was only that this was the 
normative theory, and not an accurate description of actually observed human 
behavior. Economists did not need to abandon the theory of expected utility 
maximization, but instead they should seek a proper descriptive counterpart to this 
normative theory. Prospect theory was then suggested as serving as such a descriptive 
theory.  
 
6.2 Prospect theory as unification of economics and psychology 
Prospect theory was aimed at economists. Unlike Heuristics and Biases, which was 
aimed at psychologists, prospect theory aimed to make an argument in economics. It 
was, however, a specific type of argument. Kahneman and Tversky were not 
attempting to travel across the psychology-economics border, to become economists 
and to make a contribution to economics. What they intended to do, was rather to shift 
the economics-psychology border in such a way that their work and economics would 
become part of the same science. Subsequently, they could then argue that their paper 
had proved existing theories wrong, and had provided a viable alternative. For their 
argument it did not really matter whether one understood the move as shifting the 
border so that parts of economics became part of psychology and behavioral decision 
research, or as shifting the border so that behavioral decision research became part of 
economics. The message would remain the same, namely, that behavioral decision 
researchers and economists were all part of the same scientific program, and that 
although prospect theory showed that many economists had been partially mistaken, 
the problem had been solved. With prospect theory, Kahneman and Tversky made a 
claim of unification; they implicitly argued that behavioral decision research and 
economics were really one and the same.  
                                                
33 e.g. Simon (1956, 1959, 1987). For overviews and discussions of Simon’s position regarding 
economics see Sent (2005), Augier and March (2004), and Heukelom (2007).  
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 In the discussion of prospect theory above a number of instantiations of this 
claim to a unification of economics and psychology have been mentioned. To begin 
with, the first few lines of the 1979 prospect theory article drew a distinction between 
normative and descriptive that was acceptable to both psychologists and economists, 
and thus bridged the gap between psychologists’ normative-descriptive framework 
and economists’ positive-normative distinction. Psychologists could read the remark 
about expected utility as having both normative and descriptive claims as referring to 
the standard framework in behavioral decision research. Economists could read the 
remark as saving the utility maximizing framework upon which all their theories were 
built, while at the same time opening the door to behavior that deviates from utility 
maximizing. Second, Kahneman and Tversky argued that the main problem of 
economics was that it did not include psychophysics in its account of individual 
behavior, in effect implying that economists should study individual behavior the way 
psychologists did. This meant that economists had mistakenly believed that 
economics and psychology were different disciplines, where in fact the two used the 
same behavioral foundations. Third, the distinction Kahneman and Tversky made 
between the objective ‘utility’ and the subjective ‘value’ of a choice appealed to both 
psychologists and economists. For psychologists it meant that they could understand 
prospect theory in the common Lewinian valence framework whereas to economists it 
was acceptable because Kahneman and Tversky had stayed within the bounds of the 
different ways in which these terms were used in economics.    
 The reason that prospect theory became so successful was that it had 
succeeded in combining and using conceptual frameworks from behavioral decision 
research and economics in such a way that scientists involved in decision making in 
economics found it useful. Economists could account for empirical anomalies without 
having to sacrifice their theories. Critics of economics could refer to prospect theory 
when arguing that economics was descriptively wrong, and behavioral decision 
researchers felt justified in their belief that economics was directly involved in, if not 
part of behavioral decision research.  
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7. Assessing Kahneman and Tversky 
Throughout their collaborative career Kahneman and Tversky met with a range of 
opposing arguments.34 As I will show in Chapter six, economists who initially 
enthusiastically adopted the Kahneman-Tversky framework in the 1980s, in the 1990s 
and 2000s gradually departed from this framework. Yet, in spite of this, their work 
has been tremendously influential over the years. Moreover, part of the opposition 
they have met with can probably be explained by their success and influence itself.  
 With their conceptual framework, Kahneman and Tversky offered a rationale 
for science as the ultimate foundation of rational decision making and of scientists as 
the ultimate experts of rationality. This has been arguably the most important part of 
the theoretical framework that Kahneman and Tversky exported to economics, and 
has given rise to behavioral economic paternalism, to be dealt with in Chapter six. For 
Kahneman and Tversky, as well as for the behavioral economics that grew out of their 
research, scientists were the ultimate experts on rationality, and thus ultimately 
decided what a rational decision is and is not.  
 In nineteenth and twentieth century psychophysics and experimental 
psychology the scientist was the ultimate expert regarding the objective value of the 
stimulus because it was the scientist who determined the value of the stimulus. 
Experimental psychologists wanted to know how an individual perceived the different 
stages in the brightness of a light bulb, and in these experiments experimental 
psychologists naturally knew what the objective values of the different stages of 
brightness were because they themselves had set up the experiment. Savage and  
                                                
34 The most often repeated claim has been that Kahneman and Tversky believed people to be irrational. 
The argument was that if human beings can send people to the moon and return them safely, they 
cannot be that irrational. One of the most remarkable exponents of this view has been Edwards, who 
wondered how it is possible that people are so poor assessing uncertainties, as they were in Kahneman 
and Tversky’s theory, and yet, at the same time, could be so skilled in driving their cars. Edwards has 
never elaborated upon his reservations with respect to the work of Tversky and Kahneman, perhaps 
from fear of losing the image of coherence of his program, yet it is no secret that he disagreed with 
their work [e.g. Phillips and Von Winterfeldt (2006), Krantz – interview (2008), Dawes – interview 
(2008)]. The 1980s and 1990s have given rise to a whole surge of criticism regarding Kahneman and 
Tversky’s approach to human decision behavior. The most prominent philosophical critique was 
provided by Cohen (1981). The most extensive criticisms from within experimental psychology came 
from Gigerenzer [see e.g. Gigerenzer (1991,1993,1996), Gigerenzer and Murray (1987), Sedlmeier and 
Gigerenzer (1997,2000), Hertwig and Gigerenzer (1999). These are summarized and discussed in 
Heukelom (2005)]. Gigerenzer has been the only critic to whom Kahneman and Tversky have 
explicitly responded [Kahneman and Tversky (1996)]. Other critics include Lopes (1991) and 
Cosmides and Tooby (1996). 
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Edwards applied this experimental psychological program to decision making, but 
limited the superior knowledge of the scientist. Savage emphasized that all normal 
healthy adults could evaluate the axioms of rational decision making, and assumed 
that everyone would agree with his axioms after some careful thought. Edwards 
adopted Savage’s framework, and he equally assumed that human beings in principle 
make their decisions in accordance with the axioms of rationality. 
  Following the repeated experimental evidence of violations of rationality in 
Tversky’s experiments in the 1960s, combined with the outcome of Kahneman’s 
psychophysical research that human beings are fundamentally flawed decision 
makers, Kahneman and Tversky in the 1970s developed a theory that assumed that 
human beings often and systematically deviate from what is rational and normative. 
Heuristics and Biases and prospect theory detached the normative from the 
descriptive, and constructed a theory for understanding what happened in the 
descriptive domain. One consequence of detaching the normative from the descriptive 
was that normal healthy adults were no longer qualified judges of the axioms of the 
normative theory in rational decision making. The only person still qualified to judge 
whether a specific decision was rational or not was the scientist who possessed a 
thorough training in logic, statistics and decision theory.  
 Although prospect theory was about decision making, the link with 
measurement theory can still be detected. The link shows up in the utility-value curve 
and the stated probability-decision weight curve very clearly. These curves describe 
how the individual perceives the objectively given utility and probability of choice, 
and they thus provide the basis for understanding decisions in the descriptive domain. 
However, by describing how individuals perceive objective stimuli in the form of 
utilities and probabilities, it also provides an account for the deviations found in the 
human measurement instrument, and thus provides a correcting factor that ensures the 
possibility of using the human being as a measurement instrument.  
 In different ways, the joint work of Kahneman and Tversky constituted a break 
from Tversky’s earlier work on decision making and measurement theory of the 
1960s, although it was a relative break. In his joint work with Kahneman, Tversky 
took a different approach to human decision making and, as a consequence, took a 
different approach to measurement. No longer did he maintain that human beings on 
average are rational decision makers, and no longer did he assume that the human  
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measurement instrument on average is unbiased. But decision making and 
measurement were still two sides of the same coin. What had changed was that 
Tversky now understood human beings to deviate systematically and predictably from 
what is normatively correct.  
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5. What to conclude from psychological experiments? 
How Smith and Thaler incorporated behavioral deviations in economics 
 
1. From psychology to economics 
In the late 1970s economists who followed Vernon Smith’s (1927- ) experimental 
work in economics, corroborated the experimental results of behavioral decision 
research and concluded that rational choice theory had not been successful in 
describing individual economic choice behavior [Grether and Plott (1979, 1982)]. 
Shortly thereafter, financial economist Richard Thaler (1945- ) used these 
experimental findings to infer very different implications for economic theorizing 
[Thaler (1980, 1993)]. Thaler introduced the work of Daniel Kahneman and Amos 
Tversky, and argued it provided the solution to the empirical anomalies encountered 
in financial economics. Thaler’s efforts contributed to the development of behavioral 
finance in the 1980s, which led to the rise of behavioral economics in the 1990s. The 
rise of behavioral finance and behavioral economics forced Smith to clarify his 
position on individual economic behavior. In the 2000s, this produced a collaboration 
between Smith and Gerd Gigerenzer (1947- ) and it was through Gigerenzer that 
Smith would align experimental economics with the work of Simon. 
 This chapter thus deals with a transition period in the 1980s in which  
new methods and insights from behavioral decision research altered both 
experimental and mainstream economics. The second section of this chapter retraces 
the initial corroboration of the experimental results of the psychologists by 
experimental economists in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The third section shows 
how Thaler and a number of other financial economists accepted the experimental 
corroboration but inferred a different conclusion. The fourth section sets out Thaler’s 
continued efforts to contribute to developing the field of behavioral finance in the 
1980s. Section five discusses Smith’s response to the rise of behavioral finance. 
Section six serves as a conclusion.  
 
2 Corroboration and incorporation of psychology’s behavioral deviations in 
Smith’s experimental economics  
In the 1960s and 1970s Smith gradually came to the conclusion that economics 
needed to be altered [e.g. Lee (2004), Smith (1962, 1965, 1967, 1974)]. His 
experiments formed an important basis for this. Smith stressed that time was 
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necessary for the market to reach an equilibrium and argued that experiments should 
be used to investigate which factors in the real world determine to which equilibrium 
the market drives the economy to over time. According to Smith, economics was too 
theoretical and failed to look seriously at actual behavior in the real-world economy. 
Smith complained that the standard references, Paul Samuelson’s Foundations of 
Economic Analysis (1947) and Roger Allen’s Mathematical Analysis for Economists 
(1938), only discussed “the purely formal properties of the theory” [Smith (1959), 
p.65], and were of little direct use when applied to real-world problems. He 
complained that these authors talked about the “inputs” of the production function 
without giving them any interpretation. When one did so one immediately was forced 
to make a distinction between the different kinds of inputs, Smith argued, and as a 
result one ended up with quite different mathematical results. Smith insisted 
repeatedly that, as opposed to the standard theory, his position had implications “in a 
very real economic sense” [Smith (1959), p.67]. 
 Smith’s experimental results and his growing dissatisfaction with modern 
economics led him midway through the 1970s to what is probably his strongest 
denouncement of this framework. “I believe that the microeconomic theory of the pre-
1960’s is a dead end,” Smith wrote, and immediately added an alternative: “The new 
microtheory will, and should, deal with economic foundations of organization and 
institution, and this will require us to have an economics of information and a more 
sophisticated treatment of the technology of transacting” [Smith (1974), p.321]. 
However, Smith did not imply that pre-1960s microeconomics should be put aside, 
but argued instead for a serious revision and extension of the theoretical framework. 
Smith had his reservations with respect to the economics of Allen and particularly the 
economics of Samuelson and he developed an experimental method that many of his 
fellow economists were not yet ready to accept.  
 Smith’s link to behavioral decision researchers and other psychologists was 
close. Smith’s important early collaborator, Sidney Siegel (1916 – 1961), was a 
psychologist [e.g. Innocenti (2008)]. Experimental research in economics more 
generally arose from a brief postwar period of cooperation between operations 
researchers, computer scientists, mathematicians, economists and psychologists 
[Dimand (2005), Weintraub (1992), Lee (2004)]. The link was, for instance, close 
enough for Smith to participate in discussions on Leonard Savage’s and others’ 
decision theory. In “Measuring Nonmonetary Utilities in Uncertain Choices: The 
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Ellsberg Urn” (1969) Smith took a position in the ensuing debate on the violations of 
Savage’s normative theory as presented by Maurice Allais, Daniel Ellsberg and 
others. Smith’s response to the Ellsberg argument is important because it shows how 
Smith attempted to strike a balance between Savage’s theory and its opponents, an 
attempt in which he tried to bridge the opposing theoretical and experimental sides. “I 
stand with those, like Savage, Raiffa, and Schlaifer, who say they would not want to 
violate the axioms consciously,” Smith started his argument. Yet, he was unwilling to 
go all the way with Savage: “However, having stated this I am not prepared to assert 
that he who seriously and consciously violates the axioms, and in my judgment knows 
what he is doing,’ is thereby simply making a ‘mistake,’ and should be given a little 
more conditioning and ‘education’” [Smith (1969), pp.324-325].  
Smith took a position that in a crucial way differed from the position taken by 
decision theorists and behavioral decision researchers. Smith did not to want to violate 
Savage’s axioms, but he did not accept the conclusion that people who violate the 
axioms were making mistakes either. People may have very good reasons for 
deviating from the axioms, Smith argued. For instance, this could be because they 
take into account what other people, such as friends and colleagues, think of their 
decisions. Smith did not accept the conclusion that deviations from the axioms are to 
be understood as mistakes implying the need for education. For Smith, deviations 
from Savage’s axioms, even when they were systematic, were not problematic 
because over time the market would correct those mistakes. Whereas decision 
theorists, such as Savage and behavioral decision researchers such as Ward Edwards 
and Amos Tversky believed that systematic violations immediately raised questions 
about the normative theory, for Smith this link was much less direct. For Savage, 
Edwards and Tversky, a decision was either normatively correct (rational) or 
normatively false (irrational). To Smith, rationality was a matter of content and 
degree. People might have reasons for initially deviating from the norms, and in a 
market context the institution of the market would ensure that in due time they would 
adjust their behavior towards the rational behavior. Smith was of the opinion that 
“even if [Savage’s] axioms are to be regarded as basically a normative theory, the 
theory can also do valuable service in helping us to understand actual behavior” 
[Smith (1969), pp.324-325]. The normative theory shows where and when people 
deviate from the norm, and in that sense guides the description of observed decision 
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behavior. But it also serves as a description of human behavior in market equilibrium, 
and thus helps us to understand how decision behavior adjusts over time in markets.  
 Another way in which Smith’s experimental work differed from that 
conducted by behavioral decision researchers is that his decision makers were not 
individual subjects but economic units. In one of his theoretical papers on investment 
and production planning, Smith, for instance, started as follows: “We imagine 
individual decision making units, which we call ‘firms’” [Smith (1960), p.198]. The 
individual decision making units of Smith’s theories and experiments were not 
individual human beings, as in the decision theory and the experiments of the 
psychologists, but they were individual economic units such as firms, consumers, and 
producers. Smith was not interested in the individual as an individual, but was 
interested in the individual in its role as a particular economic decision making unit.  
 As matter of fact, Smith was not even interested in the individual as an 
economic decision making unit, but instead in how the market institution influenced 
the unit’s behavior over time. In “Experimental Studies of Discrimination Versus 
Competition in Sealed-Bid Auction Markets” [Smith (1967)] Smith stated that the 
“primary purpose” of his experiments was “to study individual bidding behavior and 
price determination under two alternative forms of market organization: (1) price 
discrimination, [...] and (2) pure competition” [Smith (1967), p.56]. It was not the 
individual unit’s behavior that should be investigated, but the market environment that 
affected its behavior. In mathematical psychology and behavioral decision research 
the individual functioned as a measurement instrument for (average) individual 
psychological characteristics, as set out in Chapters two and three. In Smith’s 
experiments, the individual functioned as a measurement instrument for 
characteristics of the market mechanism. 
 Because Smith’s experiments are historically and methodologically connected 
to the experiments of the psychologists of behavioral decision research, and because 
Smith at different points actively engaged in discussions in decision theory, it might 
appear that experimental economics, decision theory, and behavioral decision research 
developed in tandem in the 1960s and 1970s. But Smith’s experimental economics 
differed in at least two crucial ways from the experiments conducted by the 
psychologists. First, Smith did not investigate the individual human being, but instead 
he investigated economic decision making units. Smith was only interested in 
individual human beings in their role as an economic decision making unit. Second, 
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Smith did not assume the static point of view in which it is believed that the 
individual that deviates from the normative theory has made a mistake. In contrast, 
Smith was interested in how decision behavior changes over time, and in the 
environments that induce these changes. Smith took a stance that he at least once 
labeled “a crude macrobiological approach,” in which the system, when not 
exogenously altered, tends towards a “stable equilibrium” [Smith (1968), p.410].  
 But Smith did not entirely dismiss the experimental results of the 
psychologists either. The stream of experimental results obtained by behavioral 
decision research in the 1970s which showed that individuals violate rational choice 
theory, required experimental economists assume a stance. David Grether (1939- ) 
and Charles Plott (1938- ), who had joined Smith’s experimental economics program 
in the 1970s, decided to subject the experimental results of the psychologists to a test. 
The reason that they could do so was that all the material and expertise were already 
available. The rise of experimental economics had produced an environment in which 
the results of the psychologists could be tested without requiring economists to learn 
new methods or techniques. Checking as many possible explanations as they could 
think of for the results obtained by the psychologists, Grether and Plott (1979, 1982) 
sought to falsify the findings of the psychologists. Moreover, they set out to test the 
experimental findings based on the presumably much more rigorous standards of 
(experimental) economics. The rise of the experimental method in economics had 
made experimental economists confident they could beat psychologists at their own 
game, or at least critically assess their work by using their own experimental method.   
 Grether and Plott (1979, 1982) focused on the alleged phenomena of 
“preference reversals,” the phenomenon that occurs when individuals change their 
preferences regarding the same choice when it has been differently formulated; and 
“intransitivity,” the related phenomenon showing that actual individual preferences 
are not always transitive.35 Grether and Plott (1979) were very suspicious of the 
empirical evidence produced by the psychologists, and aware that economists and 
                                                
35 Their references to behavioral decision research consisted of only a few articles [e.g. Slovic and 
Lichtenstein (1971, 1973), Tversky (1969, 1971)]. Paul Slovic and Sarah Lichtenstein were, however, 
quick to remark in the American Economic Review that “there is a substantial body of research on 
preference reversals within the psychological literature that is being neglected here. Moreover, 
reversals should be seen not as an isolated phenomenon, but as one of a broad class of findings that 
demonstrates violations of preference models” [Slovic and Lichtenstein (1983), p.597]. From that 
moment on, investigations of empirical falsifications of rational choice theory in experimental 
economics increased. 
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psychologists did not always use a rational choice theory for the same purpose. They 
emphasized that “[t]here is little doubt that psychologists have uncovered a systematic 
and interesting aspect of human choice behavior” [Grether and Plott (1979), p.624], 
but wondered whether 1) the phenomenon also held in more typical economic 
situations, and 2) whether it could be explained by means of economic theory.  
 The main worry of Grether and Plott was that the experimental results were 
mere artifacts produced by the experimental setup of the psychologists. They 
produced thirteen (!) methodological and theoretical economic explanations for the 
falsifications: 1) no real money was used and incentives may therefore have been 
misspecified; 2) different incomes of the subjects may have influenced some 
experiments; 3) in most of the psychological experiments indifference between two 
options was not possible; 4) perhaps subjects did not give their true selling or bidding 
price but acted strategically; 5) subjectively perceived probabilities from the lotteries 
used may not be equal to actual objective probabilities; 6) perhaps subjects chose 
lexicographically, as in Tversky’s elimination-by-aspects theory [Tversky (1971)], 
which would account for a moderate form of preference reversals; 7) perhaps the 
magnitudes of the choices were too close, leading to apparent intransitivity, as in 
Tversky (1969); 8) the cost of decision making could be too high compared to the 
expected pay-off, leading subjects to not make an effort; 9) perhaps the choices 
subjects faced contained too much information for the subject to process within the 
time available; 10) subjects could have been confused or might have misunderstood 
the experiment; 11) perhaps the phenomena reported occurred only in a few subjects; 
12) the subjects were relatively unsophisticated psychological undergraduates, 
whereas more sophisticated subjects might make more rational choices; and 13) the 
experimenters were psychologists, leading subjects to speculate about the true purpose 
of the experiments, and hence perhaps to change their behavior.  
 This last explanation for the findings particularly illustrates that Grether and 
Plott went to great lengths to show that the findings of the psychologists had been 
mere artifacts. Grether and Plott’s message was that every possible explanation for the 
psychologists’ findings needed to be controlled for, even the argument that the results 
should not be taken seriously for the sole reason that the experimenters had been 
psychologists. Grether and Plott set up two experiments in which they controlled for 
all thirteen possible explanations. They specified incentives, they made the 
experiments very simple and they made certain that all subjects understood the 
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choices they could make. Furthermore, they used undergraduates as well as graduates, 
making it clear that they were economists and not psychologists, and they took the 
two possible explanations of Tversky into consideration. But, much to their surprise, 
they obtained results that were similar to those of the psychologists. Consequently, 
they remained “as perplexed as the reader who has just been introduced to the 
problem” [Grether and Plott (1979), p.624].   
The first Grether and Plott article was published in the same year as 
Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect theory, and in Grether and Plott (1982) they 
recognized prospect theory as a prominent example of a rational choice theory which 
adjusted a number of assumptions in order to account for the empirical findings. But 
Grether and Plott (1982) stressed that prospect theory could not account for their 
experimental results; “We need to emphasize that the phenomenon causes problems 
for preference theory in general, and not for just the expected utility theory. Prospect 
theory as a special type of preference theory cannot account for the results” [Grether 
and Plott (1982), p.575].  
The conclusions Grether and Plott derived from these results are important 
because they set the standard for experimental economists’ responses to these and 
similar findings for the following quarter of a century. According to Grether and Plott 
(1979, 1982), the experimental results pointed to an inconsistency between actual 
behavior and rational choice theory that was “deeper than the mere lack of transitivity 
or even stochastic transitivity.”  The empirical results suggested “that no optimization 
principles of any sort lie behind even the simplest of human choices” [Grether and 
Plott (1979), p.623, emphasis added]. Grether and Plott did not believe that the 
empirical results could be addressed by making a relatively minor adjustment of 
rational choice theory, but drew the radical conclusion that utility maximization and 
rational choice should be completely abandoned as a description of and explanation 
for the decision making behavior of individuals.  
However, and this was equally crucial for the experimental economic 
approach, Grether and Plott did not imply that utility maximization and rational 
choice as a description of market behavior were invalidated. With respect to market 
behavior the experimental results only showed that the economic subjects, who in the 
final market equilibrium behave according to rational choice and utility maximization, 
initially behave according to a to-be-developed theory that is completely unlike utility 
maximization and rational choice. Because the disciplining, rationalizing institution 
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of the market operates between individual behavior and market behavior, a 
falsification of individual rational optimization did not falsify rational choice as a 
description of equilibrium market behavior. Quite the contrary, the experimental 
results only emphasized the role of the market as the mechanism that rationalizes 
individual behavior. Smith, Grether and Plott assumed that the market drives the 
behavior of the economy to a rational, utility maximizing equilibrium over time. 
Therefore, the fact that initially individual behavior systematically deviated from 
rational utility maximization only showed how important the market mechanism was 
in driving individuals to rational behavior in market equilibrium.  
 
3. Thaler’s financial economic anomalies and the creation of behavioral finance 
In postwar neoclassical economics, the market had largely become an empty concept, 
mainly due to Samuelson’s work. In Samuelson’s framework [Samuelson (1947)], it 
was assumed that all the decision makers in the economy always maximize utility. 
Samuelson needed to make this assumption for his operationalist approach. If 
individuals were assumed not to always maximize utility it could not be supposed that 
their observed behavior was on individual demand and supply curves and it would 
then be impossible to operationalize demand and supply curves through the operation 
of measuring individual choices. But assuming that individual subjects in the 
economy always maximize utility implied that the economy was always in 
equilibrium [Weintraub (1991)]. In contrast to the view later developed by Smith and 
in experimental economics, time was not an element in the Samuelsonian neoclassical 
economic world. Samuelson only considered static equilibria. There was a direct link 
between the behavior of individuals and the market; the market was nothing more 
than the sum of all the individual behaviors. The adjustment of individual behavior to 
market equilibrium did not come into play.  
 In the 1960s and 1970s, a new field in economics appeared that used the 
Samuelsonian neoclassical theory as a theoretical foundation for its empirical 
investigation of stock market behavior. Based on research conducted during the 1950s 
and 1960s by Franco Modigliani (1918 – 2003), Merton Miller (1923 – 2000), and 
Harry Markowitz (1927- ), financial economics, as the new field came to be called, 
gradually appeared as an accepted genuine sub-branch of neoclassical economics in 
the second half of the 1960s and 1970s [Jovanovic (2008), Poitras and Jovanovic 
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(2007), MacKenzie (2006)].36 The empirical study of stock markets was linked to 
neoclassical economics through what came to be referred to as the efficient market 
hypothesis. The efficient market hypothesis specified the theoretical position of 
neoclassical economics in the case of the stock market, and any market for that matter 
[Jovanovic (2008)]. “A market in which prices always ‘fully reflect’ available 
information is called ‘efficient’” [Fama (1970), p.383].  
 The central question for financial economists was whether stock markets 
indeed are efficient, as theory predicted, or inefficient, for which an explanation then 
would have to be found. In the second half of the 1960s and 1970s two opposing 
views developed. At MIT, Paul Cootner (1930 – 1978), Hendrik Houthakker (1924 – 
2008) and others developed and defended the idea that the stock market was not 
efficient. “[P]rice changes are not purely random but follow certain longer run 
trends,” Houthakker argued [Houthakker, quoted in Jovanovic (2008), p.228], and 
Cootner more bluntly stated that “[t]he stock market is not a random walk.” [Cootner, 
quoted in Jovanovic (2008), p.225]. The Chicago Graduate School of Business held 
and fiercely defended the opposite view, that the stock market is efficient and that the 
stock prices over time will appear to be a random walk [Jovanovic (2008)]. In 
Chicago, Eugene Fama (1939- ), a student of Miller, arose as the main protagonist, 
defending the efficient market as an empirical and theoretical fact [e.g. Fama (1970)]. 
Inspired indirectly by then Chicago mathematician Savage, Fama distinguished 
between “sophisticated traders” who were experienced enough to determine the 
intrinsic value of securities and act accordingly, and “other participants” who did not 
(yet) posses this skill and who produced the random noise around the intrinsic value. 
Sophisticated traders ensured that the market prices remained or returned quickly to 
the underlying value of the stocks [Jovanovic (2008), Fama (1970].    
 On the basis of the empirical corroboration of the psychological results by 
Grether and Plott, financial economists began to look seriously at the results of the 
psychologists. One illustrative example is Arrow (1982), which discussed a number of 
phenomena in the (stock) market that contradicted the “rationality hypothesis,” such 
as individuals’ unwillingness to accept government subsidized insurance below its 
actuarial value and observed irrationality in financial markets. Arrow suggested “that 
these failures of the rationality hypothesis are in fact compatible with some of the 
                                                
36 See e.g. Markowitz (1952, 1959, 1965), Modigliani and Miller (1958), Miller and Modigliani (1963) 
and the collected papers in Modigliani, Abel, and Johnson (1980). 
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specific observations of cognitive psychologists” [Arrow (1982), p.5]. Arrow, in other 
words, drew a direct line from observations in the laboratories of the psychologists to 
contradictions observed in the market. Experimental results from psychology, that in 
themselves had nothing to do with the economy or with markets, were linked to 
economics and used as an explanation for the unsolved financial economic puzzles. In 
one sentence Arrow linked two very different phenomena: 
 
an important class of intertemporal markets shows systematic deviations from 
individual rational behavior and [..] these deviations are consonant with 
evidence from very different sources collected by psychologists. [Arrow 
(1982), p.8] 
 
Systematic deviations from rational behavior by individuals in the laboratory could be 
an explanation for observed market deviations only when one understood the relation 
between individual and market behavior to be direct, as was the case in Samuelsonian 
neoclassical economics.  
 However, deviations from the theory of efficient markets had been discussed 
before. For instance, market deviations could be explained as resulting from market 
imperfections such as transaction costs and limited information. The deviations could 
furthermore be explained as short-run phenomena that would quickly disappear 
through arbitrage. But Arrow considered these explanations to be insufficient and 
argued that the results of the psychologists and experimental economists implied that 
market imperfections should be understood as genuine phenomena, and not as having 
resulted from temporary distortions of the market. Thus, Arrow recalled that “[a]ny 
argument seeking to establish the presence of irrational economic behavior always 
meets a standard counterargument: if most agents are irrational, then a rational 
individual can make a lot of money; eventually, therefore, the rational individual will 
take over all the wealth” [Arrow (1982), p.7]. But, Arrow argued, arbitrage and 
related arguments could easily be countered: “(1) Not all arbitrage possibilities exist. 
[..] (2) More important, if everyone else is “irrational,” it by no means follows that 
one can make money by being rational, at least in the short run” [Arrow (1982), p.7].  
 Attempts to incorporate the corroborated findings of the psychologists in 
financial economics appear scattered through the literature from 1980 onwards. But  
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Thaler was the first economist to draw economic implications from behavioral 
decision research findings explicitly. This central focus of his work made him a great 
promoter of Kahneman and Tversky’s work in economics. Extensive references to the 
work of Kahneman and Tversky occurred in almost every publication by Thaler. 
Thaler was an economist from the Chicago Research School of Business and a 
colleague of Fama. In the 1980s he worked predominantly in financial economics, 
advancing the experimental results and the theoretical approach of Kahneman and 
Tversky as an explanation for the observed falsifications of the efficient market 
hypothesis, and thus disagreeing with the prevalent financial economic view in 
Chicago. In the 1980s the exploration of systematic deviations from the efficient 
market hypothesis in financial markets by Thaler and others became known as 
behavioral finance.  
 Thaler’s first behavioral finance paper, “Toward a Positive Theory of 
Consumer Choice,” appeared in 1980 in the Journal of Economic Behavior and 
Organization. By 1991 Thaler had collected enough material to publish a book, 
entitled Quasi Rational Economics and consisting of sixteen of his papers that tested 
the traditional neoclassical economic models and offered alternatives. In 1993 Thaler 
edited another book entitled Advances in Behavioral Finance for the Russell Sage 
Foundation (RSF), consisting mainly of papers from the latter half of the 1980s, 
which was followed by a second volume in 2005, with the same title. Kahneman and 
Tversky were behavioral finance’s theoretical founding fathers, but Thaler was its 
earliest and strongest advocate. 
 Specifically, Thaler built on two lines of Kahneman and Tversky’s research. 
Thaler systematically connected Kahneman and Tversky’s biases of rational choice in 
experiments to the anomalies of rational choice theory found in financial economics, 
and he made this connection the cornerstone of a new research program. He collected 
phenomena that were anomalous in financial economics and were compatible with the 
biases found by Kahneman and Tversky. Sometimes explanations were offered on the 
basis of prospect theory or by means of some other theory. Usually, however, these 
violations of standard economic theory were presented without any explanation to 
account for them, and he simply stressed what they implied, that neoclassical theory 
had been violated.  
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 For the Journal of Economic Perspectives, Thaler published two series of 
“anomalies” columns that had the sole purpose of proclaiming that economics had 
serious problems. The first series contained fourteen anomalies articles and appeared 
between 1987 and 1991.37 The second series contained four publications and appeared 
between 1995 and 2001. The first anomaly article in 1987 documented “the January 
effect.” When the market for stocks is in efficient equilibrium, in the neoclassical 
world the average monthly return should be equal for each month. There is no reason 
to expect that stocks would perform better just because it happens to be a certain 
month. However, this was exactly what was observed in the case of January. 
Especially for smaller firms stock returns were substantially higher in January 
compared with other months. How could this January effect be possible given the 
theory of efficient markets? The answer was that it was not possible and that one 
needed a theory such as Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect theory to account for the 
findings.  
 Loewenstein and Thaler (1989) showed that many similar anomalies existed in 
and outside the economy that have to do with intertemporal choice. For example, 
people prefer to pay too much tax in advance and to receive some back when the year 
is over instead of the reverse, even when the first option is subject to costs in terms of 
lost interest. Schoolteachers who can choose between being paid in nine months 
(September-June) or in twelve (September-August), choose the second option 
although from an economic perspective the first is more rational. But Loewenstein 
and Thaler also cited the dermatologist who lamented that her patients were unwilling 
to avoid the sun when she told them about the risks of sun cancer, but who were quick 
to stay out of the sun when she told them about the risk of getting “large pores and 
blackheads.” This example, Loewenstein and Thaler argued, was also a violation of 
economic theory because it showed myopia in patients they should not have if they 
acted rationally. The implicit reasoning was that economic theory could be applied to 
every aspect of our lives and that therefore also violations of economic theory could 
be drawn from every corner of life. The recurring message of the anomalies articles 
was that there are serious problems with economic theory which cannot be easily 
dismissed, and which need to be taken seriously.  
                                                
37 The anomalies of the first series have been collected in The Winners Curse (1992). 
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In his anomalies column Thaler cited examples from finance that were clearly 
economic. The structure of the anomalies was often similar to the biases produced by 
Kahneman and Tversky. One anomaly that Thaler frequently investigated and that 
became one of the principal anomalies of behavioral finance was the “endowment 
effect.” The endowment effect was an application of the framing effect of Kahneman 
and Tversky that showed that individuals’ preferences are subject to an initial framing 
process. In other words, individuals’ preferences depend on the quantity of the means 
they are endowed with. The experiment is as follows. Divide a group of subjects 
randomly into two sub-groups and give one of the two sub-groups a standard coffee 
mug. Subsequently, ask the sub-group with the mug what price they would minimally 
want to sell the mug for. Also ask subjects of the sub-group without mugs what price 
they would maximally want to pay for the mug. Typically, the willingness to accept 
(WTA) is about twice the willingness to pay (WTP). Apparently, people reframe their 
preferences after receiving the mug. In economics, this endowment effect could serve 
as an explanation for the often observed fallacy of taking into account sunk costs [see 
e.g. Thaler (1980, 1987), Tversky and Kahneman (1981)]. The endowment effect 
further falsified the Coase theorem, which says that in order to attain the efficient 
market allocation, the initial endowment of the goods should be irrelevant. The Coase 
theorem depends on the assumption that for every individual WTA equals WTP, so 
that trading will continue until the goods are in the hands of those with the highest 
WTP. But given the demonstrated systematic difference between WTA and WTP, the 
Coase theorem no longer held true [Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1990)]. 
A defining characteristic of Thaler’s behavioral finance was that it adopted 
Kahneman and Tversky’s understanding of normative and descriptive. In addition, 
Thaler accepted their understanding of the positive realm of economics as covering 
both the normative and the descriptive domain. This understanding diverged from the 
postwar economic understanding in which a value-free positive domain was 
contrasted with the application of positive economic theories for specific value-laden 
goals of the policy maker in the normative realm. As a result, Thaler’s introduction of 
Kahneman and Tversky’s meaning of normative and positive could not but lead to 
confusion. Thaler equated Kahneman and Tversky’s descriptive domain with the  
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economists’ positive and used normative both in Kahneman and Tversky’s meaning 
and in the economists’ meaning. Thaler (1980) expressed it as follows:   
 
Economists rarely draw the distinction between normative models of 
consumer choice and descriptive or positive models. Although the theory is 
normatively based (it describes what rational consumers should do), 
economists argue that it also serves well as a descriptive theory (it predicts 
what consumers in fact do). This paper argues that exclusive reliance on the 
normative theory leads economists to make systematic, predictable errors in 
describing or forecasting consumer choices. [Thaler (1980), p.39] 
 
The conceptual re-organization of economics that Thaler took over from Kahneman 
and Tversky played an important role in behavioral economics in the 1990s and 2000s 
and it would determine how behavioral economists started to think about policy 
advice in the 2000s. This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter six. In line with 
Kahneman and Tversky, Thaler argued that further theoretical advancement of the 
normative theory was perfectly fine, but that because economists had ignored the fact 
that real-world behavior of individuals does not agree with this theory so long, they 
should now also pay more attention to building a descriptive theory of economic 
behavior.  
 Thus, Thaler not only accepted the empirical evidence presented by Kahneman 
and Tversky, but he also accepted their accompanying methodological distinction. 
Essentially, Thaler accepted Kahneman and Tversky’s attempt to recreate economics 
in the image of behavioral decision research. As set out in Chapter four, prospect 
theory made a unificatory claim. It claimed that behavioral decision research and 
economics were part of the same program, and that the approach of behavioral 
decision research was better than that of the economists. Therefore, the economists 
should adopt prospect theory and its methodological distinctions. Thaler accepted this 
reasoning entirely. He provided Kahneman and Tversky’s approach with more 
economic content, but he left the theoretical structure intact. From the early 1980s to 
the early 1990s, Thaler’s promotion of Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect theory  
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acted as the main catalyst for establishing an economic program based on the work of 
Kahneman and Tversky.  
 Another catalyst for developing behavioral finance in the 1980s was the 
support of the Alfred Sloan Foundation (ASF), the Russell Sage Foundation (RSF) 
and the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). The best way to conceive of 
the role of the NBER, the ASF and the RSF is in contributing to the attachment of a 
small group of researchers to a large and influential research program. Their financial 
resources explain how a few financial economists interested in research from a 
particular branch of psychology could develop a more or less coherent research 
program built largely around the work of two psychologists. From 1986 onwards, the 
ASF and later the RSF were consistent sponsors of behavioral economic research. In 
the mid-1990s the RSF set up a series of books in behavioral economics, set up a 
“Behavioral Economic Roundtable” that regularly brought and still brings behavioral 
economists together, and organized and still organizes a series of workshops in 
collaboration with the NBER. The financial support from ASF, RSF and NBER is a 
relevant characteristic of the rise of behavioral finance and behavioral economics, but 
is not further discussed in this dissertation. 
 
4. Distinguishing experimental economics from the rising star of behavioral 
finance 
The difference between Thaler’s behavioral finance and Smith’s experimental 
economics is that behavioral finance investigates individual behavior and that 
experimental economics investigates markets.38 The growing number of behavioral 
financial publications in the 1980s and the influence of Kahneman and Tversky’s 
work more generally pressed Smith to distinguish his experimental economics more 
clearly from these psychologists and their economic off-spring. In 1989, ten years 
after the first Grether and Plott article, Smith asked:  
 
 
                                                
38 From a different starting point, Ana Santos’ dissertation The Social Epistemology of Experimental 
Economics (2006) arrives at a taxonomy that is similar to, yet differs somewhat from the history 
described here. Within what she broadly labels “experimental economics” she distinguishes three types 
of experiments: “market experiments” such as those of Smith, and “non-market experiments,” the latter 
including “individual behaviour and decision-making experiments” such as those of Allais (1953) and 
“game theory experiments,” such as Kalish, Milnor, Nash, and Nering (1954) and Schelling (1957). 
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 How do we close the [..] gap, between the psychology of choice and agents’ 
 economic behavior in experimental exchange markets? [..] I think we 
 economists need to accept these replicable empirical results [of behavioral 
 decision research] as providing meaningful measures of how people think 
 about economic questions. For their part, psychologists need to accept the 
 dominating message in experimental research on the performance of a wide 
 variety of bidding, auctioning and customer (posted price) markets: markets 
 quite often “work” in the sense that over time they converge to the predictions 
 of the economists’ paradigm. [Smith  (1989), p.165, emphasis in original] 
  
 The conclusions drawn from the experimental results of Grether and Plott 
(1979, 1982) have been held by Smith, Grether, Plott and other experimental 
economists from the late 1970s until today. Over the years experimental economists 
have struggled over how to formulate their approach and how to distinguish their 
ideas from Thaler’s behavioral finance and more broadly from those of the behavioral 
economists. Part of the difficulty was (and still is) that experimental economists and 
Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect theory are seemingly very close. Experimental 
economists agree that the psychologists’ experimental findings indeed disprove 
rational choice of individual decision behavior, which easily led to the conclusion that 
they also agreed with the theoretical implications that were drawn by behavioral 
decision researchers and behavioral finance economists.  
 Another difficulty was that experimental economists conducted the same kind 
of experiments as the behavioral decision researchers and behavioral finance 
economists, but with a different purpose. Behavioralists conducted experiments with 
individual human subjects to investigate the decision making characteristics of the 
individual. Experimental economists conducted experiments with individual human 
subjects to investigate the market. The two sides conducted the same experiments, but 
with a different question in mind. Chapters two to four showed that experimental 
psychology used human subjects not because it was interested in any particular 
individual, but as a measurement instrument for measuring the characteristics of the 
individual. Experimental economics went a step further. It was not interested in the 
particular individuals in experiments, nor in the individual or his or her characteristics 
in general. It needed the individuals to experiment on a phenomenon that was 
altogether different from the individual subjects of the experiment. Like the biologist 
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who investigates a virus through its effect on laboratory mice, so experimental 
economics investigated the market but needed individual subjects as it were, to 
investigate the market. Nevertheless, experimental economists were easily understood 
as investigating human behavior, as will be set out in more detail in the following 
chapter. Frequently found statements in experimental economics of the sort “[i]n 
laboratory market experiments, we test the theory’s assumptions about agent 
behavior” [Smith (1989), p.154] could understandably be misunderstood as statements 
about the psychology of human beings. Moreover, as a result of this subtle distinction, 
experimental economists were pressed to distinguish themselves more clearly from 
Thaler’s behavioral finance and later from behavioral economics.  
 The use of time was crucial in Smith’s experimental economics. In 
experimental economics the market required time to drive the economy to 
equilibrium. Because of their use of time experimental economists could maintain that 
individual behavior initially deviated from the norms of rational choice theory and 
utility theory. At the same time, they could also maintain that the emerging market 
equilibrium was in line with rational choice and utility theory. Smith’s use of time 
distinguished him sharply from Samuelsonian neoclassical economics and behavioral 
economics and this was the main reason why he had difficulties explaining 
experimental economics’ position to behavioral finance economists. “People have 
their own homegrown beliefs about how markets work, or should work,” Smith 
carefully explained, and “questionnaire responses reflect these beliefs, which are 
often couched in terms of “fairness” criteria.” As a consequence, “[people’s] initial 
behavior in a market may reflect these beliefs.” However, when these individuals 
operate in a market over time their behavior “adapts to the incentive properties of 
markets” [Smith (1989), p.166, emphasis in the original]. 
 Smith went on to conclude that in economics there were “two experimental 
research programs,” both of which, he added, required considerable development. 
First there was the “economist’s maximizing paradigm,” which “often performs well 
in predicting the equilibrium reached over time in experimental markets.” However, 
the economist’s maximizing paradigm “is not generally able to account for short run 
dynamic behavior, such as the contract price paths from initial states to final steady 
states.” Second, there was “the psychologist’s ‘reference frame’ descriptive 
paradigm,” which is Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect theory and the behavioral 
finance that emerged from it. This psychological program did well “in explaining 
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subjects’ introspective responses, and their short-run or initial decision behavior, but it 
provides no predictive theory of reference frame adjustment over time.” Smith was 
quick to point out that a well-known paper from the psychological program agreed 
with this analysis. “In fact, the statement (Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler, 1986, 
p.731) ‘that they (people) adapt their views of fairness to the norms of actual 
behavior’ can be interpreted as a description of what is observed in experimental 
markets” [Smith (1989), p.166]. 
 Another way in which Smith tried to distinguish experimental economics more 
clearly from behavioral decision research, behavioral finance and behavioral 
economics was by abandoning the label “experimental game” as a description of his 
experiments. In the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s game theory, the application of 
rational choice theory to situations of human interaction, had been an important 
source of inspiration for Smith’s experiments [Lee (2004), Weintraub (1992), Dimand 
(2005)]. But game theory as a description and explanation of the interaction of 
rationally acting self-interested individuals started from a description of individuals as 
optimizers of utility. The experimental results showed that this had been a wrong 
assumption. Therefore, game theory became inappropriate for experimental 
economists as a description of individual behavior. The fact that Smith during the 
1970s explicitly discarded his use of the term “experimental games” to describe his 
experiments seems an unsolved puzzle [Lee (2004)]. But in the light of the 
corroborations produced by Grether and Plott (1979, 1982) Smith’s reasons can be 
illuminated. Smith considered game theory no longer a good description of individual 
behavior. Game theory still describes and explains the behavior of the individuals in 
the eventual market equilibrium, but cannot explain individuals’ behavior when they 
are first presented with an economic decision. It can neither explain the process of 
adjustment to equilibrium. As a result, the term “experimental game” became 
inappropriate as a description of experiments that investigated the adjustment 
behavior of the individual agents in a market setting. The experiments were still 
considered a game in the sense that they mimicked the crucial aspects of the market, 
but they were no longer a game in the sense of describing fully rational interacting 
individuals.  
Pressed to distinguish experimental economics more clearly from behavioral 
finance, Smith was led to cooperate with psychologist Gigerenzer in the 2000s. In 
2001 Smith contributed a chapter to Gigerenzer and Reinhard Selten’s edited volume 
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Bounded Rationality, The Adaptive Toolbox [McCabe and Smith (2001)]. In 2008 
Smith published a monograph entitled Rationality in Economics, Constructivist and 
Ecological Forms in which he drew an explicit link between his own and 
Gigerenzer’s work. In the Handbook of Experimental Economic Results, volume 1 
(2008), edited by Plott and Smith, Gigerenzer participates by making no fewer than 
six contributions, and the third, forthcoming volume in Gigerenzer’s Adaptive 
Behavior and Cognition (ABC)’s research group on bounded rationality in its title 
emphasizes the link with Smith: Ecological Rationality: Intelligence in the Real 
World. Finally, in 2008 Smith agreed to become co-director of Gigerenzer’s ABC 
group at the Max Planck Institute for Human Development in Berlin [email 
Gigerenzer to author, July 12, 2008]. 
  
5. Economics, behavioral decision research, and Kahneman and Tversky 
In the 1960s and 1970s behavioral decision research became relevant to economics, as 
set out in Chapters three and four. Behavioral decision researchers produced 
experimental results that seemed to falsify rational utility maximizing behavior, the 
basis of all modern economics. The role of Kahneman and Tversky has been 
emphasized: Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect theory (1979) was a conscious 
attempt to influence economics and to alter economists’ reasoning.  
 The first to pick up on behavioral decision research’s experimental results 
were experimental economists such as Grether, Plott and Smith. Grether and Plott 
(1979, 1982) corroborated the experimental findings of psychology and drew the 
conclusion that rational choice as a description of individual human behavior should 
be entirely abandoned. However, experimental economists at the same time concluded 
that rational choice as a description of efficient markets in equilibrium could be 
maintained and that the experimental results only emphasized the rationalizing forces 
of the market. Furthermore, experimental economics did not accept behavioral 
decision research’s alternative accounts, and explicitly denounced the most visible 
theory among them, Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect theory. 
 An unexpected result of experimental economists’ corroboration of behavioral 
decision research’s experimental results was that it paved the way for behavioral 
decision researchers to enter financial economics. Thaler understood the 
psychological findings to show the irrationality of individual choices, and drew a 
direct link from the irrationality of individual choices to irrational features of the 
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behavior of markets. He immediately recognized Kahneman and Tversky’s research, 
and especially Kahneman and Tversky (1979), as an important new and improved 
theory of individual decision behavior. The different responses of Smith’s 
experimental economics and Thaler’s financial economics to the experimental results 
and to prospect theory’s alternative can be explained in terms of the different notion 
of the market in experimental economics and financial economics. To Smith the 
market was a rationalizing mechanism that requires time to drive the economy 
towards equilibrium. For financial economists such as Thaler, time was not an 
element of the market. 
 This different response to the findings of behavioral decision research was a 
reflection of a more fundamental difference between experimental economists and 
behavioral decision researchers such as Kahneman and Tversky. Behavioral decision 
researchers located the explanation for the deviations from rational behavior in the 
nature of human beings. For Kahneman and Tversky the reason that human beings 
often deviate in their behavior from what is rationally optimal is because they are 
made that way. As set out in Chapters two, three, and four, Kahneman and Tversky 
stood in an experimental psychology tradition in which the fixed characteristics of the 
individual were investigated. Kahneman and Tversky investigated the human being in 
the way that the physicist investigates the atom: on the assumption that there is one 
universal way in which the individual/atom can respond to a particular stimulus. This 
was a fundamentally different understanding from that of experimental economists 
who started from the assumption that individual behavior is constantly subject to 
change and who investigated how the market causes individual behavior to change. 
Experimental economists investigated behavior like biologists in that they assumed 
that individual behavior constantly adapts to an external selection force.  
 This also explains why prospect theory was so quickly adopted by many 
economists, whereas Simon had largely failed to influence economists. Kahneman 
and Tversky, neoclassical economists like Samuelson, and financial economists like 
Thaler, all conceived of individual behavior as a stable phenomenon that, like the 
physicist’s atom, could be isolated to investigate its fixed and universal properties. 
Simon and Smith on the other hand were social scientists who understood individual 
behavior as adaptive and hence as unfixed. In their view, therefore, it did not make 
sense to isolate the individual decision maker from its environment. The universal 
properties Kahneman and Tversky, Thaler, and Samuelson were looking for simply 
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did not exist in this view of economic behavior. The two sides had a different 
understanding of individual behavior and a different understanding of collective 
decision making in markets, administrative organizations and institutions. Simon and 
Smith clashed with mainstream neoclassical economists on a very basic level while 
Kahneman and Tversky agreed with financial economists on the fundamentals. 
 Financial economists had an approach not unlike behavioral decision research 
and therefore were not as fundamentally opposed to behavioral decision research as 
were experimental economists. But not being opposed is not the same as favoring. At 
least two further reasons explain why Kahneman and Tversky specifically were 
successful in influencing many mainstream economists. First, Heuristics and Biases 
and prospect theory explained the violations of the efficient market hypothesis as 
argued by financial economists in the 1960s and 1970s. Yet, as rational choice theory 
was a cornerstone of financial economics, abandoning it completely, as Simon for 
instance had proposed, would be too radical a step. Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect 
theory was successful because it offered rational choice theory an honorable way out. 
Kahneman and Tversky’s message to economists was that there was nothing wrong 
with their theory of rational choice, but that economists should recognize that their 
label of positive actually covered a normative and a descriptive domain. Kahneman 
and Tversky explained that economists had been using rational choice theory for both 
the normative and the descriptive domain, whereas it should only be used for the 
normative realm. Kahneman and Tversky thus offered financial economists one 
straightforward way out of their problems.  
 Second, the alternative Kahneman and Tversky offered in the form of prospect 
theory was close to rational choice theory and in fact essentially was rational choice 
theory as seen through psychophysical spectacles. Being close to the traditional 
rational choice theory had the advantage that it was the same framework for 
individual behavior that financial economists had been using and were familiar with. 
The conceptual step from traditional rational choice theory to prospect theory was a 
small one. Furthermore, prospect theory did not require serious alterations or that the 
theories and models economists used be abandoned. The introduction of a few extra 
parameters sufficed to allow financial economics proceed as before.  
 An unfortunate element that has blurred the understanding of this episode in 
the history of economics and psychology is that both the alternative proposed by 
Simon in the 1950s-1970s and the group of Kahneman and Tversky-inspired 
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economists that arose in the 1980s and 1990s have been labeled behavioral 
economics, a label first used by George Katona in 1946 [Juster (2004)]. This has led 
to the misunderstanding that the behavioral finance and behavioral economics of 
Thaler was the continuation or a reappearance of the earlier project of Simon. But this 
is not true. Simon’s behavioral economics and Thaler’s behavioral economics were 
two very different projects, and the idea that they share the same label, and thus must 
be somehow related is a red herring.39 
 The late 1970s and early 1980s constitute a transition period in the recent 
history of economics. Smith and experimental economists gained prominence and 
used their new method to critically test the experimental results of behavioral decision 
research. They found that behavioral decision researchers had been right in important 
respects and concluded that rational choice theory was not successful as a complete 
description of human behavior. Financial economist Thaler, by contrast, drew a very 
different conclusion and reconceptualised financial economics on the basis of 
Kahneman and Tversky’s behavioral decision research. This unified financial 
economics with a specific branch of psychology, since in behavioral finance, 
economics became part of behavioral decision research. We will see in Chapter six 
that, from the late 1990s onwards, behavioral economists would again distinguish 
themselves from psychology and from behavioral decision research in particular. But 
in the 1980s, Kahneman and Tversky’s claim that behavioral decision research and 
economics were essentially about the same thing had been wholly accepted and 
applied in Thaler’s behavioral finance.   
                                                
39 A classification such as ‘old’ and ‘new’ behavioral economics of Sent (2004) only provides easy 
ammunition to those eager to show that the two behavioral economics’ are related. Thus, it is common 
in contemporary behavioral economics to refer to Sent’s distinctions to quickly show that 
contemporary behavioral economics incorporates Simon’s behavioral economics [e.g. Angner and 
Loewenstein (forthcoming a,b)].   
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6. Building and defining behavioral economics 
 
1. Who are we?  
George Loewenstein, a prominent behavioral economist, recalls that  
 
 In 1994, when Thaler, Camerer, Rabin, Prelec and I spent the year at the 
 Center  for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, we had a meeting to 
 make a kind of final decision about what to call what we were doing.  
 Remarkably, at that time, the name behavioral economics was not yet well  
 established.  I actually advocated ‘psychological economics,’ and Thaler was 
 strong on behavioral economics.  I'm kind of glad that he prevailed; I think it's 
 a better, catchier, label, although it creates confusion due to association with 
 Behaviorism. [email Loewenstein to author, June 16, 2008] 
 
It was no accident that Richard Thaler gave the new field its name. Thaler’s 
behavioral finance had developed in the 1980s as a sub-field in financial economics, 
but towards the late 1980s and early 1990s Thaler realized that behavioral finance 
could be broadened to include other violations of neoclassical economics. One 
example is the anomaly paper of Thaler and Loewenstein [Loewenstein and Thaler 
(1989)] discussed in the previous chapter. It started with the violation of rational 
intertemporal choice in financial markets, but subsequently also applied the theory to 
subjects’ behavior in the dermatologist’s office. As a consequence of this broadening 
of behavioral finance, more economists and non-economists began to join Thaler’s 
research program. The central argument was that neoclassical economics was 
descriptively wrong in every domain to which it was and could be applied. This 
development culminated in the creation of the field of behavioral economics in 1994, 
as Loewenstein recalls in the above quote. 
 During the 1990s and 2000s, Thaler and other behavioral economists 
expanded behavioral economics from a small research program focused on violations 
of the neoclassical theory in financial economics to a dominant research program that 
looked for inspiration beyond behavioral decision research to a range of scientific 
disciplines and methods. To date, they have investigated violations in every aspect of 
life and from the early 2000s onwards they have developed their own stance on policy 
advice under the rubric of libertarian, light, or asymmetric paternalism. As a result of 
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this expansion, behavioral economists came to realize how behavioral economics 
relates to neighboring fields. Thus, in the late 1990s and 2000s, behavioral economics 
started to distinguish itself more explicitly from neighboring fields, such as 
experimental economics and psychology. All of these developments helped to expand 
behavioral economics into a broad and stable economic research program in which the 
influence of Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky relatively declined. The two 
psychologists remained the iconic founding fathers, but the omnipresent influence 
they had achieved in Thaler’s behavioral finance in the 1980s no longer existed. 
Kahneman and Tversky’s normative – descriptive distinction remained the 
methodological basis of behavioral economics, but the labels were changed into full 
rationality versus less-than-fully, quasi, or, eventually, bounded rationality. This 
change of terminology made behavioral economists redefine the history and subject 
matter of their field, no longer claiming that only Kahneman and Tversky were their 
founding fathers, but Herbert Simon as well. 
 This chapter presents the story of how behavioral economics was built and 
redefined in the 1990s and 2000s. Of course, the literature in behavioral economics is 
so vast that it is impossible to do justice to the wide variety of research within the 
scope of one chapter. I shall, therefore, proceed by discussing the examples which can 
serve to illustrate the move to expand and redefine the field in crucial ways. Research 
into intertemporal choice and emerging preferences challenged standard assumptions 
in neoclassical theory about the time consistency of choice, and the given character of 
preferences. Using Kahneman and Tversky’s distinction between a normative 
benchmark and descriptive deviations, this research moved in some instances even so 
far as to challenge the normative benchmark of rational choice itself.  As we shall see, 
this last move was for some behavioral economists a ‘bridge too far.’ The research 
into preference formation shows how a split emerged between those economists who 
did not accept the normative benchmark and who moved into the direction of research 
such as that of psychologist Gerd Gigerenzer (under the label of “ecological 
rationality”), and those economists who kept adhering to the normative-descriptive 
distinction, albeit in modified form. Both strands claimed, as later will be seen, Simon 
as their founding father, but for different reasons. We will see that behavioral 
economists used the terminology of bounded rationality to explore the rapidly 
growing field of neuroeconomics. Here, we see the independent influence that using 
new tools of research had on economists’ practices as well.  
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Behavioral economists gradually built their program into a stable and well-
defined mainstream economic program. In this process, the main question was how to 
construct the descriptive theory of human decision behavior. To answer that question 
behavioral economists explored a range of different scientific disciplines and 
methods. At the same time, however, they remained faithful and always came back to 
the normative – descriptive framework that had originally been introduced by 
Kahneman and Tversky. This conceptual core determined how behavioral economists 
understood the economic world, it determined the welfare implications they drew, and 
finally, it determined how they pulled back when their explorations diverged too far 
from this conceptual core. The new terminology of rationality lay the foundation for 
discussing behavioral economists’ new paternalistic stance on economic policy advice 
which developed from the early 2000s. The building of behavioral economics from 
the mid 1990s onwards led behavioral economists to distinguish themselves more 
clearly from psychology and experimental economics. Redefining their own field in 
the process, behavioral economics is now one of the most thriving and innovative 
branches of economics as a discipline. 
 
2. Building behavioral economics 
2.1 Intertemporal choice and the dual system approach  
Behavioral economic research on intertemporal choice started in the early 1990s and 
culminated in the behavioral economic research based on the two-systems approach. 
The intertemporal choice and two-systems approach literature is illustrative for a 
number of reasons. First, it was chronologically the first major theme behavioral 
economists focused on and it continues to this day to be an important topic in 
behavioral economics. Second, it illustrates how behavioral economists incorporated 
Kahneman and Tversky’s work, and in particular their normative – descriptive 
distinction into economics. During this process behavioral economists sometimes 
would venture so far as to also question the normative benchmark, but in the end they 
always pulled back to the conceptual foundation as laid out by Kahneman and 
Tversky. Finally, it illustrates how behavioral economists developed a theoretical 
framework that could be applied to any economic problem and was compatible with 
important developments in neuroscience and the cognitive sciences in general.  
 The two most prominent behavioral economists who have worked on 
intertemporal choice have been George Loewenstein and David Laibson. Loewenstein 
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finished his PhD at Yale in 1985 and published his first article in 1987. From his first 
publication onwards he has been a strong proponent of more psychology in 
economics, but initially he was hardly influenced by the work of Kahneman and 
Tversky. Instead, an important theoretical influence came from the work of Jon Elster, 
with whom he wrote several articles and edited a book for the Russell Sage 
Foundation called Choice over Time (1992).40 Loewenstein has published a number of 
articles on the history of psychological and economic explanations of intertemporal 
choice and utility, revealing an extensive knowledge of the history of economic 
thought [e.g. Loewenstein (1992), Elster and Loewenstein (1992), Frederick, 
Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue (2002), Angner and Loewenstein (forthcoming a,b)]. 
Laibson finished his PhD at MIT in 1994 and started his academic career at Harvard 
University that same year. At MIT and Harvard he has focused on violations of the 
traditional economic idea of exponential discounting. His articles are a mixture of 
experimentally corroborating this phenomenon, building mathematical economic 
models that account for the observed systematic deviations, and investigating the 
psychological and neurobiological substrates of the observed behavior. 
For Loewenstein the problem of the well-known exponential discounting 
utility (DU) model was not just that individuals discount hyperbolically, but it goes 
even further. For instance, individuals can be shown to sometimes use a negative 
discount rate [Loewenstein and Prelec (1991)]. If individuals prefer an increasing 
real-wage over a constant real-wage, even when the present value of the latter is 
higher than the former, they effectively employ a negative discount rate. Perhaps even 
more challenging for received economic theory was that individuals’ intertemporal 
choices could be shown to be fundamentally inconsistent [e.g. Prelec and Loewenstein 
(1997)].41 People who prefer A now over B now also prefer A in one month over B in 
two months. However, at the same time they also prefer B in one month and A in two 
months over A in one month and B in two months. In other words, when faced with an 
intertemporal choice individuals like to save the best for last, which is in fundamental 
disagreement with economic theory. Another, by now famous descriptive falsification 
of the DU model, is the research on New York City cab drivers who judge their 
income “one day at a time” [Camerer, Babock, Loewenstein, and Thaler (1997)].  
                                                
40 See for a discussion on Elster’s work on decision making e.g. Davis (2003). 
41 Here, Loewenstein referred to Friedman and Savage (1948, 1952) who face an analogous problem in 
explaining both gambling and insurance behavior.  
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The DU model fails not only descriptively, but also normatively, Loewenstein 
argued. For instance, there does not seem to be a good reason to suppose that 
somebody who is indifferent towards oranges and apples today should also be 
indifferent towards 1) apples today, oranges tomorrow, and apples the day after and 2) 
apples three days in a row. Loewenstein argued that there is little normative and 
descriptive reason for holding on to the DU model, despite its aesthetic merits of 
mathematical simplicity and consistency. This conclusion produced tension in 
Loewenstein’s work. On the one hand, he was an early proponent of Thaler’s 
behavioral finance, and a founding member of behavioral economics. But on the other 
hand, he concluded that economic theory might also be problematic as a normative 
benchmark.  
Not surprisingly, then, Loewenstein was ambivalent about how to proceed. A 
number of publications show fundamental problems with the DU model both 
descriptively and normatively [e.g. Loewenstein (1992, 1999), Loewenstein and 
Prelec (1991), Prelec and Loewenstein (1997)]. But on different occasions 
Loewenstein also tried to extend the DU model as a descriptive theory which could 
fulfill its role while maintaining the normative benchmark. For instance, he built a 
mathematical model that can accommodate observed behavior while maintaining the 
normative benchmark as a limiting case [see e.g. Loewenstein and Prelec (1992)]. The 
discount factor is generalized to 1/(1+at), where a can be exogenously given or 
determined by another function. Loewenstein also turned his attention to neuroscience 
as a possible means to a solution [see e.g. McClure, Laibson, Loewenstein, and  
Cohen (2004)].  
Loewenstein’s explorations led him to doubt the normative – descriptive 
distinction of behavioral economics in the 1990s, but after a while he pulled back 
from contesting the normative benchmark and made his work compatible with 
Kahneman and Tversky’s approach. In the 2000s, Loewenstein acknowledged that his 
work had been stimulated “by the existence of a strong normative benchmark, 
expected utility theory,” that behavioral theory in economics and psychology had 
advanced, and that “both psychologists and economists have made important 
theoretical and empirical contributions” [Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, and Welch 
(2001), p.367]. Moreover, he added that in this area the “convergence in the 
theoretical perspectives of psychologists and economists [..] has been greater than for  
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any other topic of mutual interest in the two disciplines [Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, 
and Welch (2001), p.367]. This use of Kahneman and Tversky’s normative and 
descriptive in behavioral economics will be discussed in more detail below in   
Section 2.3. 
A similar tension can be observed in the work of Laibson. In Laibson (1997), 
“Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting,” he built a mathematical model of agents 
with hyperbolic discount functions that could explain a myriad of dynamically 
inconsistent individual preferences observed in experiments. “Golden Eggs” referred 
to the traditional rational economic individual decision model. In Laibson’s model, 
the individual was faced with an “imperfect commitment technology,” such as a 
retirement plan, which required that it be initiated one period before it started to work. 
Together with the hyperbolic discount function this model “predicted” that 
individuals’ consumption would closely track the progress of their income, but that 
with the “imperfect commitment technology” individuals were capable of correcting 
their hyperbolic discount functions by committing themselves in advance to their 
desired savings behavior. Because the imperfect commitment technology required 
individuals to commit themselves in advance, the far-sighted, rational planner 
effectively constrained the temptation to be immediately gratified once the money 
actually arrived.  
 Ipso facto the model predicted that with “financial innovation” savings rates 
would go down because commitment technology no longer needed to be started up a 
period in advance. According to Laibson, this provided an explanation for the ongoing 
decline in U.S. saving rates. “Financial innovation” should be interpreted broadly 
here. It not only comprises new saving plans at banks, but also changes in “social 
commitment devices” such as marriage, work and friendship. The idea, which went 
back to Laibson’s dissertation, was that a decrease in the strength of the structure 
and/or duration of long-term social commitments increased the probability of acting 
according to the short term hyperbolic discount function. 
Furthermore, Laibson also showed that the dynamically inconsistent 
preferences resulting from hyperbolic discounting might lead to a welfare reduction 
following financial innovation. Financial innovations allowed individuals’ short term 
hyperbolic discount functions to override their long term rational discount functions.  
Under certain conditions, the result may, from a rational, long-term perspective, be a 
reduction in welfare. 
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Laibson’s ‘Golden Eggs’ article is a typical 1990s contribution to behavioral 
economics. It made productive use of Kahneman and Tversky’s distinction between 
the normative and the descriptive by reinterpreting this in terms of a “far-sighted” and 
a “myopic” planner. Whereas in the 1980s Thaler would have used accessible 
language and would have referred to psychology to explain and solve the problem, 
Laibson presented the problem in a formalistic economic language and did not make 
any reference to psychology. Behind this emphasis on economics, however, Laibson 
was fully committed to the normative – descriptive distinction of Kahneman and 
Tversky. Golden eggs and hyperbolic discounting are the normative and descriptive 
rephrased in economic language. However, Laibson also added something to this 
framework, namely the idea that in the economy individuals might have the 
possibility of controlling their deviating behavior by means of commitment 
technologies. This idea of commitment technologies extended the Kahneman and 
Tversky framework. It suggested that individuals might be both deviating from the 
normative benchmark, while at the same time helped to explain how they deviate 
from the norm. Further, it suggested that it is not so much the scientists that need to 
find ways to correct individuals’ deviating behavior, but the individuals themselves.  
 Harris and Laibson (2001), “Dynamic Choices of Hyperbolic Consumers,” 
elaborated further on the idea of hyperbolic discounting. It tried to link the short term 
hyperbolic discounting with the long term (rational) exponential discounting and 
showed how individuals act who try to prevent their own future overconsumption. 
The paper started with the traditional discounting function for individuals, and 
replaced the constant discount factor δ with an “effective discount factor.” This 
effective discount factor consisted of the sum of two components, the “long-run 
discount factor δ” and the “short-run discount factor βδ,” where hyperbolic 
discounting implied β < 1. The traditional discount factor was hence explicitly 
decomposed into a long-run, exponential component and a short-run, hyperbolic 
component. The assumption was that individuals, faced with “stochastic income” and 
a “borrowing constraint,” anticipate their future inclination to hyperbolically discount 
(and thus to overconsume), and that they want to act against it. Hyperbolic 
discounting was thus explained as resulting from a strategic game with future selves. 
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Since β<1, the effective discount factor is negatively related to the future 
marginal propensity to consume (MPC). To gain intuition for this effect, 
consider a consumer at time 0 who is thinking about saving a marginal dollar 
for the future. We assume that this consumer acts strategically in an 
intrapersonal game where the players are temporally situated “selves.” The 
consumer at time zero –‘self 0’- expects future selves to overconsume relative 
to the consumption rate that self 0 prefers those future selves to implement. 
Hence, on the equilibrium path, self 0 values marginal saving more than 
marginal consumption at any future time period. From self 0’s perspective 
therefore, it matters how a marginal unit of wealth at time period 1 will be 
divided between savings and consumption by self 1. Self 1’s MPC determines 
this division. Since self 0 values marginal saving more than marginal 
consumption at time period 1, self 0 values the future less the higher the 
expected MPC at time period 1. [Harris and Laibson (2001), p.936, emphasis 
in the original] 
In equilibrium, self 0 would reduce his or her savings rate (and thus his or her future 
income) to the point where his or her preference for self 1’s savings rate would be 
equal to self 1’s actual savings rate. In other words, because individuals knew they 
would discount hyperbolically in the future, they would also discount hyperbolically 
now. In equilibrium the two selves maximize the combination of their preferences. 
The effective discount rate was a function of a “time preference” (the difference 
between preferences of self 0 and self 1) and an anticipation of future MPC.  
 Harris and Laibson (2001) also demonstrates how Laibson retreated from the 
idea that individuals can influence their own behavior through commitment. Instead, 
the behavior displayed was merely the result of conflicting selves, none of whom 
could be controlled by the other. Like Loewenstein, Laibson struggled between 
exploring new directions and remaining committed to a distinction between the norm 
and its imperfect realization. 
The research on intertemporal choice illustrates how behavioral economists 
extended Thaler’s behavioral finance. First a piece of standard neoclassical economics 
was examined; in this case the assumption of exponential discounting. Subsequently, 
it was shown that this piece of the neoclassical theory failed descriptively. In the next 
step, the piece of neoclassical economics as descriptive theory was adjusted to be 
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compatible again with the empirical facts, the same approach as used in Kahneman 
and Tversky’s prospect theory.  
 The behavioral economists’ way of dealing with intertemporal choice 
described human behavior as the outcome of two systems or processes striving for 
dominance. Different labels appear in the behavioral economic literature for these two 
systems: reasoning vs. intuition [e.g. Kahneman (2003)], rationality vs. emotion [e.g. 
Shefrin and Thaler (1988), van Winden (2007), Ben-Shakar, Bornstein, Hopfensitz, 
and van Winden (2007)] and cognitive vs. affective [e.g. Camerer, Loewenstein and 
Prelec (2005)] are the most prominent. Understanding human behavior as the outcome 
of conflict between different motives has a long and rich history, going back to the 
philosophy of Plato and Aristotle and to Homer’s Ulysses tying himself to the mast so 
he could hear the Sirens sing [Davis (2003), pp.63-80]. Behavioral economists’ re-
creation of neoclassical economics’ understanding of individual behavior in terms of 
two souls inhabiting one body is therefore a recent development in a long history. 
 Some behavioral economists have linked this dual system solution to research 
in neuroscience and neurobiology, thus contributing to the creation of a new sub-field 
called neuroeconomics.42 This literature maintained the normative – descriptive 
distinction, but nevertheless slightly re-interpreted the distinction by supposing that 
the two sides of the distinction represent two sides of human behavior. In other words, 
the normative was reduced from something external to the individual to one of two 
faculties innate to human nature that strive for dominance. An illustrative example is 
McClure, Laibson, Loewenstein, and Cohen (2004), “Separate Neural Systems Value 
Immediate and Delayed Monetary Rewards.” The research described in the article 
sought and found evidence for neurobiological substrates for the two components of 
the effective discount factor as described above. When faced with delayed monetary 
rewards while lying in an MRI-scanner, subjects’ brains showed peaks of activity in 
the parts of the brain associated with rational behavior (in this case the lateral 
prefrontal cortex and the posterior parietal cortex); when faced with immediate 
rewards, the limbic system associated with the midbrain dopamine center was 
especially active.  
 
                                                
42 The label neuroeconomics is used by at least two groups of scientists [see e.g. Vromen (2007), Ross 
(2008)].  
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The authors took their findings as evidence that, when faced with the choice 
between an immediate reward and a higher future (thus ‘expected’) reward, the two 
parts of the brain strive for dominance. The limbic system was especially sensitive to 
immediate rewards and signaled choosing the immediate reward. The prefrontal 
cortex was more sensitive to the higher expected pay-off and signaled choosing the 
delayed reward. In other words, the experimental results were taken as evidence for 
the postulated difference between the short-term hyperbolic discounting, and the long-
term rational exponential discounting. The normative long run rational system strives 
for dominance with the short term affective system. When the short run system is 
affecting the outcome, the resulting behavior will be observed and classified as 
systematically deviating from the norm. As such, the neuroeconomic research 
conducted by behavioral economists at once maintained the link with the normative – 
descriptive core of Kahneman and Tversky’s work, while at the same time 
constructing a link with neuroscience.  
 Based on this and other research, in the 2000s behavioral economists have 
increasingly argued that the neuroscientific framework should be adopted as a basis 
for investigating individual (economic) behavior. The recurring argument in the 
neuroeconomic research has been that in economic decision making the individual’s 
rational system tries to make the rational decision, but, alas, is often overridden by a 
strong and dominant affective system. Intertemporal choice has provided a good 
example. When people need to plan how to divide their income between consumption 
and spending at some point in the future, their affective system is not very much 
involved and the rational system will decide on a rational division between the two. 
However, when the future becomes the present, the affective system kicks in, seeking 
immediate gratification and thereby seeking to override the rational system. In other 
words, the systematic deviations from rational decision making were understood as 
having resulted from a failed attempt by the individual’s rational system to control its 
affective system.  
 Within this general neuroeconomic approach behavioral economists have 
proposed different frameworks for the two systems. Let me give two prominent 
examples. In the paper that derived from his Nobel lecture [Kahneman (2003)], 
Kahneman argued for and employed the following framework. 
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Source: Kahneman (2003), p.1451 
 
Kahneman’s framework is an intriguing mix of psychophysics, neuroscience, and the 
desire to accommodate a distinction between two decision making processes. On the 
bottom row we see a distinction between two kinds of input for decision making: 
current external stimulation and information already present in the mind. These two 
sources of information form the input for two cognitive systems as described in the 
middle row: an intuitive system (also more neutrally labeled system 1), and a 
reasoning system (also more neutrally called system 2). The distinction between the 
two systems is mainly made in terms of the effort it costs to operate them. The 
reasoning system requires much effort and is relatively slow. The intuitive system 
operates much more quickly and is relatively effortless. Another distinction between 
the two is that between non-voluntary impressions in system 1, and voluntary 
judgments in system 2. The top row further distinguishes between perception and the 
intuitive information processing of system 1. The distinction between the two 
information processing systems and perception is made in terms of automaticity and 
accessibility. On the left we find decision making that is fully automatic and 
inaccessible. One example is the perception/decision regarding which of two rooms 
has a higher temperature, a perception/decision that is made automatically and 
without the individual having access to its process. At the other end of the spectrum, 
we find decisions that are made non-automatically and to which a large degree of 
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accessibility is possible. An example is the decision regarding which of two houses is 
preferred and hence will be bought. The intuitive system is a middle ground between 
these two and reflects decision making that often proceeds automatically, but which 
can also be accessed and altered, such as the decision between € 3,000 for certain and 
a 0.8 chance at € 4,000. Using this framework Kahneman thus brought together the 
automatic perceptual system investigated by psychophysics and behavioral 
economics’ use of neuroscience, while at the same time allowing for the possibility of 
deviations from rational economic decision making.  
 Another prominent framework, extensively discussed in what may safely be 
considered as one of the canonical articles in neuroeconomics, Camerer, Loewenstein, 
and Prelec (2005), “Neuroeconomics: How Neuroscience Can Inform Economics” is 
the following: 
 
 
Source: Camerer, Loewenstein and Prelec (2005), p.16 
 
In this representation the two systems are either controlled or automatic. Examples of 
automatic, cognitive processes, quadrant III, are judgments of relative temperature 
and shapes of objects. The automatic affective system, quadrant IV, depicts the 
pleasure and pain system that on the basis of the information provided by quadrant III 
and on the basis of information of past experiences attaches a value to the object. 
Quadrant I and II constitute the cognitive and affective part of the decision making 
process that can be controlled. A decision-maker may very much like to buy a car, but 
in quadrant I reason determines that he or she cannot afford it. And he or she may not 
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be hungry at all, while in quadrant II, not wanting to disappoint his or her friend’s 
cooking efforts, he or she takes a bite nevertheless.   
 Thus, in behavioral economics and its neuroeconomics research, descriptive 
real-world decision making should be seen as a struggle between a cognitive system 
that seeks a rational solution and an affective system that disregards the optimal 
decision in favor of immediate gratification. In that respect, the dual system approach 
of contemporary behavioral economics is different from the thinking of many other 
neuroscientists and social scientists who do not see the cognitive system as superior to 
the intuitive, emotional, or affective system. Examples of the latter include the work 
of Damasio [e.g. Damasio (2003)], research descending from Simon [e.g. Gigerenzer 
et al. (1999), Gigerenzer and Selten (2001)], and evolutionary theory inspired science 
[e.g. Barkow, Cosmides and Tooby (1992)]. 
 The intertemporal choice and dual systems approach literature illustrates that 
in building behavioral economics, behavioral economists have incorporated the 
normative-descriptive distinction in their theories of economic decision behavior. 
They have come to see the normative not as something external to the individual, but 
as a rational system side by side an affective system, with which it strives for 
dominance. As Kahneman has also contributed to this new and changed perception of 
the normative and descriptive, it should be seen as reflecting a development in the 
behavioral decision research community at large, not only a development in 
behavioral economics.  
 
2.2 Are preferences innate to human nature or do they emerge through interaction 
with the environment? 
The incorporation of the distinction made between the rational norm and its imperfect 
realization in the economic agent considerably broadened the scope of behavioral 
economics. However, there seemed to be limits to broadening the scope as well. This 
can be illustrated by behavioral economists’ cooperation with anthropologists on the 
subject of the emergence of preference. This brief collaboration shows how 
behavioral economists, after their initial enthusiasm retreated when it turned out that 
this collaboration resulted in research that was at odds with the fundamental 
behavioral economic assumption of a fixed, universal benchmark of full rationality. 
As in the case of intertemporal choice, behavioral economists were unwilling to give 
up this benchmark of full rationality. The research was a large scale interdisciplinary 
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study of the ultimatum-game in fifteen small-scale societies. It was published in a 
number of journals. The most extensive discussion can be found in the book devoted 
to it, Joseph Henrich, Robert Boyd, Samuel Bowles, Colin Camerer, Ernst Fehr and 
Herbert Gintis, Foundations of Human Sociality (2004). A reflection on the research 
summarized by Henrich can be found in Gigerenzer and Selten (2001).43 
 The motivation for this large interdisciplinary study was the following. The 
ultimatum game had been played all over the world, and has always led to the result 
that individuals do not play the rational optimum, but typically divide the money 
about half-half.44 However, the experiments had only been done with university 
students in advanced capitalist economies. The question was thus whether the results 
would hold up when tested in other environments.  
 The surprising result was not so much that the average proposed and accepted 
divisions in the small-scale societies differed from those of university students, but 
how they differed. Roughly, the average proposed and accepted divisions went from 
[80%,20%] to [40%,60%]. Individuals in different societies thus showed a remarkable 
difference in the division they proposed and accepted. Henrich and his fellow 
researchers correlated these differences with two economic characteristics of small-
scale societies. First, they documented how much a group’s (normally the family) 
economic welfare depended on co-operation with other groups within a small-scale 
society. In this respect the societies differed greatly from almost none to almost 
completely. Second, the researchers investigated how much the group’s economic 
welfare depended on market exchange. There were also differences in the level of 
market integration. The researchers concluded that differences found in the behavior 
of individuals belonging to the different societies in the game should be attributed to 
differences in the environment in which they lived. As a consequence, preferences 
were not exogenous, but determined by the environment. Henrich and his 
collaborators stated this explicitly in a brief summary of their research in the The 
American Economic Review: 
 
                                                
43 The research was funded through the MacArthur Foundation’s research network The Nature and 
Origin of Preference. The network, “headed by Robert Boyd and Herbert Gintis received two grants:  
$2.55 million in 1997 and $1.8 million in 2002” [email Richards to author, December 4, 2008].  
44 The ultimatum game is the following: Player one proposes a division of a fixed sum of money, player 
two either accepts (the money is divided according to the proposed division), or rejects (both players 
get nothing). If both players are rational player, one proposes the smallest amount possible and player 
two accepts. 
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[..] preferences over economic choices are not exogenous as the canonical 
model would have it, but rather are shaped by the economic and social 
interactions of everyday life. This result implies that judgments in welfare 
economics that assume exogenous preferences are questionable, as are 
predictions of the effects of changing economic policies and institutions that 
fail to take account of behavioral change. [Henrich et.al. (2001), p.77] 
 
 Giving up the exogeneity of preferences would have far reaching implications. 
It would mean that behavioral economists had to give up a fundamental tenet of 
economics, namely that preferences are given. That would have in turn far-reaching 
consequences for the theory of decision making itself. It would draw behavioral 
economists closer to cultural anthropologists, such as Boyd or Henrich, who conceive 
culture in evolutionary or ecological terms. Taking this approach and the results of the 
experiments seriously would imply not only that individual preferences to a large 
extent are determined by the environment and by learning, but it would also 
undermine the notion of fixed norms in behavioral decision research and well-defined 
rationality in economics. It is probably due to these extensive implications that in 
spite of plans to continue the research, follow-up studies and further elaboration of the 
implications of the experiments by this diverse group of economists and 
anthropologists to date have not been worked out.  
 
2.3 Understanding behavioral economics in terms of rationality 
When behavioral economics expanded, behavioral economists were both faithful to 
the Kahneman and Tversky legacy, while at the same time they sought to broaden its 
scope. Problematic in this regard were the labels of normative and descriptive, which 
were considered confusing in an economic context that already had created its own 
understanding of these concepts. We have seen examples of how economists changed 
this distinction by developing different models of economics decision making. As a 
consequence, behavioral economists in the 1980s-2000s have reinterpreted the 
normative-descriptive distinction in terms of rationality.  
As set out in Chapter five, Thaler was well aware of the fact that the re-
interpretation of economics in terms of normative versus descriptive raised the 
question concerning the definition of the descriptive theory when the normative 
theory is about rational behavior. And here Thaler was not very specific, or at least he 
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did not offer a conclusive answer. Thaler referred to behavior that deviates from the 
normative solution on a number of occasions as “irrational” or “non-rational.” 
Furthermore, he noted that he “would not want to call such choices rational” [Thaler 
(2000), p.138]. On other occasions Thaler referred to the normative-descriptive 
distinction as rational versus emotional [see e.g. Shefrin and Thaler (1988), p.611].  
But the main interpretation Thaler used in the 1980s and 1990s was the term 
“quasi rationality,” most prominently as the title of a collection of articles, Quasi 
Rational Economics (1991). Quasi rationality suggests a category of behavior 
somewhere between the full rationality of the normative decision and irrational 
behavior. Regularly used in the 1980s and 1990s quasi rationality is perhaps best 
understood as the failed attempt of people to be rational, which is exemplified by the 
one suggested definition of the term that Thaler has provided: “quasi rational, 
meaning trying hard but subject to systematic error” [Thaler (2000), p.136]. On 
another occasion it was characterized as “less than fully rational” [Thaler (1991), 
p.xviii].  
 From the early 2000s onwards, the term which has been increasingly favored 
by behavioral economists is “bounded rationality.” The distinction that was made is 
that between the fully rational decision and the decision actually made that has been 
deemed boundedly rational when deviating from the rational decision. Full rationality 
in behavioral economics was defined as follows:  
 
The standard approach in economics assumes “full rationality.” While 
disagreement exists as to what exactly full rationality encompasses, most 
economists would agree on the following basic components. First people have 
well-defined preferences (or goals) and make decisions to maximize those 
preferences. Second, those preferences accurately reflect (to the best of the 
person’s knowledge) the true costs and benefits of the available options. Third, 
in situations that involve uncertainty, people have well-formed beliefs about 
how uncertainty will resolve itself, and when new information becomes 
available, they update their beliefs using Bayes’s law – the presumed ability to 
update probabilistic assessments in light of new information. [Camerer et al. 
(2003), 12-14-1215)] 
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 Using the distinction between full and bounded rationality naturally entailed 
making references to the work of Herbert Simon. This can be illustrated by Gabaix 
and Laibson’s article “A Boundedly Rational Decision Algorithm” (2000). In this 
article, Gabaix and Laibson created decision algorithms for a specific decision 
problem that deviated from the “fully rational” algorithm, to which the term 
“boundedly rational” was applied. The following simulation was constructed. 
Consider a five-level decision tree where at each level, including the first, there are 
ten different pay-off boxes and between one and five connections to the next level. 
Each of the pay-off boxes’ possible connections to the next level has a certain 
probability, with the added probability of the connections of one box always 
amounting to one. An example of such a randomly generated decision tree appears as 
follows. 
 
Source: Gabaix and Laibson (2000), p.434 
 
Gabaix and Laibson argued that for a fully rational decision algorithm, the decision 
maker would be required to calculate the expected pay-off of each box and then make 
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a decision about which of the ten first level boxes to start. However, this would 
require a considerable amount of computational capacities and time. The authors 
accepted from Simon’s work that both are often unavailable. They considered three 
“boundedly rational” alternative algorithms: i) “Follow-the-leaders” (FTL), which 
ignores probability paths of less than 0.25, ii) column cut-off, which ignores one or 
more of the last columns, and iii) discounting, which discounts the values of later 
columns. Of these three alternatives, FTL came closest to the fully rational outcome. 
Furthermore, it closely matched behavior of subjects in an experiment who were faced 
with the same task. It was concluded that individuals’ behavior might be explained in 
terms of a boundedly rational algorithm. 
 In other words, the concept of bounded rationality was taken from Simon and 
together with the concept of full rationality employed to rephrase Kahneman and 
Tversky’s normative – descriptive distinction. In one clear sweep, Kahneman and 
Tversky’s distinction between the concepts of normative-descriptive were replaced by 
concepts more appropriate in an economic context, and at the same time Simon was 
appropriated as an authoritative source for the use of these concepts. Simon provided 
behavioral economics with the fitting language and offered it the necessary authority. 
This is exemplified by Kahneman in the American Economic Review article based on 
his Nobel lecture, entitled “Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral 
Economics” (2003). In the opening passage Kahneman used the term “bounded 
rationality” and referred to Simon, but at the same time subtly but clearly 
distinguished his and Tversky’s work from Simon’s.  
 
The work cited by the Nobel committee was done jointly with Amos Tversky 
(1937-1996) during a long and unusually close collaboration. Together, we 
explored the psychology of intuitive beliefs and choices and examined their 
bounded rationality. Herbert A. Simon (1955, 1979) had proposed much 
earlier that decision makers should be viewed as boundedly rational, and had 
offered a model in which utility maximization was replaced by satisficing. Our 
research [on the contrary – FH] attempted to obtain a map of bounded 
rationality, by exploring the systematic biases that separate the beliefs that 
people have and the choices they make from the optimal beliefs and choices 
assumed in rational-agent models. [Kahneman (2003), p.1449] 
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In a clever way, Kahneman invoked Simon to construct authority for the behavioral 
economic program, while at the same time interpreting the concept of bounded 
rationality in such a way that it would become fully compatible with his and 
Tversky’s approach and that of the behavioral economists. Thus, at the same time 
behavioral economists remained committed to Kahneman and Tversky’s 
methodological distinction between separate normative and descriptive domain, re-
labeling this distinction in more appropriate economics terms, and claiming Simon’s 
intellectual heritage as adding credibility to their research.  
 
2.4 Economic policy as a form of paternalism 
The re-interpretation of Kahneman and Tversky’s distinction between the normative 
and the descriptive in terms of a conflict within the economic decision maker had 
important consequences for welfare economics. Most mainstream economists in the 
1990s and 2000s associated welfare economics in one way or another with the term 
normative. That was one reason why Kahneman and Tversky’s labels of normative 
and descriptive invoked confusion when inserted into economics discourse. The 
reinterpretation of normative versus descriptive in terms of full-rationality versus 
bounded rationality solved this confusion and in turn allowed behavioral economists 
to develop their own position on welfare economics. Behavioral economists described 
their new stance on welfare issues as a form of paternalism. Behavioral economic 
paternalism, then, resulted from the solution that behavioral economists found in 
dealing with the violations of the normative or full-rationality benchmark. It illustrates 
the ultimate consequence behavioral economists have drawn from their new program.   
 The paternalism debate involves the application of behavioral economic 
insights into real-world policy questions. For instance, behavioral economics had 
discovered that people often save much less for their pensions than they should, and 
that when they do save, they do not diversify their portfolios optimally. Following on 
these results, programs have been set up to investigate how people can be induced to 
save more for retirement and better diversify their stock portfolios [e.g. Cronqvist and 
Thaler (2004), Thaler and Benartzi (2004)].  
Another example concerns the use of medication. It has often been found that 
people who need to take drugs on a regular basis are very lax at doing so. Even when 
the risks are substantial and potential costs in terms of health very great, such as in the 
case of medication that reduces the chance of having a second stroke, people are very 
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lax at taking their medication properly. To solve this problem, programs have been set 
up that investigate how insights from behavioral economics can be used to design 
incentive mechanisms that induce people to take their medication [e.g. Badger et al. 
(2007)]. Finally, behavioral economists have turned their attention to development 
economics, with the purpose of using insights from behavioral economics to improve 
the functioning of development programs [see e.g. Mullainathan (forthcoming), and 
Betrand, Mullainathan and Shafir (forthcoming)] 
 Behavioral economists have framed and defended this research in a number of 
closely related ways. Well-known is Thaler and Sunstein’s (2003) “Libertarian 
Paternalism.” Libertarian paternalism can be understood as a paternalism that does not 
restrict individual freedom of choice. Thaler and Sunstein distinguish themselves 
explicitly from the Samuelsonian stance towards welfare issues.   
  
 We clearly do not always equate revealed preference with welfare. That is, we 
 emphasize the possibility that in some cases individuals make inferior choices, 
 choices that they would change if they had complete information, unlimited 
 cognitive abilities, and no lack of willpower.  
 [Thaler and Sunstein (2003), p.175] 
 
In the behavioral economics paternalism debate, the justification for paternalistic 
policies has been the fact that decisions people actually make, their “revealed 
preferences,” do not always match with their “true” preferences. Behavioral 
economists have thus constructed a distinction between “revealed” and “true” 
preferences. This does not mean that preferences are context dependent. Rather, it 
means that it depends on the context whether the true preferences can and will be 
revealed appropriately. A source that is sometimes relied on in this regard is John C. 
Harsanyi who noted that “in deciding what is good and what is bad for an individual, 
the ultimate criterion can only be his own wants and his own preferences,” where the 
individual’s “own preferences” are his “true” preferences: “the preferences he would 
have if he had all the relevant factual information, always reasoned with the greatest 
possible care, and was in a state of mind most conductive to rational choice” [quoted 
in Angner and Loewenstein (forthcoming), pp.53-54]. 
A more detailed and elaborate explication and defense of this new branch of 
behavioral economics can be found in Camerer et al. (2003) “Regulation for 
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Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for ‘Asymmetric Paternalism’.” 
In this article, the five authors (Camerer, Issacharoff, Loewenstein, O’Donoghue and 
Rabin) make a case for what they label “asymmetric paternalism,” where “[a] 
regulation is asymmetrically paternalistic if it creates large benefits for those who 
make errors, while imposing little or no harm on those who are fully rational” 
[Camerer et al. (2003), p.1212]. Behavioral economics, then, “describes ways people 
sometimes fail to behave in their own best interests” [Camerer et al. (2003), p.1217]. 
These “apparent violations of rationality [..] can justify the need for paternalistic 
policies to help people make better decisions and come closer to behaving in their 
own best interests” [Camerer et al. (2003), p.1218]. 
 Thaler and Sunstein (2003) countered possible aversions to paternalism by 
economists and others by linking paternalism to libertarianism. Camerer et al. (2003), 
on the other hand, founded their defense of paternalistic policies on the need for 
asymmetry in paternalistic policy. The definition of asymmetric paternalism 
resembles the Paretean improvement argument: “a policy is asymmetrically 
paternalistic if it creates large benefits for those people who are boundedly rational 
[..] while imposing little or no harm on those who are fully rational [Camerer et al. 
(2003), p.1219, emphasis in the original]. Or, in other words, “asymmetric 
paternalism helps those whose rationality is bounded from making a costly mistake 
and harms more rational folks very little” [Camerer et al. (2003), p.1254]. Another 
way of putting it, Camerer et al. (2003) argued, is to see the limitedly rational 
individual as imposing negative externalities on his or her own demand curve. “When 
consumers make errors, it is as if they are imposing externalities on themselves 
because the decisions they make as reflected by their demand do not accurately reflect 
the benefits they derive” [Camerer et al. (2003), p.1221]. Hence, there is a need for a 
policy maker who can remove the externalities and redirect behavior in such a way 
that the externalities disappear. Camerer et al. (2003) furthermore noted that firms 
could either consciously or unconsciously use the irrationality of individuals to gain 
more profit.  
A detailed example has been provided by Grubb (2007), who showed that cell-
phone companies could permanently increase their profits using the phenomenon of 
overconfidence. When consumers systematically underestimate the number of 
minutes they will use their cell phones each month, it is profitable for firms to charge 
the marginal costs per minute up to the number consumers expect they will use their 
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cell-phones. After this point, they can greatly increase their rates. Consumers will not 
mind because they do not expect to be using their phones that much. But the cell-
phone company knows that the consumers are overconfident, and thus knows the 
customers will use some of these expensive minutes. Thus the cell-phone company 
increases its profit by exploiting consumers’ overconfidence. The example shows that 
firms in the market can use the limited rationality of individuals and thus not produce 
efficient outcomes. Moreover, the example shows that it might be more in the interest 
of companies to maintain or even amplify the limited rationality of individuals. It 
suggests that firms are apt to look for ways to increase the irrationality of individuals, 
and that as a result the market, instead of producing an efficient equilibrium, could 
even produce greater irrationality. Behavioral economists have shown that deviations 
from full rationality do not only persist in markets, but that markets can even increase 
this deviating behavior.  
On the basis of these results, behavioral economists have argued that 
economists are morally obliged to act against the violations of full rationality: 
 
As economists, how should we respond to the seemingly self-destructive side 
of human behavior? We can deny it, and assume as an axiom of faith that 
people can be relied upon to do what’s best for themselves. We can assume 
that families paying an average of $1,000 per year financing credit card debt 
are making a rational tradeoff of present and future utility, that liquidity 
constraints prevent investing in employer-matched 401k plans, that employees 
prefer investing in their own company’s stock instead of a diversified portfolio 
[..] that people are obese because they have calculated that the pleasures from 
the extra food, or the pain of the foregone exercise, is sufficient to compensate 
for the negative consequences of obesity. [Loewenstein and Haisley 
(forthcoming), p.4] 
 
According to behavioral economists, economics is particularly suited for solving the 
violations of full rationality because it possesses the knowledge of how to “steer 
human behavior in more beneficial directions while minimizing coercion, maximizing 
individual autonomy, and maximizing autonomy to the greatest extent possible” 
[Loewenstein and Haisley (forthcoming), p.6]. The role of the economist in this 
regard can be seen as analogous to the psychoanalytical therapist. “Just as the 
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therapist endeavors to correct for cognitive and emotional disturbances that detract 
from the well-being of the patient, such as anxiety, depression, or psychosis, the 
economist/therapist endeavors to counteract cognitive and emotional barriers to the 
pursuit of genuine self-interest” [Loewenstein and Haisley (forthcoming), pp.9-10]. 
 Behavioral economists have attempted to solve mankind’s limited rationality 
problem by using phenomena similar to those that formed the basis for behavioral 
economics to begin with. The reason that they could do so was that behavioral 
economics had remained faithful to Kahneman and Tversky’s approach. The most 
important phenomenon in this regard is what is most commonly known in behavioral 
economics as framing. One of the central findings of Kahneman and Tversky’s 
behavioral decision research and behavioral economics was that people are 
susceptible to the way in which a choice is presented to them. Depending on the 
“reference point,” in Kahneman and Tversky’s terms, or “frame,” the term Thaler 
favored for behavioral economics, people change their preferences. The example 
taken from Thaler and Sunstein (2003) is of the cafeteria manager who can either 
place the desserts before the fruits or vice versa. If he or she frames this decision as 
fruits-before-desserts, the fruit will be chosen more often. Thus, framing is used to 
influence people’s behavior without affecting their freedom to choose in any 
significant way. Changing the default option from not-participating to participating in 
pension saving schemes is another often-quoted example.  
 By exploring how policies can be designed to solve the bounded rationality of 
individuals, behavioral economists have taken the full-rationality versus bounded 
rationality framework and the experimental results of psychologists and economists to 
their ultimate consequences. Behavioral economic paternalism is very an economics 
solution to bounded rationality, emphasizing incentive mechanisms and monetary 
rewards.  
 
3. Defining behavioral economics 
The different explorations of behavioral economists in the 1990s and 2000s 
contributed to the gradual construction of a clearly defined field. Over the course of 
some twenty years, behavioral economics used the conceptual core as laid out by 
Kahneman and Tversky and explored its implications in rethinking the economic 
agent. Rather than the received rational decision maker of neoclassical theory, the 
individual became a decision maker in whom the cognitive and the affective system 
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were in competition. Despite the fact that behavioral economists questioned the 
normative benchmark at different points in time, in the end this distinction remained a 
core element of behavioral economics, though in a modified form. Over time the 
labels were re-interpreted in terms of full and bounded rationality. In turn, this 
allowed behavioral economists to claim the heritage of Simon, though they took a 
different perspective than other social scientists who claimed to work in the tradition 
of Simon, namely what could be broadly and roughly labeled the ecological approach 
to rationality. This group includes anthropologists such as Boyd and Henrich, 
psychologists such as Gigerenzer, and experimental economists such as Vernon Smith 
and Charles Plott. But behavioral economists’ use of Simon also made them more 
clearly aware of how they differed from other strands involved with decision research.  
 These theoretical and conceptual developments formed only one aspect of a 
gradual process which defined behavioral economics. In addition to this theoretical 
and conceptual definition, behavioral economists came to define themselves across 
disciplinary lines. In particular, they gradually began to distinguish behavioral 
economics from the discipline of psychology and from the sub-discipline of 
experimental economics. In the case of psychology, the reason was that behavioral 
economists wanted to be accepted by the economic mainstream. To achieve this they 
had to comply with the mainstream economic view that economics and psychology 
are separate disciplines and that economics is superior to psychology when it comes to 
rigor and formal modeling. Some aspects regarding the attempts made by behavioral 
economists to distinguish themselves from psychology have been hinted at above in 
the discussion concerning Laibson’s way of incorporating psychological insights. 
More specifically, behavioral economists have employed the following arguments to 
distinguish behavioral economics from the discipline of psychology. 
 First, behavioral economics has been defined as economics on the basis of its 
use of mathematical modeling. This argument has remained largely implicit, as in the 
case of Laibson, but it is nevertheless clear that behavioral economists consider their 
use of mathematics superior to that of the psychologists, and that they see it as a 
defining characteristic of economics. Another illustrative example in this regard is the 
work of Matthew Rabin [e.g. Rabin (1993, 1994, 1998)]. Rabin has incorporated 
experimental results from psychology into economics, but has combined this with 
advanced economic mathematical modeling. He argues that “none of the broad-stroke 
arguments for inattention to psychological research are compelling,” but at the same 
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time cautions that “not all psychological research will be [..] proven to be of great 
economic importance.” The reason is that because they come from psychology, these 
psychological results have not yet been subjected to “the same rigorous standards that 
our discipline, at its best, applies elsewhere” [Rabin (1998), p.41]. That is, ultimately 
it requires the mathematics of economics to judge how useful the insights from 
psychology are. This use of mathematics is something that defines behavioral 
economics as economics, and therefore as different from psychology.   
 Second, behavioral economists distinguished themselves from psychology on 
the basis of their use of the experimental method. For instance, in a methodological 
comment on sharing data or experiment instructions with other researchers, Camerer 
noted that “[i]f you asked a psychologist for data or instructions he or she might be 
insulted, because the convention in that field is to give the writer the benefit of the 
doubt” [Camerer (2003), pp.34-35].45 Another example concerns the use of deception. 
A common experimental procedure in psychology is to tell the experimental subjects 
the experiment is about one thing, while it is in fact about something else. Behavioral 
economists and experimental economists have resisted this method of deception ever 
since experiments have been used in economics. The reason for instance that Grether 
and Plott (1979) controlled for the fact that the experimenters had been psychologists 
was that they suspected that because the subjects knew they might be misled in a 
psychological experiment they would behave differently. In recent years the use of 
deception has produced increasing discussion in the experimental communities of 
economics and psychology [e.g. Hertwig and Ortmann (2008), Ortmann and Hertwig 
(2002), Jamisona, Karlaub, and Schechter (2008)]. 
 The motivation for explicitly drawing a border between behavioral and 
experimental economics was different. Both research programs were part of the same 
economic science, and to define behavioral economics as economics, it was not 
necessary to distinguish between behavioral and experimental economics. The reason 
that behavioral economists nevertheless wanted to distinguish their field explicitly 
was that they had come to realize that theoretically they were of a fundamentally 
different opinion than experimental economists regarding the relation of individual 
decision making to market outcomes. However, because experimental economists 
used the same experimental method as behavioral economists, outsiders could easily 
                                                
45 Interesting in this regard is that Camerer holds a PhD (defended in 1981) in behavioral decision 
research, and not in economics. His supervisor at the University of Chicago was Robyn Hogarth.  
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conclude that they must be the same. Therefore, the two needed to be clearly 
distinguished. The distinction was drawn on the basis of the experimental method. 
 The different views of experimental economics by behavioral economists have 
been grouped together in Loewenstein (1999) “Experimental Economics from the 
vantage-point of Behavioural Economics.” Loewenstein (1999) positioned behavioral 
economics explicitly in opposition to experimental economics. He formulated his 
critique in terms of the “psychological distinction” of external versus internal validity. 
Under the heading of external validity, Loewenstein saw four problems with 
experimental economics. First, experimental economics put great emphasis on the use 
of auctions in its experiments. As people in reality hardly ever find themselves in an 
auction situation, it is doubtful that these experiments can tell us very much about 
economic behavior in the real world. Second, Loewenstein disagreed with 
experimental economists’ use of repetition in what has been called the Ground Hog 
Day argument. In reality, Loewenstein argued, people never make the exact same 
decision forty times in a row. Real world behavior is much more like the first few 
rounds of an experiment than the last two or three rounds. Third, Loewenstein 
criticized experimental economists for their tendency to reduce real-world content to 
the absolute minimum possible. Apart from the fact that a context-free experiment is 
an illusion, Loewenstein argued it also greatly reduces the external validity of the 
experiments.46  Instead, economists should, just as Loewenstein himself, make the 
experimental situation as congruent with reality as possible; hence make the 
experiment “context-rich.” Fourth, according to Loewenstein experimental 
economists wrongly assumed that monetary rewards result in strict control over 
incentives. It has been shown in numerous experiments that this is not the case. With 
monetary incentives, subjects are also likely to be driven by other motives than profit 
maximization. Finally, one problem concerning internal validity that Loewenstein 
observed was that experimental economists had been far too careless in not using 
randomization and in comparing the experimental results that had been obtained under 
different circumstances. 
   
 
 
                                                
46 Loewenstein both uses ‘context’ and ‘content.’ 
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4. Behavioral economics in the 2000s: stable, defined, but slightly schizophrenic 
In the 1990s and 2000s behavioral economics was built, defined, and distinguished as 
a stable mainstream economic program. It was built on and remained true to the 
framework as laid out by Kahneman and Tversky, although it re-labeled its key 
concepts in terms of rationality. On the basis of their explorations, behavioral 
economists came to define step by step behavioral economics both theoretically and 
conceptually as an economic program that seeks to develop theories of bounded 
rationality in order to complement the normative benchmark of full rationality. In 
turn, this has laid the foundation for a new approach to welfare policy under the rubric 
of paternalism.   
 But the emerging behavioral economics has also been somewhat 
schizophrenic. Behavioral economists have defined behavioral economics as an 
important improvement on the traditional neoclassical economic paradigm by this 
incorporation of insights from psychology, but at the same time they have sought to 
define behavioral economics as being different from psychology. They have claimed 
the heritage of Simon and his bounded rationality, but at the same time they have 
explicitly distinguished behavioral economics from the work of other social scientists 
using Simon’s work. Yet, they have not done so by discussing how Simon should be 
interpreted, but instead on the basis of their view of the proper way to conduct 
experiments in economics. And finally, they have sought to define behavioral 
economics as mainstream economics, but at the same time they have gone to great 
lengths to embed behavioral economics more firmly in the cognitive and neuro 
sciences.  
 The reason for this slight schizophrenia is that the incorporation of psychology 
has not been a neutral process. In fact, behavioral economists have used psychology to 
redefine economics. The psychological theories, experimental results and 
authoritative figures have not been used for their own sake but solely because they 
could be used to steer economics in a different direction. Part of this new direction has 
been a language of “enriching” economics with psychology, but this is merely a 
rhetorical guise for convincing economists which part of psychology they should 
understand, and in which way that should alter economic reasoning. That behavioral 
economists have not been neutral receivers of psychological input, but have actively 
built, defined and distinguished behavioral economics using psychology does not  
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diminish or undermine the behavioral economic project. However, it does raise the 
question regarding how we ought to understand the flow of theories, methods and 
results that cross from one discipline to the other. 
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7. Changing meanings: disunity in economics and psychology 
 
In the first chapter, I introduced Peter Galison’s notion of disunity and applied it to 
economics and psychology. Economics and psychology in the postwar period were 
disunified cultures. The two disciplines communicated with one another, and theories, 
methods and experimental results travelled between them. But the communication and 
exchange were not understood in the same way. By and large, psychologists 
understood economics to be only interested in the normative aspects of economic 
behavior. As such it was understood to be a sub-discipline of psychology. For 
economists, on the other hand, psychology and psychological assumptions constituted 
the necessary premise upon which economic theories and models were constructed. 
Economics started where psychology left off, just as chemistry starts where physics 
ends.  
 This thesis has shown how from the late 1970s and early 1980s onwards 
economists have used psychology to redefine economics. In this period, behavioral 
decision researchers communicated with experimental economists and with financial 
economists, and as a result theories, methods, and experimental results travelled from 
psychology to economics. This was not a neutral exchange that left theories, methods 
and experimental results unaffected. Instead, the meaning of the theories, methods, 
and experimental results exchanged altered when they entered economics. They lost 
some of their psychological connotations and gained new economic connotations. For 
instance, the experimental method and experimental results lost their role of testing 
the human measurement instrument, and continued as only testing human behavior 
against the normative benchmark of rationality. Prospect theory lost its connotation of 
unifying psychology and economics in one field of behavioral science, although this 
took several years before it became clear.  
 What is particularly illustrative in this regard are the two very different ways 
in which psychological theories, methods, and experimental results were interpreted 
in experimental economics and financial economics. The theories, methods and 
experimental results that travelled from psychology to economics acquired very 
different new meanings in these two economic programs. In addition to the disunity 
between psychology and economics, a disunity appeared in the early 1980s between 
experimental and behavioral economics.  
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 In experimental economics, the corroboration of psychologists’ experimental 
results was interpreted as completely invalidating any description of individual 
behavior as rationally maximizing utility. Therefore, in experimental economics 
prospect theory was interpreted as showing how even an adjusted rational 
maximization theory was not descriptive of individual behavior. In addition, the 
experimental results were interpreted as proving the importance of the market as a 
rationalizing mechanism that over time drives the economy to equilibrium. The 
experimental results lost their relation to the traditional normative benchmark, but 
acquired a new meaning by demonstrating a phenomenon unexamined by 
psychologists: the market. In contrast, in behavioral economics the experimental 
results of the psychologists maintained their meaning in disproving the normative 
theory of rational decision making. However, this was merely the first step in 
producing new additional meanings they were to be given in behavioral economics, 
namely as invalidating the norms of rationality in markets. In behavioral economics, 
psychologists’ experimental results were interpreted as disproving the existence of 
rational equilibria in markets, and prospect theory was interpreted as a first and 
promising candidate for providing a descriptive alternative that could explain both 
deviating individual behavior and irrational markets.  
 As a consequence, these different cultures and sub-cultures also employed and 
understood the experimental method in different ways. For psychologists, the 
experimental method was a way to investigate the human being in its natural state. It 
was a method which could be used to investigate the underlying characteristics of 
human behavior that determine or affect all human behavior, irrespective of its 
particular background, knowledge, or cultural specifics. For example, in order to 
reduce the noise from particularities of the individuals in the experiments as much as 
possible deception was often considered a valuable method. It ensured that 
experimental subjects would not respond on the basis of prior knowledge of the theory 
behind an experiment, specific cultural beliefs of proper behavior and so forth; a 
methodological problem in psychology generally known as the Hawthorne effect [e.g. 
Adair (1984)]. In contrast, both experimental economists and behavioral economists 
ruled out deception because they used the experimental method to investigate how the 
individual behaved in different economic situations. It was not the individual’s 
underlying nature, but his or her economic behavior that was the subject of 
investigation. Therefore, it was vital that the subjects in the experiments completely 
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understood what situation they were in, and that they never felt as if they were being 
fooled by the experimenter. The individual should behave as if he or she was in the 
economic environment simulated by the experimental set up, and should not behave 
as an individual who does not completely understand what is going on and/or suspects 
he or she is being fooled in some way or another. Thus, the experimental method had 
a different meaning in psychology and economics. 
 One difference between the use of experiments in experimental and behavioral 
economics was that for experimental economists experiments were a method of 
testing the functioning of the market that operates over and above individuals, 
whereas for the behavioral economists experiments tested market behavior as a 
characteristic of individual behavior in a market environment. For behavioral 
economists, market or economic behavior was about the individual, and the testing of 
this behavior only required that individuals be given an economic choice. For 
experimental economists, on the other hand, the market was a mechanism, an invisible 
hand, that over and above individual behavior directed the behavior of each economic 
agent towards achieving more rationality. This market could only be tested through 
individuals, who in the controlled setting of an experiment behaved as if they were in 
a real economic market. Because of this different understanding of the market, 
experimental and behavioral economists also employed experiments differently. 
Behavioral economists employed experiments to carefully observe how individuals 
respond to specific economic choices. Experimental economists, on the other hand, 
employed experiments to investigate how individual economic behavior adapts over 
time when individuals face the same situation a large number of times, but in each 
round acquire more information about the behavior of the other participants and more 
information about the functioning of the market. Thus, in addition to the different 
meanings of the experimental method in psychology and economics, the experimental 
method acquired a different meaning in the two subcultures of experimental and 
behavioral economics.  
 The disunity of psychology and economics is further illustrated by their 
different understanding and use of measurement. To behavioral decision researchers, 
measurement and individual behavior were two sides of the same coin. Coming from 
the German psychophysical tradition, the theory of human decision making was at 
once understood as a theory of human perception and rational inference, and as a 
theory of the human being as a measurement instrument. In psychological 
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experiments, the underlying nature of human decision behavior as well as the human 
measurement instrument was investigated. But when psychological theories, 
experimental methods and experimental results travelled to economics, this double 
meaning was lost. In both behavioral and experimental economics discussions of 
measurement were simply absent.  
 All these different elements of the disunity of economics and psychology and 
the disunity of experimental and behavioral economics explain the different ways 
economists and psychologists have understood the relationship between their 
disciplines. The psychologists saw the economists using the same method and same 
theory as used in psychology and thus considered economists to be engaged in the 
same project as psychology. Because of this understanding of economics, Kahneman 
and Tversky advanced prospect theory as a theory meant to unify the two disciplines 
that for some unknown reason had been developing separately alongside each other. 
Economists on the other hand saw psychology as investigating human behavior, and 
therefore as a possible source of information for economics’ starting point. The 
difference between experimental and behavioral economics was that for behavioral 
economists changing the behavioral assumptions had direct consequences for the 
economic models and theories, whereas for experimental economists it did not. 
Economics and psychology were disunified in their understanding of the relationship 
between economics and psychology, but experimental and behavioral economists also 
had different understandings of the relationship between the two. The difficulty in 
understanding the history of the mutual influence of economics and psychology is not 
only that influencing factors meant different things in the different disciplines, but that 
as a consequence also what the different disciplines were about and how they were 
related were understood differently. Across the different (sub-)disciplines and across 
time, the definitions of economics and psychology have not been stable entities.    
 Finally, the disunity between experimental and behavioral economics in the 
United States has been amplified by opposing political ideologies. This is the reason 
why the distinction between experimental and behavioral economics is much more 
pronounced in the United States than it is in Europe. With their emphasis on the 
market as the only source of efficient allocations of resources and efficient production 
of goods, experimental economists such as Vernon Smith and Charles Plott are to be 
situated on the free-market end of the political spectrum, where the role of the 
government should be kept to an absolute minimum and where each individual has the 
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right and ability to take care of him- or herself. The repeated claim of Friedrich 
Hayek’s intellectual heritage is another indication of how the experimental 
economists are politically positioned. Behavioral economists, on the other hand, favor 
a government that actively stimulates individuals to overcome their cognitive 
limitations, follow their own true preferences and thus advance their well-being. 
Behavioral economists favor a much more interventionist government, and implicitly 
a government that reduces the social inequality that results from economic and other 
structures that put some people at a disadvantage. Behavioral economists feel morally 
obliged to help individuals who, for example, are trapped by credit card companies 
into paying high interest rates on their loans, and to help individuals without 
considerable wealth to save for retirement. 
 Since the late 1970s experimental and behavioral economists have both relied 
on a branch of psychology called behavioral decision research to redefine economics 
in their own specific ways. The flow of theories, methods and experimental results 
from psychology to economics and their loss of psychological connotations illustrate 
the disunity of economics and psychology. So do the two very different ways in which 
these theories, methods and experimental results were picked up and used by 
experimental and behavioral economists to redefine economics. Economics and 
psychology are disunified cultures and behavioral economics and experimental 
economics are disunified sub-cultures. Their history can only be understood by 
recognizing them as such. 
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Samenvatting in het Nederlands 
 
Dit proefschrift handelt over de invloed van twee psychologen, Daniel Kahneman en 
Amos Tversky, op de economische wetenschap in de afgelopen dertig jaar. Het is 
daarmee een historisch onderzoek naar de interactie tussen twee 
wetenschapsgebieden, de economie en de psychologie. Dat leidt meteen tot een eerste 
probleem, want hoe beschrijft men de interactie van twee culturen die verschillend 
naar de wereld, elkaar en de mens kijken? Om hier grip op te krijgen introduceer ik in 
het eerste, inleidende hoofdstuk Peter Galison’s gebruik van het begrip ‘disunity.’ 
Disunity laat zich hier het beste vertalen als disharmonie. Economie en psychologie 
hebben veel met elkaar te maken en theorieën, instrumenten en experimentele 
resultaten reizen soms van de één naar de ander. Maar dat wil niet zeggen dat de twee 
één harmonieus geheel vormen. Het gebruik van de andere wetenschap dient altijd een 
specifiek doel binnen de eigen wetenschap en theorieën, instrumenten en 
experimentele resultaten die van de één naar de ander reizen verliezen in dit proces 
een gedeelte van de betekenis die ze in de wetenschap hadden waar ze vandaan 
komen, en krijgen nieuwe betekenis in de wetenschap van bestemming.  
 Met dit algemene raamwerk begint het tweede hoofdstuk met de mathematisch 
psychologen en keuzegedrag onderzoekers (behavioral decision researchers) aan de 
Universiteit van Michigan in de jaren 1950 en 1960. In deze periode was de 
Universiteit van Michigan het centrum van de Amerikaans psychologie. Het huisde 
onder andere het Institute for Social Research (ISR), Clyde Coombs’ Michigan 
Mathematical Program, en Ward Edwards’ Engineering Psychology Laboratory en het 
daaraan gekoppelde keuzegedrag onderzoek (behavioral decision research). Ik laat 
zien dat cruciaal voor de mathematische psychologie en keuzegedrag onderzoekers 
een tweezijdige interpretatie van psychologie was. Omdat de menselijke perceptie van 
de wereld afwijkt van de objectieve werkelijkheid is het noodzakelijk een theorie te 
ontwikkelen over hoe de mens die objectieve werkelijkheid waarneemt. Dit was de 
ene kant van psychologie. Maar aangezien meten uiteindelijk de keuze van het subject 
is tussen twee stimuli, was psychologie tegelijkertijd een onderzoek naar menselijk 
keuzegedrag. Met andere woorden, in de psychologie van Coombs’ mathematische 
psychologie en Edwards’ keuzegedrag onderzoek gebruikte men de mens als 
meetinstrument om menselijke keuzegedrag te meten.  
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 Deze tweezijdige interpretatie van psychologie als het gebruik van een 
meetinstrument om datzelfde meetinstrument te onderzoeken werd problematisch toen 
duidelijk werd dat het meetinstrument zich niet gedroeg zoals het zich zou moeten 
gedragen. Dit was het probleem waar Tversky mee worstelde. Tversky moest kiezen 
tussen twee kwaden: Of zijn experimentele resultaten die lieten zien dat menselijk 
keuzegedrag vaak irrationeel is waren ongeldig, en de theorie van menselijk 
keuzegedrag toch in orde; of de experimentele resultaten waren geldig en de theorie 
fundamenteel onjuist. De laatste conclusie echter, zou eveneens meettheorie als basis 
voor de hele wetenschap ongeldig verklaren, een conclusie die Tversky niet zomaar 
bereid was te trekken. Kahneman bood een uitweg met de interpretatie dat er met de 
meettheorie en dus met de theorie van menselijk keuzegedrag niets mis was, maar dat 
dit een theorie was voor optimaal keuzegedrag waar daadwerkelijk, alledaags 
keuzegedrag op een voorspelbare manier van afweek. Aldus waren de experimentele 
resultaten geldig, terwijl tegelijkertijd de theorie voor meten en keuzegedrag 
behouden kon worden.  
 In het derde hoofdstuk behandel ik het werk van Kahneman en Tversky in de 
periode voor hun gezamenlijke onderzoek. Tversky deed onderzoek voor zijn PhD in 
de vroege jaren 1960 aan de Universiteit van Michigan. Zijn twee begeleiders waren 
Coombs en Edwards, en Tversky’s onderzoek is een synthese van Coombs’ 
mathematische psychologie en Edwards’ keuzegedrag onderzoek. Tegen het einde 
van de jaren 1960 echter, worstelde Tversky steeds meer met de spanning tussen 
Leonard Savage’s a priori keuzeaxioma’s en het keuzegedrag van subjecten dat hij 
waarnam in zijn experimenten. Kahneman had een andere achtergrond. Sterk 
beïnvloed door zijn werk voor het Israëlische leger dat hij als student psychologie 
uitvoerde, concentreerde hij zich op de psychologie van cognitieve vergissingen. 
Kahneman liet zien dat alhoewel wij mensen denken dat we onze cognitie, onze 
hersenen, in het dagelijks leven goed gebruiken, dit allesbehalve het geval is en we 
systematisch cognitieve vergissingen maken. 
 De lange en succesvolle samenwerking tussen Kahneman en Tversky begon in 
1969. De meest productieve periode waren de jaren 1970, die de basis legden voor 
hun roem in de psychologie, economie, en daarbuiten. In het vierde hoofdstuk zet ik 
Kahneman en Tversky’s onderzoek uit de jaren 1970 uiteen, waarin ik laat zien hoe 
Kahneman’s psychologie van cognitieve vergissingen een oplossing bood voor 
Tversky’s worsteling met Savage’s a priori axioma’s en de experimentele 
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afwijkingen daarvan. Kahneman’s oplossing was om de normatieve en descriptieve 
toepassing van de theorie rigoureus te scheiden. Daardoor konden Savage’s a priori 
axioma’s als normatieve regels voor keuzegedrag behouden blijven, terwijl 
tegelijkertijd de experimentele resultaten als descriptief bewijs konden dienen voor 
het feit dat menselijk keuzegedrag systematisch afwijkt van de norm. In 1979 
culmineerde Kahneman en Tversky’s onderzoek in “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of 
Decision under Risk,” een artikel dat beschrijft hoe en waarom menselijk gedrag 
afwijkt van de norm. Prospect theory werd gepubliceerd in Econometrica en was 
expliciet bedoeld om ook de economen te overtuigen van de nieuwe psychologische 
benadering. In het artikel stelden Kahneman en Tversky dat economen en 
psychologen de verwachte nutstheorie (expected utility theory) op dezelfde manier 
gebruikten en betoogden daarmee impliciet dat economie en psychologie verbonden 
waren in één grote gedragswetenschap. 
 In hoofdstuk vijf laat ik zien hoe economen reageerden op prospect theory. Er 
vallen twee belangrijke reacties te onderscheiden, elk met hun eigen geschiedenis. 
Experimenteel economen zoals Vernon Smith bevestigden en accepteerden de 
experimentele resultaten, maar verwierpen elke oplossing, inclusief prospect theory, 
die de verwachte nutstheorie slechts aanpaste aan de nieuwe resultaten. Daarnaast 
concludeerden de experimenteel economen dat de resultaten van de psychologen het 
belang van de markt als een instituut dat over de tijd menselijk keuzegedrag naar een 
rationeel evenwicht stuurt alleen maar benadrukte. Financieel economen zoals 
Richard Thaler aan de ander kant accepteerden de experimentele resultaten van de 
psychologen eveneens, maar zagen ze als bewijs voor de waargenomen 
irrationaliteiten van financiële markten. Daarnaast haalden deze financieel economen 
Kahneman en Tversky en hun propsect theory binnen als de belangrijkste, zo niet de 
enige oplossing voor het theoretische gat dat was gevallen. Dit leidde tot de creatie 
van een nieuw gebied in de financiële economie, genaamd ‘behavioral finance.’ De 
reden voor het snelle succes van prospect theory was dat het de financieel economen 
een elegante weg uit de problemen bood. Het normatief-descriptief onderscheid 
zorgde ervoor dat de traditionele, neoklassieke modellen uit de economie gehandhaafd 
konden blijven als de normatieve theorie, terwijl tegelijkertijd een descriptief 
alternatief werd geboden dat maar weinig verschilde van de eerdere theorieën en dus 
makkelijk in de economie kon worden opgenomen. 
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 In de late jaren 1980 en vroege jaren 1990 begonnen Thaler en zijn 
volgelingen hun benadering ook toe te passen op vraagstukken buiten de financiële 
economie. Het nieuwe, verbrede onderzoeksgebied groeide snel en werd in 1994 
officieel gedragseconomie (behavioral economics) gedoopt. In het zesde hoofdstuk 
beschrijf ik de geschiedenis van de gedragseconomie in de jaren 1990 en 2000. Met 
behulp van de voorbeelden van onderzoek naar intertemporele keuze (intertemporal 
choice) en ontstane voorkeuren (emerging preferences) laat ik zien dat de 
gedragseconomen vele manieren onderzochten om nieuwe descriptieve theorieën te 
bouwen, maar uiteindelijk altijd trouw bleven aan het oorspronkelijk raamwerk van 
Kahneman en Tversky. Geleidelijk werden de predicaten normatief en descriptief 
vervangen door volledige rationaliteit (full rationality) en beperkte rationaliteit 
(bounded rationality). Dit stelde gedragseconomen onder ander in staat om hun eigen 
visie op economisch beleidsadvies te ontwikkelen onder de kop van ‘paternalisme.’ 
 Al deze verschillende ontwikkelingen droegen bij aan de gestage groei van de 
gedragseconomie tot een stabiel, helder omschreven en dominant economisch 
onderzoeksprogramma. Maar het maakte ook duidelijk hoe gedragseconomen hun 
programma onderscheidden van andere economische onderzoeksprogramma’s en 
andere wetenschappelijk disciplines. Gedragseconomen begonnen met name hun 
programma te onderscheiden van de experimentele economie en van de psychologie. 
Dit lijkt enigszins schizofreen. Gedragseconomen definieerden hun programma als 
een verrijking van de economie met behulp van de psychologie, maar definieerden het 
tegelijkertijd nadrukkelijk als iets anders dan psychologie. En gedragseconomen 
maakten veelvuldig gebruik van experimenten en claimden het werk van Herbert 
Simon als belangrijke voorganger, maar onderscheiden gedragseconomie 
tegelijkertijd nadrukkelijk van experimentele economie, dat andere economische 
programma dat experimenten gebruikt en zichzelf als werkend in de Simon-traditie 
beschouwde. 
 Hoe moeten we deze schijnbare schizofrene in de gedragseconomie begrijpen? 
In het zevende en laatste hoofdstuk toon ik aan dat de geschiedenis beschreven in dit 
proefschrift laat zien hoe economen delen van de psychologie hebben gebruikt om de 
economische wetenschap te herdefiniëren. De reis van theorieën, methodes en 
experimentele resultaten van psychologie naar economie was nooit een neutraal 
proces dat theorieën, methodes en resultaten ongemoeid liet. In tegendeel, ze verloren 
een deel van hun psychologische connotatie en kregen er nieuwe economische 
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connotatie voor terug. Illustratief in dit verband is de geschiedenis van experimentele 
economie en gedragseconomie, die beiden zeer verschillende nieuwe connotaties 
gaven aan de psychologische theorieën, methoden, en resultaten. Experimentele 
economie en gedragseconomie gebruikten de psychologie om naar eigen inzicht, en 
op geheel eigen wijze de economische wetenschap te herdefiniëren. Daarmee laat dit 
proefschrift niet alleen zien dat theorieën, methoden, en experimentele resultaten die 
van de psychologie naar de economie reisden geen stabiele entiteiten waren, het 
benadrukt eveneens dat de definitie van wat de economische wetenschap is verre van 
constant is. Om die reden kan de geschiedenis van de interactie tussen economie en 
psychologie alleen begrepen worden door ze te zien als disharmonische culturen.    
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